Diagrams of Sensation: Deleuze and Aesthetics

The Surface, the Fold and the Subversion of Form: Towards a Deleuzian Aesthetic of Sobriety
Michael Goddard

From Geophilosophy to Geoaesthetics: The Virtual and the Plane of Immanence vs Mirror Travel and The Spiral Jetty
Simon O'Sullivan

'The Face is a Horror Story': The Affective Face of Horror
Anna Powell

Cinema Three? Re-Animating Deleuze
Bill Schaffer

Deleuze's Kiss: The Sensory Pause of Screen Affect
Felicity J. Coleman

Ten Propositions on the Brain
Gregg Lambert & Gregory Flaxman

Deleuze and Essence
Keith W. Faulkner

Varia

How Radical is the New? Deleuze and Bachelard on the Problems of Completeness and Continuity in Dialectics
James Williams

Bachelard and the History of the Mind
Cristina Chimisso

On Contingency of Datum: Carnap, Husserl, Bachelard
Bernard Barsotti

Reviews

Affect as the Space of the Political
Kostas **Koukouzelis**

pli

The Warwick Journal of Philosophy / Volume 16 (2005)
www.warwick.ac.uk/philosophy/pli_journal/
pli_journal@hotmail.com
ISBN 1 897646 12 7

pli The Warwick Journal of Philosophy Volume 16 (2005)

pli

The Warwick Journal of Philosophy
Volume 16 (2005)

Diagrams of Sensation:
Deleuze and Aesthetics



Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy

Pli is edited and produced by members of the Graduate School of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Warwick.

Volume 16. Diagrams of Sensation: Deleuze and Aesthetics

ISBN 1 897646 12 7
ISSN 1367-3769
© 2005 *Pli*, individual contributions © their authors, unless otherwise stated.

Editorial board 2004/5:

Darren Ambrose
Wahida Khandker
Scott Revers
Henry Somers-Hall
Michael Vaughan

This issue edited by Darren Ambrose and Wahida Khandker.

Contributions, Orders, Subscriptions, Enquiries:

Pli, The Warwick Journal of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL UK

Email: pli_journal@hotmail.com
Website: www.warwick.ac.uk/philosophy/pli_journal/

Cover design by zago design inc: www.zagodesign.com

Contents

Diagrams of Sensation: Deleuze and Aesthetics

The Surface, the Fold, and the Subversion of Form: Towards a Deleuzian Aesthetic of Sobriety
MICHAEL GODDARD 1

From Geophilosophy to Geoaesthetics: The Virtual and the Plane of Immanence vs. Mirror Travel and The Spiral Jetty
SIMON O'SULLIVAN 27

'The Face is a Horror Story': The Affective Face of Horror
ANNA POWELL 56

Cinema Three? Re-animating Deleuze
BILL SCHAFFER 79

Deleuze's Kiss: The Sensory Pause of Screen Affect
FELICITY J. COLEMAN 101

Ten Propositions on the Brain
GREGG LAMBERT & GREGORY FLAXMAN 114

Deleuze and Essence
KEITH FAULKNER 129

Varia

How Radical is the New? Deleuze and Bachelard on the Problems of Completeness and Continuity in Dialectics
JAMES WILLIAMS 149

Bachelard and the History of the Mind
CRISTINA CHIMISSO 171

On Contingency of Datum: Carnap, Husserl, Bachelard
BERNARD BARSOTTI 186

Reviews

Affect as the Space of the Political
KOSTAS KOUKOUZELIS 209

Acknowledgements

The papers by James Williams, Cristina Chimisso, and Bernard Barsotti derive from a one-day conference held at the Goldsmith's College, The University of London, on 27th November 2003, entitled 'Bachelard and the History of Science'.

Pli 16 (2005), 1-26

The Surface, the Fold, and the Subversion of Form: Towards a Deleuzian Aesthetic of Sobriety

MICHAEL GODDARD

Introduction: Is There a Deleuzian Aesthetic?

The modern understanding of aesthetics as being split between analyses of experience on the one hand and an engagement with works of art on the other derives from the Eighteenth Century and especially from the work of Immanuel Kant. Whereas the Greek term *Aesthisis* originally referred solely to that which is related to perception, in Kant's formulation, aesthetics designates both sensibility as the form of possible experience and the theory of art as a representation of real experience.[1] As Daniel Smith has indicated, this division corresponds to a dualism between the subjective and the objective elements of sensation so that the conditions of experience in general, such as the forms of space and time, constitute the objective element, while the real experiences of pleasure and pain on which aesthetic judgements are based would constitute the subjective element both in the creation and reception of works of art.[2] Given this

1 See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, (New York: Willey Books, 1943), pp. 21-43 and *Critique of Judgement*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), pp. 43-95. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), 46-58.

2 Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 29.

predominant account of aesthetics, several critics such as Jacques Rancière have questioned whether Deleuze's engagement both with works of art and with sensation constitutes an aesthetic at all.[3] This is not merely a terminological question, but one of how to read both Deleuze's engagement with art and sensation and his philosophical work more generally. However, there is no necessity to limit aesthetics to its representational, Kantian paradigm; the emphasis on aesthetic practices in Deleuze's work, not to mention the explicit invocation of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm in Guattari's later work, indicate a more productive, constructivist reading of the role of aesthetics in Deleuze's philosophy, which clearly will not be limited to reflections on works of art. This is precisely the approach to be found in Mireille Buyden's exemplary work *Sahara,* for example, which constructs an account of Deleuzian aesthetics around the problematics of the concept of form, rather than abandoning the terrain of aesthetics altogether to its dominant model: "aesthetics will be our [conducting thread], on account of the leading role Deleuze gives to art, right up to and including philosophical reflection."[4]

Returning to the Kantian model, the duality between the two dimensions of Kantian aesthetics is a hierarchy of orders of representation; for Kant both experience and works of art are representations, but whereas experience is a first order representation of an ungraspable noumenon, which only appears as represented by the senses as a phenomenon according to the a priori forms of space and time, works of art are second order representations of phenomena, or representations of representations, in that they reproduce perceptions that are already in themselves representations. Therefore the objective and subjective elements of aesthetics deal with entirely distinct levels of representation, which cannot and should not be confused. According to Daniel Smith, Deleuze's engagement with aesthetics is precisely in order to unite these two poles and therefore entails a radical critique of Kant's critical philosophy:

> Deleuze argues that these two aspects of the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can only be re-united at the price of a radical recasting of the transcendental project as formulated by Kant, pushing it in the direction of [...] a 'superior empiricism': it is only when the conditions of experience in general become the genetic conditions of real experience that they can be reunited with the structures of works of art.[5]

3 Jacques Rancière, "Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?" *Gilles Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique,* ed. Eric Alliez, (Paris: Institut Synthélabo, 1998), pp. 525-536.

4 "L'esthétique nous sera [...] nôtre [fils conducteur], en raison de la rôle pilote que Deleuze accorde à l'art, jusque et y compris dans la réflexion philosophique." Mireille Buydens, *Sahara: L'Esthétique de Gilles Deleuze,* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990), p. 8.

The full resonance of this conception of aesthetics will require considerable elaboration but the key point is that it is a monistic or unitary aesthetics that rejects both the opposition between the subjective and the objective as well as that between the possible and the real. In other words, instead of a division between objective laws of possible experience and the subjective, second order representation of real experience in works of art, there is only the actualisation of virtual sensation, whether in works of art or "real" experience. This has several consequences, the first of which is that there is no longer any hierarchy between real and aesthetic experience so that works of art are no longer understood as representations of a prior reality. Instead, both experience and works of art are understood as differing yet parallel expressions of virtual sensation, of percepts and affects, so that a painting or a novel, as much as an organism can be considered as a form of life.[6] This implies an abandonment of the concept of representation not only as a way of understanding artworks, but also as an explanatory framework for experience itself. Instead of a subject representing an external, objective world to itself through a harmonious use of its faculties, there is only a world or chaosmos, in a process of continual individuation and inter-relation; a world in which there are no fixed subjects or objects but only an expressive flux out of which individuations emerge or are actualised as temporary zones of relative order in a sea of indeterminacy.

Obviously this concept of aesthetics owes a lot to both contemporary developments in science and to modernist aesthetic practices themselves, which also problematise the role of representation in both aesthetic experience and experience in general. For example, multi-perspectival works of art as developed in Cubism, not only question the mimetic nature of the work of art, but question the nature of experience itself: does experience take place according to stable laws of three dimensional space

5 Smith, p. 29.

6 On percepts and affects see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy,* trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, (London; New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 163-170.

and time, or is it at first an enormous multiplicity of potential points of view, only secondarily reduced to stable subject-object relations? This does not mean that aesthetics dispenses with questions of form, whether in relation to either experience or works of art, although clearly it no longer produces a hierarchical opposition between objective and subjective form. Instead, in line with contemporary developments in the philosophy of science, form is considered as a relatively stable moment in a continuous process of morphogenesis, individuation or simply formation whether it is of an organism, a work of art or a pre-individual singularity such as a feeling, a perception or a thought.[7] In this conception, form is not an abstract principle that structures a totality, but a process that has a life of its own, a becoming or a haeccity.[8] This does not exclude a critical engagement with form, since as Buydens points out a good deal of Deleuze's work alone and with Guattari concerns a critique of form as representation or rather stratification.[9] Nevertheless, even the most stratified formation is still a process, however blocked, so form can be rethought processually as a time-space of consistency in the midst of perpetual metamorphosis or becoming.

This critical subversion of form in Deleuze's work entails not only a dynamic conception of form but also a rethinking of subversion as something other than a momentary instance of transgression. As theorists such as Brian Massumi have pointed out, subversion as it is conventionally conceived belongs to a paradigm of cultural theory from which Deleuze's thought of becomings and relations clearly departs.[10] François Zourabichvili has also claimed that distinguishing feature of Deleuze's thought is precisely that it forgoes a logic of subversion in favour of one of perversion, thereby leading to a distinct aesthetics and politics: "[Deleuze constructs] a *perversive* rather than a subversive model. [...] Deleuze never believed in the promises of subversion; instead,

7 See especially, Gilbert Simondon, "The Genesis of the Individual," trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter, *Incorporations,* ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, pp. 297-319. See also Raymond Ruyer, *La Genèse des Formes Vivantes,* (Paris: Flammarion, 1956).

8 One of the few works of art history to conceptualise form in this way is Henri Focillon, *The Life of Forms in Art,* trans. Charles B. Hogan and George Kubler, (New York: Zone Books, 1989).

9 Buydens, p. 28.

10 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual,* (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 69-70.

he was attentive to the way that every order, every institution is constantly being perverted by 'lines-of-flight.' "[11]

However, what this essay will show is that in the work of Deleuze, perversion is only a starting point for the destabilisation of form, which crucially attains a virtual, molecular level, where it is no longer a question of perversion but of impersonal becomings. This strategy is subversive, neither in the sense of a "momentary parodic rupture,"[12] nor as a mythology of global insurrection,[13] but precisely through putting form in relation to the subterranean metamorphic forces and becomings that constantly compose and decompose it. This entails an understanding of aesthetic practices and philosophy as two distinct yet related methods for the subversion of form, understood in this way, on a plane of virtual indiscernibility between the two practices.

If form is conceived of in this dynamic way, it is no longer necessary to judge aesthetic experience according to good or bad form, or even the presence or absence of form, but rather to discern processes of formation and deformation, taking place not only in the work of art or its observer but crucially between them as an event or encounter. This conception of form is crucial to the concept of an aesthetic of sobriety, which is how Deleuzian aesthetics will be characterised in this essay. This clearly will entail an understanding of sobriety, not in opposition to intoxication or delirium but as the rigor necessary to engage with these chaotic and vital forces and give them a consistency rather than a stable form; in other words, as so many methods for an immanent, non-exclusionary engagement with delirium. Before developing this concept more fully, however, it is worth paying more attention to the way this conception of aesthetics as an aesthetic of sobriety departs from modern aesthetics conceived of as the judgements of works of art.

