Is Civil Society Self-Regulation Effective? The case of Roman Third-Sector and the “Mafia Capitale” Scandal

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to measure the effectiveness of an exemplary civil society self-regulation against its own objectives, and to map out reasons behind non-compliance. It focuses on a checklist of indicators (CDV) developed by Italian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the aftermath of the “Mafia Capitale” scandal when threatened by strict government regulation and by critical public opinion. Methodologically, this test of effectiveness is performed employing the blueprint designed by the One World Trust. To preview the outcome of this test of effectiveness, it will be concluded that self-regulation has been effective primarily in protecting the sector’s autonomy against hypothetical legislative interferences. Even if quantitative findings indicate a medium compliance rate, qualitative findings suggest that there can be many reasons behind non-compliance which sometimes do not depend entirely on CSO’s commitment to comply with voluntary standards. In this context, a distinction between objective and subjective reasons of non-compliance is drawn.