The crucial division that operates in Deleuze's aesthetics is not between real experience and works of art but between aesthetics in this expanded and monistic sense and the régime of judgement or representation. Whereas works of art have often been understood in

11 "Un modèle *perversif* plutôt que subversif, contrairement à Negri [...] Deleuze n'a jamais cru aux promesses de subversion; en revanche, il était attentif à la manière dont tout ordre, toute institution ne cessent d'être pervertis par des «lignes de fuite». François Zourabichvili, "Les deux pensées de Deleuze et Negri: une richesse et une chance," *Multitudes* 9, (Paris, May-June 2002) p. 140.

12 Massumi, p. 69.

13 Zourabichvili, p. 140.

representational terms as the transformation of experience or reality into a static form, this, for Deleuze, is the effect of régimes of judgement and has nothing to do with artistic creation. Instead, artistic creativity involves a productive opening to processes of formation and deformation of which it is a provisional and open composition, or a relative individuation of the flux of sensations. Even in an apparently static form of artwork such as a painting, the work of art is a temporal phenomenon, an individuation, a form of life and it is only the effect of judgement to turn this individuation into a representation by comparing it to a prior reality in relation to which it would be an inferior copy. For Deleuze, it is crucial that aesthetics breaks free of this régime of judgement since "to create is to bring into existence and not to judge".[14] If a creative act is always new, there are no pre-existent categories according to which it can be judged and so aesthetics must engage with it affirmatively outside the régimes of judgement and interpretation. This argument is clearly a critical engagement with Kant's third critique in which aesthetics is presented precisely in terms of judgement. It calls for a new type of aesthetic criticism entailing a rigorous engagement with the complex processes involved both in experience and aesthetic creation. This critical rigor is precisely what an aesthetic of sobriety, as an immanent critique developed within the fields of philosophy, aesthetic practices and empirical experience, would attempt to provide.

The Aesthetics of Sobriety and the Concept of the Surface

What is at stake in Deleuze's reworking of aesthetic theory is a shift away from both modern and postmodern conceptions of aesthetics in terms of excess, transgression and marginality, without however merely occupying the inverse pole of the centre, the law and containment. If the aesthetics of sobriety is not a question of what happens at the border or periphery, it is certainly not a return to the traditional safety of being middle of the road. What is necessary is an abandonment of this centre-periphery system, even as the object of a deconstructive critique, since to affirm the margin

14 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical,* trans. Daniel Smith and Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 135.

only reinforces the power of the centre and to transgress only increases the power of the law.[15]

Deleuze developed a radical account of spatiality in *The Logic of Sense* through the concept of a constantly shifting surface on which all kinds of events and encounters take place; to be more precise, the surface constitutes the space of the event itself. This concept derives from Deleuze's reading of Stoic philosophy, in which there is a division between bodies and their mixtures on the one hand and the events that these bodies undergo on the other. It is precisely on the side of the incorporeal event that the surface would be constituted: "what is more intimate or essential to bodies than events such as growing, becoming smaller, or being cut? [...] The Stoics [...] contrast the thickness of bodies with these incorporeal events which would play only over the surface of things like a mist over the prairie (even less than a mist, since a mist is after all a body)".[16] In other words the surface concerns the "extra-being"[17] of events rather than the existence of bodies, or verbs rather than nouns. While this involves a specific temporality, that of incorporeal becomings rather than the living presents of bodies,[18] it is primarily a spatial model that entails a thought in the middle of bodies and states of affairs that discerns how incorporeal events take place on their surfaces; it is a thought that therefore abandons pre-established spatial relations in favour of the fluid metamorphoses of events, in order to think how new relations or potentials for expression come into being.

This is not to say that the surface is a concept that encompasses everything; the surface exists in relation to both the depths of particular bodies and the heights of their imaginary transcendence. The surface is the skin of the world, a specific zone of emergence and disappearance, convergence and divergence, contact and separation. It is not a transcendence of the body, but the place where the body is gripped by a constantly shifting field of incorporeal forces, sensations, percepts and affects. The surface is precisely the becoming of bodies and states of affairs, the formation and deformation of apparently static entities. It is

15 A related critique of postmodern and postcolonial strategies as exemplified by the work of Homi Bhabha, can be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire,* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 137-156.

16 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 5.

17 Ibid, p. 7.

18 Ibid, p. 5.

life itself, in that it is the play of forces that animate bodies whether organic or inorganic in processes of growth or decay. The surface is life in the virtual sense of an event, for which lived experience would be the actualisation by a particular body. This is the distinction between life as a virtual event and lived experience that Deleuze sums up in his later essay, "Literature and Life," as follows: "a passage of Life that traverses both the liveable and the lived."[19]

That this concept of surface has an essential connection to the elaboration of an aesthetic of sobriety finds support in the "Porcelain and Volcano" series of *The Logic of Sense*.[20] In "Porcelain and Volcano," Deleuze directly develops the problematics of developing a sober relation to intoxication in relation to the work of the delirious or pathological writers Fitzgerald, Lowry, Burroughs and Artaud precisely through a radical rethinking of the concept of the surface. It is worth examining this series in more detail as it provides not only Deleuze's clearest account of the relations between sobriety, intoxication and aesthetic practices, but is also the closest that Deleuze comes to providing a methodology for his aesthetics.

For a start, Deleuze, following Fitzgerald, differentiates between two forms of "cracking" or the event associated with delirium. The first is a cracking of the surface, which is an impersonal event and the second is the breaking up of the body itself in its noisy depths, which is a total organic breakdown. The question for Deleuze, for the abstract thinker, is of how it is possible to will the surface event, without however its corporeal actualisation; how to keep this cracking of the surface on the surface where it can proliferate laterally, rather than sinking into the depths of a particular body: "If the order of the surface is itself cracked, how could it not itself break up, how is it to be prevented from precipitating destruction?"[21]

What is at stake in this operation is the extension of the cracking of the surface into a creative breakthrough rather than a psychotic breakdown, a transformation of the surface instead of its destruction. In other words, if creative practices necessitate a reworking of the field of events, how can these processes be continued as events without destroying the bodies that produce them? This is clearly an ethical question, which aims to affirm the

19 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 1.
20 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, pp. 154-161.
21 Ibid, p. 157.

creative act or event, while at the same time abandoning the image of the transgressive and self-destructive artist. Deleuze anticipates that this precarious enterprise runs the risk of seeming ridiculous and hypocritical in relation to those who suffer genuine breakdowns and it is here that Deleuze pre-empts the objections of critics such as Michel Cressole through a thorough questioning of his own enterprise:

> Are we to speak always about Bousquet's wound, Fitzgerald's and Lowry's alcoholism, Nietzsche's and Artaud's madness while remaining on the shore? Are we to become the professionals who give talks on these topics? Are we to wish only that those who have been struck down do not abuse themselves too much?[22]

In this questioning, in which the abstract thinker risks turning into a hypocritical social worker, who is powerless to do anything for his or her cases, the important point is the one about leaving the shore. What Deleuze is proposing is a seemingly impossible middle path between delirium and reason, between chaos and order: "should we go a short way further to see for ourselves, be a little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little of a guerrilla—just enough to extend the crack but not enough to deepen it irremediably."[23] Again this runs the risk of hypocrisy, in that it could be interpreted as a desire to benefit from the marginalised experiences of alcoholism, addiction and madness while avoiding the risks of its actualisation in dangerous practices. This is one way of making sense of Deleuze's affirmation of Henry Miller's project of getting drunk on pure water, or Burroughs claim that anything that can be chemically produced can be attained by other means.

However, what is at stake in Deleuze's text is not merely the desire to "get off" on the intoxications of others, but instead, by seemingly not going so far, that is, only being a little crazy or a little alcoholic, to extend these practices of intoxication further, through a rigorous counter-actualisation that would be limited to the surface. If the process whereby the crack of the surface is painfully interiorised in a body is a process of

22 Ibid, p. 157. For Deleuze's response to Michel Cressole, who accused him of benefiting from the experiences of others and being a "glorified social worker" precisely in relation to this Series, see Gilles Deleuze, "Letter to a Harsh Critic," *Negotiations: 1972-1990*, trans. Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 9-12.
23 Ibid, pp.157-158.

actualisation, since it makes physical what was only a virtual event, then this counter-actualisation is the doubling of this process in a rigorously superficial acting,[24] which maintains the virtuality of the event: "To the extent that the pure event is each time imprisoned in its actualisation, counter-actualisation liberates it, always for other times."[25]

In other terms, Deleuze seeks to develop an aesthetic of sobriety or counter-actualisation that would be nothing other than the affirmation of the creative element of practices of intoxication and would rigorously extend them into connection with other practices and events. This sober relation to intoxication, far from being hypocritical or distanced, was the very practice of these intoxicated artists when they were creating, that is when they were able to remain on the surface themselves. It is at the surface that creative practices operate as symptomatologies, not only by diagnosing cultural pathologies through bringing their corporeal actualisations to the surface, but also by discerning lines-of-flight from these pathological conditions through the creation of new modes of existence. Perhaps the crack depends on artists ready to destroy themselves who subscribe to the axiom, "better death than the health we are given,"[26] but what Deleuze is suggesting is the existence of another health, the Great Health of the surface and the event which would "give to the crack the ability to fly over its own incorporeal surface area, without stopping at the bursting of each body; it is, finally, to give us the chance to go further than we would have believed possible."[27] By remaining rigorously on the surface it is possible not only to extend the ecstasies of intoxication outwards but to generate intersubjective events and affirm the powers of life. This is because the aesthetics of sobriety is precisely the method whereby new forms of existence and practice can be evaluated without being judged. In other words, sobriety, conceived of in this way, is the continuation and extension of the event of intoxication by other means.

While Deleuze is not suggesting that it is the same thing to create a work of art and to create a work of philosophy or aesthetics, both processes nevertheless depend on developing a sober relation to delirium and intoxication in order to generate new relations between events, affects

24 Ibid, pp. 150, 161.
25 Ibid, p. 161.
26 Ibid, p. 160.
27 Ibid, p. 161.

and practices. For both the artist and the philosopher it is essential firstly to perform a "symptomatology" or a discernment of the sensations that traverse the body and which are the expression of not merely an individual but a social pathology.[28] This is because while each body is singular, the events to which it is subject are collective and impersonal and only become individualised through a process of actualisation. This process is not the judgement of a social reality, but simply a bringing to the surface or counter-actualisation of the collective delirium that one inhabits and is directly and corporeally affected by. Secondly it is necessary to re-work these signs, to bring them into contact with other materials, bodies and events in new configurations, by remaining at the surface where creative transformations can take place. It is here that style is of paramount importance, not in order to articulate aesthetic judgements or to generate interpretations, but precisely to extend the emergence of new modes of existence by following the movements already begun in the artwork into new milieus, which are in turn transformed. Aesthetic theory as much as aesthetic practice is also an art of the surface and therefore requires a rigorous and unrelenting sobriety: a sobriety that is open to intoxication, but which turns its back on judgement, interpretation and the imposition of form in a process of morphogenesis and perpetual creation.

Deleuzian Aesthetics, the Fold and the Neo-Baroque

This account of Deleuze's aesthetics would remain incomplete, if it did not take into account the crucial transformation that Deleuze's thought underwent through his encounter with the Baroque and his development of the concept of the fold in the mid 1980's. While the concept of the fold has a complex genealogy in Deleuze's work, it can be productively understood in relation to Deleuze's concept of the aesthetics of sobriety in terms of the surface examined above.[29] The concept of the surface was opaque in its insistence on a creative counter-actualisation in both the

28 On literature as symptomatology, see Deleuze, "Coldness and Cruelty," *Masochism*, trans. Jan McNeil, (New York: Zone Books, 1989), pp. 14-16 and *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 3-4.
29 For an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the fold in relation to contemporary aesthetic practices, see Greg Lambert, *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, (New York; London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 21-26 ff.

artist and the thinker, in other words a form of subjectivation, without specifying how these processes might operate. What was needed was a dynamic account of subjectivation, outside of conventional and static conceptions of subjectivity. This is precisely what the concept of the fold is able to contribute to the aesthetics of sobriety. In other words, the surface as a concept is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the aesthetics of sobriety and must be worked over, or "folded," before a complete account of the aesthetics of sobriety can be arrived at.

Although Deleuze first developed his concept of the fold in relation to Foucault's later work on subjectivation, in *The Fold* he turned to an analysis of the philosophy of Leibniz in relation to Baroque aesthetics without the concept losing its proximity to questions of subjectivation. For Deleuze, Baroque aesthetics departs from the Classical model of distinct forms and representation in favour of "an operative function, [...] it endlessly produces folds."[30] This can be on the most literal level in that Deleuze refers to the preponderance of folds of material, the textures of material objects and the distortions of curvilinear space as so many concrete examples of folding in both Baroque painting and architecture. However, these folds that occur in matter, are only one level of the fold, which are supplemented by another level that Deleuze does not hesitate to call the "folds in the soul."[31] This co-existence of two levels is not arbitrary, but derives from both the tendency of having two levels in paintings related to heaven and earth respectively and especially the design of the Baroque house. Rather than reinforcing transcendence, this co-existence of two levels destabilises it by insisting on the interpenetration between the material and spiritual realms.

Similarly, Leibniz's concept of the monad is inseparable from what Deleuze calls "Baroque mathematics" which, as with architecture and painting, is now based on curves rather than straight lines. Given this re-formulation, the subject is reconceived as a "concavity," which is defined as a particular point of view. It is here that Leibniz's philosophy anticipates both contemporary perspectivalism and even technological art forms such as cinema. The crucial aspect of this conceptualisation is that point of view precedes rather than expresses the subject, which is defined

30 Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque,* trans. Tom Conley, (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 3.
31 Ibid, pp. 14-26.

as "what comes to [...] or rather what remains in the point of view."[32] According to Deleuze this subject is now a "superject," which is not so much the variation of a static subject but a point of view on variation, which gives rise to a subject. In other words, the subject is that in which an exteriority of variation can be folded or enveloped: a particular perspective. This enveloping in a point of view is what generates a soul through the folding of the outside. This is precisely Leibniz's Monad: it is self-enclosed in that it envelops and closes off a certain region of the outside, yet without the openness to this outside it would never be constituted. Perhaps it can best be understood as a process of complication: it complicates the divergent exterior variations by including them in a unity or point of singularity inseparable from these variations.

For Deleuze, Leibniz's Baroque model of the monad is highly resonant with contemporary aesthetic practices since it is a way of thinking of subjectivity as process in relation to a world that is not given as a totality but as an infinite potential.[33] Furthermore, the idea of works of art as the folding of divergent series characterises not only contemporary tendencies in visual arts but also literature and music. Deleuze refers to the divergent series in the novels of James Joyce, Jorge Borges and Witold Gombrowicz, as well as in serial music, as examples of how this Baroque concept of the fold pervades some of the most radical examples of contemporary aesthetics. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences between this modern experimentation and the Baroque since, after all, Baroque systems including Leibniz's philosophy tend to rely ultimately on a concept of God, however immanently conceived.[34]

For Deleuze, Leibniz's Baroque account of the divergences between monads as taking place in a compossible world is abandoned in contemporary aesthetic practices, in favour of a motley world in which all the variations and divergences cannot be captured in expressive units. In Deleuze's words, "in the same chaotic world, divergent series are

32 Ibid, p. 19.
33 For another account of the links between the Baroque and modern aesthetic practices, see Christine Buci-Glucksman, *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity,* trans. Patrick Camiller, (London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994).
34 On neo-baroque aesthetic practices see Haroldo de Campos, "Barocco-ludisme deleuzienne," *Gilles Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique,* ed. Eric Alliez, (Paris: Institut Synthélabo, 1998), pp. 545-554.

endlessly tracing bifurcating paths. It is a chaosmos."[35] This transformation from world to chaosmos necessarily has a profound effect on subjectivation, which ceases to be monadic and becomes dissonant or nomadic. This is because it is impossible either to contain or unify the entire chaosmos, or to select a defined position or stable point of view upon it. For Deleuze, this difference, which is expressed both in Art Brut and atonal or serial music, can be summed up as the transformation from Baroque monadism to contemporary nomadism:

> To the degree that the world is now made up of divergent series (the chaosmos) [...] the monad is now unable to contain the entire world as if in a closed circle that can be modified by projection. It now opens on a trajectory or a spiral in expansion that moves further and further away from a centre. [...] Stockhausen's musical habitat or Dubuffet's plastic habitat do not allow the differences of inside and outside, of public and private, to survive. They identify variation with trajectory and overtake monadology with nomadology.[36]

This is not a rejection of the Baroque concept of the fold but merely its reworking in relation to modernity and its breakdown of the relation between the subject and the world. It is this nomadic conception of subjectivity as the transitory folding of the chaotic outside that corresponds to the model of subjectivation that Deleuze identified in Foucault's project; nevertheless the concept of the monad as point of view still provides a crucial model for how this subjectivation operates and both contemporary aesthetics and subjectivation can still be characterised in terms of the folding of divergent series. It is in terms of both this connection to and divergence from baroque aesthetics that the relevance of the fold to contemporary aesthetic practices should be understood. As such, the fold can be understood as a complication of the concept of the surface and is a key element of Deleuze's aesthetics of sobriety.

35 Deleuze, *The Fold,* pp. 81.
36 Ibid, p. 137.

Sobriety as Method: The Case of Literature

The relations between Deleuzian thought and particular aesthetic practices pose problems, which cannot be easily contained within the pre-existent disciplines of aesthetic theory. In the case of literature, even the most current forms of deconstructive literary criticism, or cultural studies approaches to literature are deficient from a Deleuzian perspective in that they consist in imposing an order or structure on a text, however nuanced or contextual the readings they generate. To a certain extent this is unavoidable, since any analysis involves the selection and recombination of textual elements according to either pre-established aims or literary methodologies. According to André Colombat, literary criticism as a discipline inevitably constructs texts as stable objects, and literary critics as their expert readers who supplement the naive readings of the general populace with their expert re-readings, which constitute and reinforce the authority of their discipline: "The work of the critic is almost always engaged in the direction of culture, as if it were a matter of filling in the cracks at any cost, in order to reconstitute a well-structured whole."[37] The result of these critical labours is the inscription of the text in a pre-existent disciplinary discourse, which disciplines both the text and its readers, while simultaneously assuring the authority of the critic as expert reader, backed up by years of university education, proficiency in relevant languages and associated disciplines, as well as in critical discourse itself.

The challenge raised by Deleuzian thought and taken up by André Colombat is how to engage critically with texts in a counter-disciplinary practice that would move in the opposite direction to that required by the imperatives of culture and expertise: "The work of the intelligence always develops at the same time as another type of interpretation in which a multitude of lines cross each other, resist, break up and give way to a more powerful one that carries them away."[38] For Colombat, it is this other interpretation, which has more in common with the experience of a naive

37 "Le travail du critique s'engage presque toujours [...] dans la direction de la culture, comme s'il s'agissait a tout prix de boucher les fissures, de reconstituer un tableau bien structuré," André Colombat, *Deleuze et la Littérature,* (New York; Berne; Frankfurt; Paris: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 46.
38 "Le travail de l'intelligence se developpe toujours en meme temps qu'un autre type d'interprétation dans laquel une multitude de lignes se croisent, resistent, se brisent, cedent a une plus puissante qui les emporte," ibid, p. 47.

first reading,[39] than with a professional literary analysis, that would constitute a Deleuzian approach to literature and indeed other aesthetic practices.

How then is it possible to evaluate and engage with a text without falling into the traps of disciplinary expertise on the one hand or the dangers of naivety on the other? How can an approach that resists disciplinary norms and procedures attain the rigour that was previously referred to as an aesthetic of sobriety? Again, it is a question of staying at the surface of the text. Expressed negatively, this entails neither turning the text into a transcendent object nor a debased one; neither seeking its hidden meanings nor its structure and, at the same time, not reducing the text to a mere intersection of external discourses. There are two crucial concepts, which are essential to this enterprise. The first is a non-linguistic account of the sign, drawn in part from Peircean semiotics, and the other is the concept of autopoiesis, adapted from the work of the contemporary scientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.[40] Both of these concepts need to be elaborated in order to generate a Deleuzian approach to aesthetic practices.

Deleuze first developed the idea of the work of art being composed of signs, or more precisely régimes of signs, in his work on Proust, *Proust and Signs*. While from the beginning this conception had a strong resonance with Peircean semiotics, which similarly posits a non-linguistic conception of the sign, this connection was only made explicit in Deleuze's *Cinema* books of the 1980's.[41] Initially Deleuze's conception of the sign was drawn largely from his engagement with Proust's aesthetics, along with the philosophies of Bergson and Nietzsche. What Proust provided for Deleuze was the conception of aesthetic practice as the discernment, metamorphosis or translation of signs from one realm to another. Proust's project in his *In Search of Lost Time* is not the representation of his childhood memories but the translation of various types of signs such as the signs of sensuous experience and the signs of love into the signs of art: "The signs of art, finally, give us a time regained, an original absolute time which includes all the others."[42]

39 Ibid, p. 45.

40 See Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realisation of the Living*, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980).

41 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 30-34.

In other words, rather than representing a pre-given reality, Proust's work evaluates and reworks the affects of this reality into a particular composition of signs, which are nothing more than blocs of affects and sensations in a virtual form.[43] The work of art would be this composition of affects into provisional organisations of signs, which are the expressions of a virtual world. To read is to encounter these signs, to be affected by them, and to affect them, in a process that has little to do with signification and interpretation in any conventional sense but, like the creative act itself, is another translation or another recoding of signs.[44]

This does not mean that critical knowledge is ruled out. Instead it is relativised, as a provisional approximation of the text, an apparatus of capture or the tracing of a particular encounter or actualisation, which will never exhaust the virtual productivity of the text. Furthermore, what a Deleuzian approach necessitates is a rigorous approach to the encounter itself, to take the affects and movements of a text seriously, and to rework them rigorously and creatively without destroying their consistency. It is here that the art of criticism lies: to translate the signs of the text both rigorously and creatively, to put the text to work in a new context, while remaining faithful to its movements, tendencies and the virtual worlds that it generates. In other words, the critic must respect the "life" of the text rather than its supposed form, structure or meaning.

This concept of the life of the text also draws on the biological theories of Maturana and Varela, who developed the concept of "autopoiesis" in order to distinguish between living and non-living entities. The concept of autopoiesis, literally self-creation, contested the Darwinian idea that organisms adapted to a pre-given objective reality, represented via the senses. Instead, they posited that organisms specify or create their environment and that there is no distinction between cognition and life. The concept of autopoiesis is based on a rigorous distinction between organisation and structure, in which the former is given precedence. According to this theory, organisation, as a network of relations, is what defines the stability of a living being and not its structure or particular components. Furthermore, organisation is itself a dynamic process, subject to growth and decay, that can best be understood as the virtual tendencies

42 Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard, (London: Allen Lane, 1972), p. 24.

43 C.f. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* p. 167.

44 See also André Colombat, "Deleuze and Signs," *Deleuze and Literature*, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks, (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 14-33.

of a particular organism. This virtual life, of which a particular state of an organism is an actualisation, is always provisional and subject to metamorphosis:

> The organisation of a living system is the set of relations between its components. [...] The description of that organisation is an abstract description of relationships. [...] The structure of a living system, by contrast, is constituted by the actual relations among the physical components.[45]

Autopoiesis is essentially a process of self-production that maintains this virtual organisation and constructs a relation with the outside. Deleuze, for whom organisation is more on the side of the actual or structure, reconfigures this distinction. He contrasts organisation, structure and transcendence with composition, becoming and immanence, thereby emphasising the aesthetic and metamorphic dimensions of autopoiesis: "A plan of organisation [...] will always be a plan of transcendence that directs forms as well as subjects, and that stays hidden. [...] It always has an additional dimension. [...] On the contrary, a plan of immanence has no supplementary dimension; the process of composition must be apprehended for itself."[46] In other words, all living beings are networks that transcode signs, creatively evaluating their environment in order to produce their own composition.[47]

This concept of autopoiesis is therefore highly resonant with Deleuzian aesthetics. In speaking of the life of the text, it is not a question of some vague notion of its essence or meaning but a precise description of its virtual composition, its networks of signs, the blocs of affect and sensation that constitute it and the virtual worlds it has the potential to generate. It is true that this virtual network of relations cannot be specified

45 Fritjof Capra, *The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter*, (London: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 98.

46 Deleuze, "Spinoza and Us," *Incorporations*, (New York: Urzone Inc., 1992), p. 630. See also Deleuze and Guattari, "Memories of a Plan(e)-maker," *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 265-272 and Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze*, (London: Routlege, 1999), pp. 145-152.

47 This formulation also echoes the work of Raymond Ruyer. On the importance of Ruyer's philosophy of biology for Deleuze, see Paul Bains, "Subjectless Subjectivities," *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari*, ed. Brian Massumi, (London; New York: Routlege, 2002), pp. 101-116.

exhaustively and objectively in the same manner as a structure, but the organisation of affect and sensation by the régimes of signs encoded in a particular text are not at all a vague subjective phenomenon either. While all critical engagements with a text will necessarily be a translation that creates a new text, the challenge is to maintain the autopoietic consistency, the life of the text in a new context. The test of whether this has been successful will not be whether the text has been exhaustively dissected through a merciless analysis of its structure, but whether its life has been affirmed rather than violated and whether it continues to emit signs, that it continues to transmit powerful affects and provide singular perceptions. In short, does the text give rise to new autopoietically consistent life or die on the operating table from a too violent critical intervention? It is no longer treating the text or its writer as a pathological symptom for the critic to cure, but as a symptomatology: "The writer is not a patient but rather a physician, a physician of himself and of the world. The world is the set of symptoms."[48]

Conclusion: Deleuzian Aesthetics and the Subversion of Form

The elements of Deleuzian aesthetics that have been traced in this essay, namely the monistic critique of representation, the surface, the fold, regimes of signs and autopoiesis, taken together constitute a general aesthetic project of the subversion of form. This project sometimes has a subterranean existence in Deleuze's work. However, particularly in Deleuze's engagement with aesthetic practices and his collaboration with Guattari, it can be seen as a key problematic as has been demonstrated by Mireille Buyden's book on Deleuzian aesthetics, *Sahara*.[49] That the subversion of form should be a key element in Deleuzian aesthetics is given directly in the extremely brief reference to the Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz at the beginning of the essay "Literature and Life."[50] The context is crucial here, since the fact that this reference, however brief, constitutes the first two sentences of this essay gives it a great deal more

48 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, 3. C.f. Deleuze, "Coldness and Cruelty," *Masochism*, (New York: Zone Books, 1989), p. 16.

49 The first two sections of this book concern the theoretical and practical status of the concept of form in Deleuze's work, See Mireille Buydens, *Sahara: L'Esthétique de Gilles Deleuze*, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990), pp. 13-55.

50 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, pp. 1-6.

weight than its brevity would otherwise indicate: "To write is certainly not to impose a form (of expression) on the matter of lived experience. Literature rather moves in the direction of the ill-formed or incomplete."[51] In this citation, Deleuze (and Guattari's) critical engagement with forms of expression is clearly stated and is elaborated throughout the rest of the essay as an analysis of literature as "health," becoming and the invention of a minor language.

In order to fully grasp what is involved in this extremely condensed essay, which like many of the other essays in the collection is a condensation of concepts developed not only by Deleuze alone but with Guattari, it is necessary to understand these three aspects of writing as the subversion of the three dimensions of form that was previously advocated by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus.*[52] The concept itself of "forms of expression," which Deleuze and Guattari derive from the linguist Louis Hjelmslev, is in a relation to and acts upon "forms of content," in much the same way that in Deleuze's earlier concept of sense or the event acted upon states of affairs.[53] However, in *A Thousand Plateaus,* the concept of form is given a more dynamic articulation in that rather than there being a simple relation between matter and form or content and expression there are instead complex processes of formation or stratification, operating according to the three dimensions of subjectification, signification and organisation.[54] The operations of literature, analysed in Deleuze's later essay, correspond to these varieties of form or stratification in the following manner: the invention of a minor language as the subversion of signification, becoming as the subversion of subjectification and health as the undoing of the organism or the organisation of the body.

The most straightforward of these subversions is that of signification through the invention of a minor language. This concept, developed most forcefully in Deleuze and Guattari's work on Kafka,[55] does not refer to the use of marginal languages, slang or argots, so much as a process that "opens up a kind of foreign language within language, which is [...] a

51 Ibid, p. 1.
52 Especially in Plateau Six, "November 28, 1947: How do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs," Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 149-166.
53 Ibid, p. 89.
54 See especially ibid, pp. 40-74.
55 Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature,* trans. Dana Polan, (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 16-27.

becoming-other of language, a minorisation of this major language."[56] If Kafka is such a good example of this procedure, it is because instead of writing in the relatively marginal languages of Czech or Yiddish, he writes in German, but deterritorialises this major language by placing it in proximity with the minor currents it excludes, thereby inventing "a new language within language."[57]

The second subversive aspect of writing that Deleuze identifies is the metamorphosis of subjectivity it gives rise to, the undoing of subjectification that Deleuze refers to in terms of becomings. As with the dismantling of signification, becoming also works as a minorisation but in this case of subjective identity. Hence, Deleuze refers to the famous series of becomings, previously developed with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus,* involving increasing degrees of minorisation: becoming-woman, becoming-animal and becoming-molecular.[58] Deleuze cites numerous examples of these procedures in J.-M. G. Le Clézio, Michaux and D. H. Lawrence[59] and associates becomings with a miscegenation or a bastardisation of races: "*Bastard* no longer designates a familial state, but the process or drift of the races."[60]

While the first two levels of subversion are essentially reprises of *A Thousand Plateaus,* the concept Deleuze develops of the "health" of the writer, is also related to aesthetics of sobriety developed in *The Logic of Sense* that was analysed in the second part of this essay. Deleuze takes from Kafka and Michaux the idea of the writer as a type of athlete, but one who possesses an "athleticism [that] far from reconciling literature with sports [...] is exercised in flight and in the breakdown of the organic body—an athlete in bed."[61] In this way, Deleuze contests the understanding of writing as the expression of neuroses or psychoses. For Deleuze, illness is not a process but the blockage of a process and he sees the writer less as a patient than as a doctor: "the writer [...] is not a patient

56 Deleuze, *Essays critical and Clinical,* p. 5.
57 Ibid, p. 5.
58 Ibid, p. 1.
59 Ibid pp. 1-2.
60 Ibid, p. 4.
61 Ibid, p. 2. Deleuze cites in this and other contexts a "story" by Kafka concerning a champion swimmer who does not know how to swim. No reference is given for this story, which may be taken from Kafka's *Diaries.* See Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical,* pp. 2, 5, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka,* p. 26.

but rather the physician of himself, and of the world."[62] This is because the writer is attuned through his own pathology to the world as to a set of symptoms or signs:

> Literature then appears as an enterprise of health: not that the writer would necessarily be in good health (there would be the same ambiguity here as with athleticism), but he possesses an irresistible and delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, too strong for him, suffocating things whose passage exhausts him, while nonetheless giving him the becomings that a dominant and substantial health would render impossible.[63]

This fascinating passage, which is a reworking of "the great health" referred to in *The Logic of Sense*,[64] is also a description of the third level of the subversion of form, namely the dismantling of the organism. This is perhaps the deepest or most delicate level in that it involves the greatest risks both of death and also of a violent restratification. Again it is a case of opening to metamorphic forces, to delirium, without however losing oneself completely, the becoming a little-mad or a little-intoxicated of *The Logic of Sense*, or the art of caution necessary to avoid complete organic disintegration: "you have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and subjectification if only to turn them against their own systems."[65] So this health of the writer not only differs from normative conceptions of health but is also distinct from disease, even if it might seem to exist in proximity to all manner of pathological symptoms, perversions or addictions. As Deleuze puts it: "the writer returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums."[66] For example, the constant poor health of Nietzsche contributed nothing to his philosophy but his organic and subjective combat against these symptoms was completely interwoven with the new vision of philosophy he developed. For Deleuze, this is confirmed by the fact that when Nietzsche succumbed entirely to disease his creation stopped altogether.[67] On the other hand Spinoza's "delicate

62 Ibid, p. 3.
63 Ibid, p. 3.
64 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 161.
65 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 161.
66 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 3.
67 Ibid, p. 3.

health, while it lasted," permitted him to bear "witness to a new vision whose passage it remained open to," thereby constituting a health "sufficient to liberate life wherever it is imprisoned by and within man, by and within organisms."[68]

This process echoes Deleuze and Guattari's formulations about the creation of a Body without Organs: "Dismantling the body has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorialisations."[69] This procedure of wresting a creative vision or thought from disease, or "literature as delirium,"[70] is what has been analysed here as an aesthetic of sobriety: that is creation as the maintenance of a distance both from disease and normative functioning, chaos and order or, more exactly, the constitution of a plane of consistency with the minimum degree of order necessary to actualise the maximum amount of chaos. This necessarily entails risk, since delirium can also go in the other direction, that of disease or "larval fascism."[71] This multiple subversion of form, summed up by Deleuze in his "Literature and Life" essay, is the place where the greatest resonance can be found between writing, as well as other aesthetic practices, and Deleuzian aesthetic theory, as a radical undermining of stable forms of both expression and content in favour of an immanent expression of life in its virtuality, becoming and immaturity.[72] It also constitutes the essential method and stakes of the aesthetics of sobriety not only in literary and philosophical practices but also in social practices as an aesthetics, ethics and politics of everyday life.

68 Ibid, p. 3.
69 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 160.
70 Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 4.
71 Ibid, p. 4.
72 This term derives from Gombrowicz but expresses succinctly the relation between becoming and the subversion of form: immaturity implies processes of formation and deformation, growth and decay that overflow any static conception of from or structure. See especially, Witold Gombrowicz, *Ferdydurke*, trans. Danuta Borchardt, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).

Works Cited

Alliez, Eric ed. *Gilles Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique.* Paris: Institut Synthélabo, 1998.

Ansell-Pearson, Keith. *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze.* London: Routledge, 1999.

Bains, Paul. "Subjectless Subjectivities." *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari.* Ed. Brian Massumi. pp. 101-116.

Buci-Glucksman, Christine. *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity.* Trans. Patrick Camiller. London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1994.

Buydens, Mireille. *Sahara: L'Esthétique de Gilles Deleuze.* Paris: J. Vrin, 1990.

Capra, Fritjof. *The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter.* London: Harper Collins, 1996.

Colombat, André. "Deleuze and Signs." *Deleuze and Literature.* Ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks. Edinburgh University Press, 2000. pp. 14-33.

---*Deleuze et la Littérature.* New York; Berne; Frankfurt; Paris: Peter Lang, 1990.

Crary Jonathan and Sanford Kwinter eds. *Incorporations.* New York: Urzone Inc., 1992.

De Campos, Haroldo. "Barocco-ludisme deleuzienne." *Gilles Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique.* Ed. Eric Alliez. pp. 545-554.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

---"Coldness and Cruelty." *Masochism.* Trans. Jean McNeil. New York: Zone Books, 1989. pp. 7-138.

---*Essays Critical and Clinical.* Trans. Daniel Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

---*The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.* Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

---*Kant's Critical Philosophy.* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press, 1984.

---*The Logic of Sense.* Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

---*Negotiations: 1972-1990.* Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

---*Proust and Signs.* Trans. Richard Howard. London: Allen Lane, 1972.

---"Spinoza and Us." *Incorporations.* Ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter. pp. 625-633.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature.* Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986

---*A Thousand Plateaus.* Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

---*What is Philosophy?* Trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson. London; New York: Verso, 1991.

Focillon, Henri. *The Life of Forms in Art.* Trans. Charles B. Hogan and George Kubler. New York: Zone Books, 1989.

Gombrowicz, Witold. *Ferdydurke.* Trans. Danuta Borchardt. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000.

Guattari, Félix. *Chaosmosis.* Trans. Paul Bains. Sydney: Power Publications, 1995.

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. *Empire.* Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Judgement.* Trans Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987.

---*The Critique of Pure Reason.* Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. New York: Willey Books, 1943.

Lambert, Gregg. *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.* New York; London: Continuum, 2002.

Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual.* Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2002.

---ed. *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari.* London; New York: Routlege, 2002.

Maturana, Humberto and Francisco Varela. *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realisation of the Living.* Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.

Patton, Paul ed. *Deleuze: A Critical Reader.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

Proust, Marcel. *In Search of Lost Time.* Trans C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin. London: Chatto and Windus, 1992.

Rancière, Jacques. "Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?" *Gilles Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique.* Ed. Eric Alliez. pp. 525-536.

Simondon, Gilbert. "The Genesis of the Individual." Trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter. *Incorporations.* Ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter. pp. 297-319.

Smith, Daniel W. "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." *Deleuze: A Critical Reader.* Ed. Paul Patton. pp. 29-56.

Pli 16 (2005), 27-55

From Geophilosophy to Geoaesthetics: The Virtual and the Plane of Immanence vs. Mirror Travel and The Spiral Jetty

SIMON O'SULLIVAN

In this article I aim to switch the ontological categories for thinking art away from a certain *representational* register.[1] In particular, I want to explore other ways of thinking the ethical and political efficacy of art, and specifically its 'other worldliness' (its resistance to the present milieu) away from a horizon of transcendence and a logic of the possible. I propose to do this by adopting a double pronged and somewhat experimental approach. The article then involves two philosophical discussions – or two philosophical *encounters* – with Deleuze *and* at the same time a kind of non-philosophical *encounter* with an art practice which mirrors the philosophy (and in some senses 'grounds' it). To a certain extent I might be accused of deliberately *mis*reading Deleuze here insofar as I utilise his ideas on philosophy, rather than on sensation and affect, to think these practices. The article is then an experiment in taking Deleuze's philosophical concepts into other realms, other milieus (and in allowing the latter to feed back on Deleuze). It is in this sense that the

1 This article is part of a larger book project entitled *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (forthcoming with Palgrave Macmillan). The book stages a series of encounters between specific modern and contemporary art practices and the writings of Deleuze. The book is then both 'on' Deleuze and his thought – but also an attempt to 'do' Deleuze by smearing his concepts into other milieus. Other encounters will involve: rhizomatics/machinics and expanded practice/relational aesthetics; affect/the logic of sensation and installation; minor literature and collaborative practice; and the fold and abstract painting.

artistic 'case studies' are meant *not* as illustrations but as *parallels* to, and in some senses *deviations* from, the conceptual work. They also serve to demonstrate that art is a form of thought in and of itself.

The first philosophical discussion, which begins with a brief contrasting of Deleuze with Theodor Adorno, is on the notion of the *virtual*.[2] It is here that I track through Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, and think about the application and implication of the latter to/for art. The second philosophical discussion is on *immanence*, and specifically the *plane of immanence*, the latter understood as a kind of non-philosophical, but founding moment of philosophy. I also make a detour here to Deleuze and Guattari's important notion of the *Body without Organs*. The other two sections, or *excurses*, concern the art practice of the so called earth artist Robert Smithson who, in his earthworks, non-sites *and* in his copious writings, presents us, I would argue, with what Deleuze might call a new 'image of thought'. As we shall see, we might also characterise Smithson's works as the construction of a Body without Organs.

Although Smithson died young, he was nevertheless one of the most influential (and least containable) artists of the late 1960s. This was a time when artists were radically questioning accepted assumptions about art and involving themselves in practices that located themselves outside of the gallery (and indeed beyond representation altogether).[3] Smithson, like Don Judd, Robert Morris, and others, took the break with representation to its most extreme edge, in Judd's case expunging any reference to

2 In a previous article, 'The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art Beyond Representation', *Angelaki*, vol. 6, no. 3, December 2000, pp. 125-35, the virtual was configured as the realm of *affect*. Here, as a kind of corrective, I attend more to the virtual's *temporal* aspect, which is to say I turn from Deleuze's *Spinozism* to his *Bergsonism*. In both the argument is in part made against Adorno, and as such what follows involves a reworking of some material from the previous article (see also footnote 31 below).

3 For an account of sculpture's movement beyond the gallery, as well as to its relationship to landscape and architecture (*and* to the variety of positions taken by artists in relation to these coordination points) see Rosalind Krauss' essay 'Sculpture in the Expanded Field', republished in *The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology*, ed. D. Preziosi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). One might argue that in attending to the structural possibilities inherent in the expanded field, i.e. giving a relational account of various practices, Krauss loses sight of each work's singularity. Her discussion of Smithson would be a case in point (ibid., pp. 295-296).

anything outside of the object.[4] Smithson's practice was also located 'beyond' representation in this sense, although it also had a *mythic* quality to it. Indeed, as we shall see, a certain notion of narrative, albeit a kind of posthuman geological narrative, is present throughout his work. As such, although he can be grouped with other artists of his generation, Smithson stands out as somewhat singular and atypical. He also draws attention to the always partial and occasionally reductive readings that are given to minimalism when it ignores these more fantastical (we might even say *psychedelic*) elements. This article focuses on this more fantastical element to Smithson's practice, and on just two of Smithson's projects: *Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan* and the *Spiral Jetty*, both of which, in their own way, are exemplary of Smithson's attitude and style as an artist.

The late 1960s were of course also a time of wider political unrest and ethical experimentation. Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, the plane of immanence, understood by them in a geopolitical sense, was itself being activated once more in a new revolutionary energy: new non-traditional modes of being, and new non-formalised practices of life and art, were both being experimented with.[5] It is the same moment that Deleuze's philosophy comes into its own, the publication of *Difference and Repetition* announcing a project of thinking differently and of constructing an image of thought beyond representation. This article then marks a moment, *the* moment, in which a philosophy of difference and an art practice of immanence are both being constructed (what we might call in each case a move towards abstraction). Of course, this is not the first time that such a philosophy is produced (one need only think of Spinoza), but it might be argued that at this moment philosophy *and* art so closely follow one another that they become two forks of the same serpent's tongue.

4 As Smithson also remarks in his essay on 'Donald Judd': 'With Judd there is no confusion between the anthropomorphic and the abstract. This makes for an increased consciousness of structure, which retains a remote distance from the organic. The "unconscious" has no place in his art. His crystalline state of mind is far removed from the organic floods of "action painting". He translates his concepts into artifices of fact, without any illusionistic representations.' R. Smithson, *The Collected Writings*, ed. J. Flam (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), p. 5, hereafter *CW*.

5 M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 260-79.

1 The Virtual (or Deleuze's Bergsonism)

In a difficult passage from *Bergsonism* Deleuze outlines what for him, as for Bergson before him, is the important, in fact crucial, difference between the ontological couplings of the actual and the virtual, as opposed to those of the real and the possible. This difference, as Deleuze remarks elsewhere, is not simply a question of terminology, but rather 'of existence itself.[6] Here is the passage in full:

> The possible has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but *as such possesses a reality* ... On the other hand, or from another point of view, the possible is that which is 'realised' (or is not realised). Now the process of realisation is subject to two essential rules, one of resemblance and another of limitation. For the real is supposed to be in the image of the possible that it realises. (It simply has existence or reality added to it, which is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the concept there is no difference between the possible and the real.) And, every possible is not realised, realisation involves a limitation by which some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others 'pass' into the real. The virtual on the other hand, does not have to be realised, but rather actualised; and the rules of actualisation are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation.[7]

The possible then is realised through resemblance *and* limitation, whereas the virtual is actualised through difference *and* creation. Indeed, the key issue with the possible, which is implied above and pursued by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*, is that it is 'retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it'.[8] Put simply, the possible is always already a kind of *representation* of the real that appears to pre-exist it. We might say then that the possible becomes as such by a kind of sleight of hand. It is in fact merely an isotope of the real inasmuch as it only lacks reality (it

6 G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), p. 211, hereafter *DR*.
7 G. Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books), pp. 96-97, hereafter *B*.
8 *DR*, p. 212.

merely 'doubles like with like')[9]. The possible then operates as a kind of mirror image of the real, but one which sets itself up as if it offered a 'real' alternative. This is the illusionistic moment, the *camera obscura* of the possible which appears to offer something 'new' but in fact only offers more of the same. Indeed we might rename this logic of the possible a logic of *utopia*, inasmuch as utopian thinking (and this includes *representations* of utopia) is often locked into this double movement. Utopia, we might say, can be nothing more than a mirror reflection (however distorted) of the real.

As a contrast to Deleuze we might look at how Adorno deploys a notion of utopian thought, specifically in relation to art:

> Art's utopia, the counter-factual yet-to-come is draped in Black, it goes on being a recollection of the possible with a critical edge against the real ... It is the possible, as promised by its impossibility. Art is the promise of happiness, a promise that is constantly being broken.[10]

For Adorno art operates as a kind of 'utopian blink'; it presents the *possible* through its *apparent* difference to the existent. Indeed, for Adorno, art is not really 'of' this world at all; it prefigures and *promises* a world yet-to-come. Art, if you like, operates within *messianic* time. And yet art is inevitably doomed to frustration: the promise (of reconciliation) is constantly being broken. Art is positioned within this melancholy field, this always-already defeated logic. In fact it is worth noting that philosophy, for Adorno, operates on this register also: 'The only philosophy which can be reasonably practised in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption.[11] In a sense then Adorno has abandoned the existent. Indeed, this is what gives his work its particular tenor.

On one level this is certainly different to Deleuze's position inasmuch as the possible, for both writers, appears to be a form of transcendent criticism (that is to say, criticism made from the standpoint of redemption). If, however, we were to position Adorno's broken promise

9 *DR*, p. 212.
10 T. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 196.
11 T. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), p. 247.

as a form of *immanent* criticism, that which seeks to grasp the contradictions inherent in the existent by presenting, via art, something 'different', then we might be able to stake out some common territory between Adorno and Deleuze.[12] In fact there seem to be many points of connection between Frankfurt School Critical Theory and the later writings of Deleuze and Guattari. In fact in their last work together, Deleuze and Guattari themselves attend to a notion of utopia, and to a notion of what they call *immanent, revolutionary utopias* (as opposed to authoritarian, transcendent ones).[13] Such utopias are synonymous with what they call political philosophy: 'that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu'.[14] For Deleuze and Guattari this utopian impulse in philosophy (which *is* philosophy) involves a resistance to the present. 'The creation of concepts [which] in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist'.[15] That is, precisely, revolution, understood as the affirmation of a 'people-yet-to-come.'

12 This is to simplify somewhat Adorno's notion of criticism and his own use of the categories transcendent and immanent. In fact for Adorno both of these forms of criticism have advantages – but also drawbacks: transcendent criticism allows a vantage point 'outside' of ideology and thus the possibility of a critique of the whole *but* in so doing it locates itself at a kind of fictitious (and utopian) Archimedean Point. It also tends towards a kind of escapism, and to sweeping (barbaric) generalisations. Immanent criticism, on the other hand, seeks to grasp the contradictions within concrete phenomena (i.e. culture). It seeks to reveal the contradictions between the objective idea and its pretension *but* as such it can overlook the general ideological character of society (it neglects to link the object back to the life processes that produced it). Ultimately, of course, it is a form of *dialectical* criticism, moving between the two 'perspectives', which Adorno advocates. (See T. Adorno, 'Cultural Criticism and Society,' *Prisms*, trans. S. and S. Weber (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), especially pp. 23-33). It is worth pointing out here that the notion of criticism, as Adorno deploys it, is of a fundamentally different nature to the notion of philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it. The first is negative almost by definition, the second, again by definition, is creative and affirmative. This is not to say that one must be oblivious to the history, the 'life processes', that produce Deleuze and Guattari 's philosophy, but it is to say that Adorno's critical operation presumes the always already ideological character of philosophy and thus can operate as a kind of trap for thought.

13 In a tantalising footnote Ernst Bloch is given as an example of a thinker of immanent utopias (*WP*, p. 224, f. 12).

14 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 100, hereafter *WP*.

15 *WP*, p. 108.

Can Adorno be brought into this fundamentally affirmative and creative project? To a certain extent (after all both Adorno and Deleuze articulate a resistance to the present, and in so doing make a call to the future). However, it is really Adorno's attitude, his *philosophical* attitude, which is the stumbling block (his particular *style* of thought as perhaps Deleuze would say). Adorno, as a thinker, is trapped in a form of negativity (as are all proponents of negative critique).[16] For Adorno then, art, that very autonomous of objects, operates in/as a negative dialectic (it is the 'impossible possible'). We can return to Deleuze here and remind ourselves that Deleuze's issue with the possible is that it is never a genuinely creative category (even if it may seem so) but is in fact always already limited by the real that it resembles and cannot help but resemble. This is the case even, and perhaps especially, when it seeks to *negate* this real. This is not to disavow the criticality of art works but it is to say that this criticality must be accompanied by creativity (and in fact we might say that the former, when it really *is* criticism, is only ever really produced by the latter).

To return to Deleuze, then, who in his discussion of the possible is keen to demarcate a notion of difference that does not imply a negativity and indeed that escapes 'identity thinking' altogether. He will do this *not* through recourse to a negative dialectic but through recourse to a notion of the virtual. First though, back to the possible once more, the characteristic of which, for Deleuze, is that it 'refers to the form of identity in the concept'.[17] Difference here is nothing but the 'negative determined by the concept.[18] Another way of saying this is that the possible, in order to be realised, merely has existence *added* to it, *but* an existence which is already determined by the concept albeit as a kind of outside. Here then the possible operates as a point of transcendence, but, as with all transcendence, is in fact a product of immanence which has been abstracted out *and then* 'projected' back on to the plane of immanence as if it came from an 'elsewhere'.[19]

16 As Jean-Francois Lyotard once remarked, the danger of negative critique is that 'the thing criticised holds back and even consumes the one who criticises, as Sodom petrified Lot's wife', 'Beyond Representation', trans. J. Culler, *The Lyotard Reader*, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 155.

17 *DR*, p. 211.

18 *DR*, p. 211.

19 It is the same operation, *or* inversion, that ideology performs as mapped out in the early Marx. For example, with religion: God, which is a *product* of man is then abstracted out and made into that which apparently *produces* man (transcendence

The virtual on the other hand names a field of difference which is not, and cannot be, subsumed by the concept. The virtual 'designates a pure multiplicity' which as such 'radically excludes the identical as a prior condition.[20] The virtual then names a *real* place but one which has yet to be actualised. Whereas the real and the possible instigate a philosophy of transcendence, the virtual and the actual affirm immanence. We might rephrase this and say that whereas the possible names a logic of Being (ontology of stasis), the virtual affirms a logic of *becoming* (ontology of process). Indeed it is only with, and within, the virtual that we have pure difference in and of itself (we might call this *anoriginal* complexity, pure multiplicity, *aliquid being*, or simply the realm of the undifferentiated). The virtual, or rather the process of actualisation of the virtual, is then *the* creative act, precisely the production, or actualisation, of difference and thus diversity from a pre-existing field of potentialities.

Another way of thinking this process of actualisation is as problem-solving. To quote Deleuze: 'the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem.[21] It is in this sense, thinking biologically, that the organism is the solution to a problem: the eye as a solution to the specific 'problem' of light; the claw as a solution to the need for food, and so on. Art can also be seen as a 'solution' in this sense, as part of a general, creative evolution. The forms of art precisely providing 'solutions' to 'problems' of space, time, perception *and* memory (that is, specifically *human* problems).[22]

One way to think this virtual multiplicity is as the 'pure' memory of Bergson's thesis. As such the virtual can be understood as a temporal

is here precisely a product, albeit *masked*, of immanence).

20 *DR*, p. 211-12.

21 *DR*, p. 212.

22 This is precisely the argument set out in Henri Focillon's *The Life Forms of Art*, trans. C. Beecher Hogan and G. Kubler (New York: Zone Books, 1992). Here the work of art is 'an attempt to express something that is unique, it is an affirmation of something that is whole, complete, absolute. But it is likewise an integral part of a system of highly complex relationships' (ibid., p. 31). Art emerges from this complexity but does not necessarily resemble these conditions. Furthermore art works *back* on these conditions, for example, in relation to space, Focillon points out: 'A work of art is situated in space. But it will not do to say it simply exists in space: a work of art treats space according to its own needs, defines space and even creates such space as may be necessary to it' (ibid., p. 65).

dimension of the object. The virtual is 'a part of the real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension.[23] We might say then that the virtual is a kind of *fractal* realm. The virtual would always be 'contained' within the actual, as it were, though in an ever more condensed state as it approaches the present. In fact the same might be said of perception: the closer one is the more apparently simple forms become complex, which is to say the realms of space and time are *both* fractal in character.[24]

It is here that the differences between Deleuze's notion of the virtual and its more common usage within AI and VR parlance become clear. In these latter places and spaces the virtual is understood as a kind of property of matter, albeit matter interpenetrated by information. With Deleuze however the virtual *differs in kind* from the actual. It is not 'of' matter but 'of' spirit as Bergson might say (as Deleuze remarks, Bergson reserves the use of the possible only in relation to matter – that is to a *closed system*).[25] In a sense the realm of pure perception ('before' any selection on the basis of needs and interests has been made) *is* a virtual realm but this 'pure perception' is not the same kind of virtuality as that of pure memory (it exists, as Bergson demonstrates on a different axis: it is *spatial* rather than *temporal*).[26] In fact both pure perception (*matter* or, in Deleuze's terms, the 'movement-image') and pure memory (*time* or, in Deleuze's terms again, the 'time-image') are intuitive abstractions from what, in experience, is a mixed state of affairs (our habits of representation and of representational thought). Pure memory ('identical to the totality of the past') is then like pure perception ('identical to the whole of matter'), an inhuman, super-objective state which can only be accessed intuitively. Put bluntly, it is difficult given the present human configuration to access this pure perception and pure memory which is nevertheless a kind of 'background' to our experience. We live in a state in which differences in kind (between matter and memory) are mixed. We are 'badly analysed composites' 'that arbitrarily group things that *differ in kind*.[27] Deleuze's transcendental empiricism involves intuitively going

23 *DR*, p. 209.

24 This is to follow Henri Bergson's account of memory and temporality (the celebrated cone). See *Matter and Memory*, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York: Zone, 1996), pp. 150-163, hereafter *MM*.

25 *B*, p. 43.

26 For Bergson's major statement on this see *MM*, pp. 77-131.

27 *B*. p. 18.

beyond experience towards the *conditions* of experience (and not the conditions of *possible* experience (Kant) - but the conditions of *real* experience).[28] This implies an ethical imperative, the latter understood as a pragmatic enquiry into our particular space-time coordinates (or simply our consciousness). We must divide these mixed composites along lines that differ in kind, and then follow these lines to their pure states, before returning, armed with a kind of Spinozist 'knowledge', to the mixtures.

When it comes to actually actualising different spatialities and temporalities then technology has a crucial role to play. For Deleuze this is paradigmatically the case with the movie camera. In *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* this machine-eye-consciousness is portrayed as a kind of 'actualising machine'. It opens up perception and memory to a world beyond the strictly human (its mechanical eye moves towards a state of pure perception in the Movement Image and towards a state of pure recollection in the Time Image). For Deleuze, following Bergson, this gets to the very heart of philosophy's role: to think *beyond* the human (*beyond* representation). We might say then that the camera, and in fact all 'visualising' technologies, continue Bergson's intuitive method 'outside' of philosophy. We might also say that the actualisations these technologies perform and produce are specifically *non-human,* or *machinic* modes of consciousness.

Equally important is that we look to the field of that which has already been actualised. Again, we must ask the fundamentally ethical questions of how and why such and such *becomes* actual (how and why are we the mixtures that we are, perceiving the mixtures that we do?) Indeed, following Brian Massumi, it might be argued that it is not the actual that should hold our attention, nor in fact the virtual, but rather the *processes of actualisation* (the processes of *selection* if you like). We need to attend to that border, or 'seeping edge' as Massumi calls it, between the actual and the virtual. For Massumi it is precisely in this place that potential is found, the potential for transformation.[29]

28 As Deleuze remarks: 'Intuition leads us to go beyond the state of experience toward the conditions of experience. But these conditions are neither general nor abstract. They are no broader than the conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience' (*B.* p. 27).

29 It is important to point out that Massumi's understanding of the virtual, at least in his essay 'The Autonomy of Affect', *The Deleuze Reader*, ed. P. Patton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), is that it is the realm of *affect*. The 'seeping edge' then is the point at which that which is immanent to experience (affect) becomes conceptualised within experience (specifically with language) (pp. 217-239). This is not however to contradict a more Bergsonian notion of the virtual as the relation between affect and its articulation which is specifically a temporal one.

We might say, again following Massumi, that the world of things (the object world) is only that which has been extracted or has *emerged* from the realm of relations, or *conditions*.[30] Technology being the name for that which manipulates this emergence. Late capitalism's most sinister aspect is that it controls many if not all of these matrices of emergence. That is to say, it *determines* what becomes actual. Art practice might have a role to play in reversing this process, in reconnecting us with pre-objective relations/conditions and allowing a different combination, a different set of *modulations* as it were, to emerge. Art practice might then, like philosophy, involve intuition. An intuition incarnated in materials which takes us 'beyond' the actual, plunges us deep into the virtual, before returning with new actualisations. Indeed art practice can be positioned at that 'seeping edge' between the existing state of affairs and a world 'yet-to-come'. Again, this is not to position art as transcendent, for as we have seen the ontological coordinates of the actual and the virtual operate 'within' immanence (within *this* world). The virtual does not *lack* a reality, but is merely that which has yet to be actualised.

Excursus 1: Mirror Travel

In the essay 'Entropy and the New Monuments' Robert Smithson writes about those artists who are his contemporaries (and as such he is also writing about himself) precisely in terms of pure matter and pure memory. The new monuments, the emerging minimalist objects and expanded practices of the late 1960s, are here described as *crystal* objects with a face turned to the actual, and a face plunging deep into the virtual. Indeed, for Smithson, this is what characterises the new monuments: they present a different view of matter *and* a different conception of time:

> Instead of causing us to remember the past like the old monuments, the new monuments seem to cause us to forget the future. Instead of being made of natural materials, such as

30 Massumi pursued this line of argument in a recent paper, 'Living Memory', at the *Life's (Re)emergence: Philosophy, Culture, and Politics* conference, Goldsmiths College, May 2003.

> marble, granite, or other kinds of rock, the new monuments are made of artificial materials, plastic, chrome and electric light. They are not built for the ages but against the ages. They are involved in a systematic reduction of time down to fractions of seconds, rather than representing the long spaces of centuries. Both past and future are placed into an objective present. This kind of time has little or no space in it; it is stationary and without movement, it is going nowhere, it is anti-Newtonian, as well as being instant, and it is against the wheels of the time-clock ... [The] destruction of classical time and space is based on an entirely new notion of the structure of matter.[31]

This 'new' image of time is then one in which the past is coextensive with the present, which itself is coextensive with the future. This is an image of time in which the latter is no longer determined by movement.[32] A stationary time, the time of *cronos*. As Smithson remarks this involves the production of a 'new' image of matter, also, we might say following Deleuze-Bergson, a kind of 'pure perception' of matter, produced by 'new' synthetic materials. We might then call these new monuments, following Deleuze, the production of a specifically *Bergsonian* image of thought. To quote Deleuze: 'Bergson's major theses on time are as follows: the past coexists with the present that it has been; the past is preserved in itself, as past in general (non-chronological); at each moment time splits itself into present and past, present that passes and past which is preserved.[33] It is this preservation of the past in the present that Smithson sees in the new monuments (a kind of 'freezing' of time). In fact for Smithson the new monuments go one step further in also actualising a kind of future within the present (we might say that this is their future orientation or *prophetic* function).

31 *CW*, p. 11.

32 See Deleuze's book on *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1995) for a discussion of this revolution in time (and encapsulated by Hamlet's phrase 'The time is out of joint'): 'As long as time remained on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or number. This was the view of ancient philosophy. But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship. It is now movement that is subordinate to time. Everything changes, including movement ... this is the first great Kantian reversal' (ibid., p. vii).

33 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (London: Athlone, 1989), p. 82, hereafter *C2*.

Smithson calls this 'backward looking future', and sees it as a characteristic of many of the new monuments where there is the conjunction of an 'extreme past' with a kind of Science Fiction future.[34] Put simply, for Smithson, the new monuments activate a different, non-human, inorganic and what we might call *geological* duration. This becomes paradigmatic in Smithson's own work, and especially with the later and larger earthworks which Smithson completed (for example *Broken Circle, Spiral Hill*, or *Spiral Jetty* – both of which one had to *enter* into). However even with Smithson's smaller works, his crystal and mirrored objects, time becomes a material to play with. Indeed, as Smithson remarks, in very much a Bergsonian vein:

> When a *thing* is seen through the consciousness of temporality, it is changed into something that is nothing. This all-engulfing sense provides the mental ground for the object, so that it ceases being a mere object and becomes art. The object gets to be less and less but exists as something clearer. Every object, if it is art, is charged with the rush of time even though it is static, but all this depends on the viewer. Not everyone sees the art in the same way, only an artist viewing art knows the ecstasy or dread, and this viewing takes place in time.[35]

It is then as much the viewer (a *specific* kind of viewer) as the object that produces art in this sense (that actualises the virtualities of the 'object'). For Smithson art is the name for this encounter in which an object rejoins the flow of time it was always already a part of (but had been extracted from). Indeed all these objects and practices, these new monuments, might be located on that 'seeping edge' between the actual and the virtual, which we might rephrase here as the coexistence of the pure past (and future) with the present, or simply a seeing of the object *as* object, and a seeing of the object *in* process, *as* duration.

In the above quote, and in Smithson's essay in general, there is, I would argue, a kind of philosophy going on, inasmuch as there is the deployment of certain concepts (for example of a 'time' no longer determined by movement) in order to 'think' a new kind of art. Nevertheless there is not, in this essay anyway, the *production* of a 'new image of thought.' There is a *description* of how the new monuments

34 *CW*, p. 15.

35 *CW*, p. 112.

actualise certain virtualities but not the performance of this actualisation itself. For this we have to go to another of Smithson's practices. This is not to say that we leave the realm of words. For Smithson these are as much the matter of art as any geological material, but we do turn to a different kind of writing, a *programmatic* piece of writing in which Smithson 'records' and in some senses reflects on the construction of his 'Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan'.

'Incidents' involved nine 'displacements': the positioning of twelve small square mirrors in different constellations within the South American desert landscape which Smithson and his fellow travellers were driving through. Each displacement had, and has, a peculiar quality to it which comes down to the specifics of the context in which it was placed (geology, flora, weather, etc). Each displacement then extracts and pictures a particular set of durations (or simply alternative temporalities). But 'Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan' is not just Smithson's journey, and not just the photographs of each displacement either. It is also the essay itself which operates as a kind of *programme* of how to access, or actualise, other virtualities.[36] Indeed the essay records what 'happens' with each displacement, a disruption of time and space (precisely mirror travel), but also, and I think more importantly, contained within the essay are the instructions on how to conduct the displacements again. Here for example is an extract from 'The Third Mirror Displacement':

> In the side of a heap of crushed limestone the twelve mirrors were cantilevered in the midst of large clusters of butterflies that had landed on the limestone. For brief moments flying butterflies were reflected; they seemed to fly through a sky of gravel. Shadows cast by the mirrors contrasted with those seconds of colour. A scale in terms of 'time' rather than 'space' took place. The mirror itself is not subject to duration, because it is an ongoing abstraction that is always available and timeless.

36 In this sense Smithson's essay performs much the same function as Carlos Casteneda's writings as they are characterised and utilised by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (see especially pp. 161-2). Indeed, inasmuch as *A Thousand Plateaus* is itself programmatic it resonates very well with Robert Smithson's *The Collected Writings*. In fact Smithson's book operates as a kind of intense condensation of plateaus 3, 4, 5 and 6.

> The reflections on the other hand, are fleeting instances that evade measure.[37]

In each of the displacements Smithson 'inserts' the mirrors *into* the earth. The mirrors then become *a part of the* landscape placed as they are in the geological ground zero of the desert. And yet the mirrors are also *apart from* the earth inasmuch as they reflect the sky (and other flora and fauna) and in so doing actualise other durations of organic and inorganic life. In fact the mirror, in Smithson's hands, becomes a device for 'erasing' typical duration, or simply human, linear time. For flattening it out, precisely for making time into a multiplicity: 'But if one wishes to be ingenious enough to erase time one requires mirrors, not rocks. A strange thing, this branching mode of travel: one perceives in every past moment a parting of ways, a highway spreads into a bifurcating and trifurcating region of zigzags.[38]

This 'switching' of registers via the mirror displacements (for Deleuze it would be the crystal) occurs in 'space' as well as time.[39] The mirror displacement journey involves the actualisation of those micro-universes usually imperceptible. Here for example is Smithson again, this time from 'The Fifth Mirror Displacement':

37 *CW*, p. 122.

38 *CW*, p. 131.

39 We might compare this with what Deleuze says about time in *Cinema 2*, although here it is the crystal, rather than the mirror, that allows for 'time travel': 'Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we *see in the crystal*. The crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos. This is the powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world. The visionary, the seer, is the one who sees in the crystal, and what he sees is the gushing of time as dividing in two, as splitting' (*C2*, p. 81). See Brian Massumi's 'Painting: the Voice of the Grain', in *Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Artworking 1985-1999*, (Brussels: Palais des Beaux-Arts, 2000) for an interesting utilisation of the time-crystal in relation to contemporary art, and specifically to the photocopied/painted surfaces of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger's work: 'Lichtenberg Ettinger's paintings function to preserve the evanescence of things: their always coming too early to be what they should become, and to late to remain what they would have been. Freeze-framing the too-early-and-too-late captures the image in what Deleuze would call a time-crystal. The time-crystal holds together, as accompanying facets, what in the linear unfolding of things are successive beats, the risings and fallings, in the rhythm of interweaving' (ibid., p. 11).

> On the outskirts of the ruins of Palenque or in the skirts of Coatlicue, rocks were overturned; first the rock was photographed, then the pit that remained. 'Under each rock is an orgy of scale,' said Coatlicue ... Each pit contained miniature earthworks - tracks and traces of insects and other sundry small creatures. In some beetle dung, cobwebs, and nameless slime. In others cocoons, tiny ant nests and raw roots. If an artist could see the world through the eyes of a caterpillar he might be able to make some fascinating art. Each of these secret dens was also the entrance to the abyss.[40]

For Smithson each of the displacements also operates to 'summon forth' a Mayan God from the Mexican desert that then articulates the workings of the displacements. Here art practice has left the realms of representation and become an *incarnation* of sorts, each God 'coming-forth' to embody a certain Mayan understanding of the world. Are these Gods figures projected onto the plane of immanence (figures of transcendence)? Perhaps, but they can also be understood as Smithson's *conceptual personages,* 'future-people' that embody a certain mode of being, a certain *style* of life. For example, Quetzalcoatl from 'The Ninth Mirror Displacement': 'The double aspect of Quetzalcoatl is less a person than an operation of totemic perception. Quetzalcoatl becomes one half of an enantiomorph (*coatl* means twin) in search of the other half. A mirror looking for its reflection but never quite finding it ... By travelling with Quetzalcoatl one becomes aware of primordial time or final time - The Tree of Rocks.[41]

Smithson's essay is then a work of imagination, a kind of creative fabulation, a story that *mythifies* reality.[42] Yet the essay also works as a

40 *CW*, p. 126.

41 *CW*, p. 131.

42 The artist Matthew Barney would seem to be a kind of successor to Smithson in this sense: a producer of modern myths for a modern world. In the *Cremaster* cycle of films, and in particular *Cremaster 3*, we also see an emphasis on the sculptural element of film: 'The Cremaster cycle tries to take on a cinematic language...I wanted to see how this sculptural project, which is what it is, could align itself with the cinematic form, and still come out as sculpture' (M. Barney, 'Artists Project', *Tate: International Arts and Culture*, issue 2 (Nov/Dec 2002), p. 59). In *Cremaster 3* there is also the inclusion of Richard Serra – one of Smithson's friends and allies – as master architect whom Barney himself, as apprentice, must overcome. This is not to give the film an overly narrative/linear reading for in fact

manual. It gives instruction on 'mirror travel', an undertaking we might recast in Deleuzian terms as 'travel' 'into' the virtual. Importantly this mirror travel must be performed: the instructions must be followed. Smithson gives us an account of his own journey, and in doing so informs us how we might repeat the experiment. What we have here then is an example of a pragmatic and practical philosophy (philosophy as a way of life as it were). After all you can *read*, and *understand* the concepts of the actual and the virtual but in order to actualise the virtual then these 'concepts' need to be incarnated in other materials and via other practices. We might say that this is the ritualistic function of art such as Smithson's which endeavours to take us out of our usual space/time coordinates, precisely to produce a reconfiguration of our habitual mode of being.[43]

2 The Plane of Immanence (or the Non-Philosophical Moment of Philosophy)

> In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over chaos. In this sense they contrast with sages, who are religious personae, priests, because they conceive of the institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside ... Whenever there is transcendence, vertical being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is philosophy whenever there is immanence.[44]

Barney is attracted to icons such as Serra because they are 'physical states' and not so much 'developed narrative characters' (ibid., p. 59). The connection with Deleuze-Bacon's notion of the figural seems apposite here. There is also the importance of landscape/location in the *Cremaster* films, as kinds of characters in themselves: '...it is important for that landscape to be drawable as a discrete object. That it should be possible to make a sculptural form from the Canadian Rockies or the Utah Salt Flats (ibid., p. 59). As we shall see, Smithson produces just such a sculpture from the Utah landscape. Indeed, Barney's films here mirror Smithson's earthworks: both operate on an epic scale, both are landscape sculptures, and both involve the construction of new myths that invoke a people-yet-to-come.

43 This is ritual in the sense that Georges Bataille uses the term: to refer to a form of play which takes the participants out of mundane consciousness (or 'work time') and into the realm of the sacred (the time of the instant). See G. Bataille, *Prehistoric Painting: Lascaux or the Birth of Art* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

44 *WP*, p. 43.

For Deleuze and Guattari philosophy *is* thinking immanence. Philosophy operates *on* the plane of immanence and through 'forms' which are themselves immanent to the plane (they do not 'arrive' from 'elsewhere'). In this sense philosophy is radically opposed to religion which projects its figures *onto* the plane of immanence from a transcendent point. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari write about Chinese hexagrams, Hindu mandalas, Jewish Sephiroth, Islamic 'Imaginals' and Christian icons all as being *projections* from a kind of vertical being, precisely a populating of the plane with *figures*.[45] Philosophy, on the other hand, populates its plane with concepts which are intimately connected to one another and to the plane from which, in some senses, they emerge.

But philosophy is only one form of thought amongst many, each with their own specificity. Indeed *What is Philosophy?* demarcates what Deleuze and Guattari see as the *three* great forms of thought: philosophy, but also science and art, each of which throws a 'plane over chaos' and has their own particular milieu *and* rules of invention.[46] In fact, in *What is Philosophy?*, notions of the virtual are only really relevant to the first two forms of thought: philosophy actualises the virtual in an event by means of the concept. (Deleuze's famous example, from Lewis Carroll, being 'the smile without the cat'). Science, on the other hand actualises the virtual in 'states of affairs' on a plane of reference, by a process of 'slowing down' and the positioning of 'partial observers' (we might say simply 'a cat').[47] Art, in this book anyway, and despite what Deleuze and Guattari say elsewhere, is more involved in notions of the possible. The aesthetic figures with which it populates its plane of composition express *possible* worlds. I have dealt with what *What is Philosophy?* says about the workings of art elsewhere.[48] Here I want to continue paying attention to philosophy, and more specifically to what appears to be the *non-philosophical moment of philosophy*, and which in a sense *grounds* the philosophical enterprise. In fact we might say that this moment lies at the very heart of all creative thought.

Before moving on however it is important, in fact it is one of the avowed purposes of *What is Philosophy?* to distinguish these three forms of thought from mere opinion or *doxa*. Whereas opinion merely

45 *WP*, p. 89.
46 *WP*, p. 197.
47 *WP*, p. 197.
48 See reference in footnote 2 above.

reproduces the present milieu, forms of thought such as art and philosophy are, rather, future orientated. In their construction they 'summon forth a new earth, a new people'.[49] Indeed this, for Deleuze and Guattari, as we have seen, is what makes philosophy political, if not revolutionary. Philosophy's *absolute* deterritorialisation (of the concept on the plane of immanence) conjoins with the present milieu in a *resistance* to the present (the *relative* deterritorialisation of capitalism and the concomitant domination of opinion). At stake here are new becomings which are always *minor* in nature.[50] Opinion then might be characterised as the *quasi* thought of the *majority*, the *doxa* of any particular time. The latter works by proposing:

> a particular relationship between an external perception as state of a subject and an internal affection as passage from one state to another (exo- and endoreference). We pick out a quality supposedly common to several objects that we perceive, and an affection supposedly common to several subjects who experience it and who, along with us, grasp that quality.[51]

When philosophy becomes confused with opinion (which, when it is called 'theory,' it so often does) then thought itself suffers and becomes little more than the confrontation of rival opinions, or, as Deleuze and Guattari remark, little more than 'pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations at Mr. Rorty's'.[52]

For Deleuze and Guattari then doing philosophy involves something a good deal more precise, and we might say a good deal more *radical*. Indeed it involves three interconnected operations: the creation of concepts, the construction of conceptual personages, and the 'throwing down' of a plane of immanence. Each in some senses relies on the others. The plane of immanence is the philosopher's point of view or attitude. It is the laying out of the ground, or terrain on which concepts (themselves territories) can be constructed. Concepts are constructed through the

49 *WP*, p. 99.
50 For a discussion of the minor, specifically in relation to literature, see G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986), esp. pp. 16-27. For a discussion of the minor in relation to film, and specifically 'Third-world' film, see *C2*, pp. 215-224.
51 *WP*, p. 144.
52 *WP*, p. 144.

combination of various components (which are invariably 'borrowed' from other concepts) and which are then given a certain consistency. This latter procedure itself involves a further invention of *conceptual personages* that 'live' these concepts (these characters are kinds of philosophical avatars of the philosopher himself: Descartes' idiot, or Nietzsche's Zarathustra for example). It is the last however, the laying down of the plane of immanence, understood as the philosopher's particular *style* (what Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* calls an 'image of thought') which procedurally comes first. It is the laying out of a plane as the conditions of a problem, the concepts which populate it being the case of a solution. Importantly it is a non-philosophical undertaking. It is in fact the non-philosophical moment of philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari's project here, as in *Difference and Repetition*, is to excavate and map out the *modern* image of thought and specifically that of Kant. How the latter always returns to resemblance, to recognition (to *re*presentation) and ultimately to an unquestioned assumption of common (read *good*) sense. However it follows from this that 'other' images of thought, 'other' planes of immanence can be instituted (we might see this as one of the many undertakings of *A Thousand Plateaus*). Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari say: 'those who do not renew the image of thought are not philosophers but functionaries who, enjoying a ready-made thought, are not even conscious of the problem and are unaware even of the efforts of those they claim to take as their models.[53] This is why the encounter, the *non*-philosophical encounter, is of such importance to the philosopher: it can bring about the destruction of a previous image of thought. Here then are Deleuze and Guattari talking about this encounter with the 'outside' of thought:

> Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess ... To think is always to follow the witch's flight.[54]

53 *WP*, p. 51.
54 *WP*, P. 141.

The plane of immanence is then precisely a form of *experimentation* and implies a certain experimental mode of being. It is a 'sieve stretched over chaos', an attempt to give consistency to chaos ('to give consistency without losing anything of the infinite').[55] This is opposed to science which 'seeks to provide chaos with reference points' thus abandoning infinite movement in a general limitation of speed (the slowing down that science, to be as such, must perform).[56] It is also, as we have seen, opposed to religion, which installs a transcendent order from above, by the projection of figures *onto* the plane of immanence.

This non-philosophical moment of philosophy (that in turn *renews* philosophy) can only proceed by intuition and by a certain amount of 'losing-one's-self'. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Henri Michaux and the notion that one only really *thinks* by 'becoming something else, something that does not think – an animal, a molecule, a particle - that comes back to thought and revives it.[57] Deleuze and Guattari are not referring to Michaux's art works here ('usually these measures do not appear in the result, which must be grasped solely in itself and calmly') but rather, it seems to me, are referring to the journeys, the adventures (whether drug influenced or not), which in some senses allow for, and perhaps provoke, such and such a concept, or indeed such and such an art work, to be made.[58] It is at this place that we move away from the three forms of thought to something wilder, something more chaotic. Indeed, later in *What is Philosophy?* art, science and philosophy are characterised as *chaoids*, forms of thought which refer back to chaos, and are in fact *of* chaos (a chaos given consistency).[59] However before this consistency is achieved there is the moment of the *encounter* with chaos, the confrontation with non-thought. It is in this place, at this moment, that the plane of immanence is instituted, almost as a survival mechanism, but also as that which will allow thought and creativity to unfurl.

It might be useful to turn here from *What is Philosophy?* to *A Thousand Plateaus*, the latter being very much a book about the non-philosophical adventures of philosophy. In this earlier, and in many senses *wilder*, work we have, as might be expected, a series of *strategies* for 'accessing' immanence, which is here described in more concrete terms.

55 *WP*, P. 141.
56 *WP*, p. 42.
57 *WP*, p. 42.
58 *WP*, p. 41-42.
59 *WP*, p. 208.

The plane of immanence in *A Thousand Plateaus* is a more slippery, we might even say more liquid, 'place'. It is Spinoza's God/Nature/substance, but the latter *stretched*, a place in which:

> There are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages.[60]

Here the plane of immanence is opposed to the plane of transcendence (also called the plane of organisation and development). It is the realm of the *molecular* from which *molar* aggregates such as our subjectivity and identity are formed.[61] It is, if you like, the ground zero of non-organic life. And it is on, and across, this plane that the 'Body without Organs' (BwO) moves, the latter understood, at this point anyway, as itself a kind of surface upon which the 'I' is a mere striation. As such, the BwO is a mechanism, a procedure, for undoing the strata that binds us:

> Let us consider the three great strata concerning us, in other words, the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, significance, and subjectification. The surface of the organism, the angle of significance and interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection. You will be organised, you will

60 *ATP*, p. 266.

61 It is to this notion of subjectless individuations that Deleuze returns in his last writings. In *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, trans. A. Boyan (New York: Urzone, 2001) Deleuze gives us the example of young children – who might as yet have no, or next to no, individuality as such (they all resemble one another) – but who do have singularities: 'a smile, a gesture, a funny face – not subjective qualities. Small children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss' (ibid., p. 30). It is this life of immanence that runs parallel to any psychosocial notions of individuality: 'the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other' (ibid., p. 29). For Deleuze this *life*, or 'great health' is the proper subject of literature – and we might say of art also. See also *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. D. W. Smith and M. A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), and Daniel W. Smith's informative introductory essay.

> be an organism, you will articulate your body – otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement – otherwise you're just a tramp. To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or *n* articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification).[62]

The BwO is then, paradoxically, a kind of aesthetic machine *but* its operating field is immanence rather than transcendence. It breaks down the subject object split, tears apart what Guattari once called the 'ontological iron curtain between being and things.[63] It is always *a* BwO, never mine, or yours, or his, or hers. It is constituted solely by *a*personal affects, by intense thresholds and differential gradients of speed and slowness. It has a relation with the strata that it is in some senses a part of, but it is also that which sets the strata free, that which allows for the possibility of *destratification.*

Of course, the point is to *build* yourself a BwO, and as such the BwO is a technique of construction as well as the production of intensities: 'But what comes to pass on the BwO is not exactly the same as how you make yourself one...One phase is for the fabrication of the BwO, the other to make something circulate on it or pass across it.[64] In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari offer us a whole selection of constructed BwO's, some of which are botched (simply do not 'work'), some of which are cancerous (producing a proliferation of strata, that is, fascism), and others of which are destructive (for example the drug addict producing a hollowed out and ultimately nihilistic BwO, or the masochist who might build a BwO but then find that no intensities come to pass). Perhaps the most successful BwO's are those that can be repeated, those that can be 'reused'. Art might be a name for these experimental modes of being, these strange and exciting (and sometimes frightening) 'new' images of

62 *ATP*, p. 159.

63 F. Guattari, 'On Machines', *Complexity: Architecture/Art/Philosophy*, trans. V. Constantinopoulos (London: Academy Editions, 1995), p. 8.

64 *ATP*, p. 152.

thought. Although art can also be, and often is, the name for those BwO's which have precisely been blocked, botched or otherwise broken. This amounts to saying that the dangers of transcendence are everywhere and always accompany experiments and adventures in *thinking* immanence.

Excursus 2: The Spiral Jetty

In the essay 'A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects', Smithson lays out his project of 'abstract geology' understood as a general 'slowing down' of thought.[65] This is how the essay begins:

> The earth's surface and the figments of the mind have a way of disintegrating into discrete regions of art. Various agents both fictional and real, somehow trade places with each other - one cannot avoid muddy thinking when it comes to earth projects, or what I will call 'abstract geology.' One's mind and the earth are in a constant state of erosion, mental rivers wear away abstract banks, brain waves undermine cliffs of thought, ideas decompose into stones of unknowing, and conceptual crystallisation break apart into deposits of gritty reason. Vast moving faculties occur in this geological miasma, and they move in the most physical way. This movement seems motionless, yet it crushes the landscape of logic under glacial reveries. This slow flowage makes one conscious of the turbidity of thinking. Slump, debris slides, avalanches all take place within the cracking limits of the brain. The entire body is pulled into the cerebral sediment, where particles and fragments makes themselves known as solid consciousness. A bleached

65 Smithson, in another essay, also lays out a parallel project of 'abstract cartography'. Again there are many similarities between this project and the Deleuzoguattarian project of rhizomatics. In the essay Smithson notes that: 'From *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* of Orrelius (1570) to the "paint"-clogged maps of Jasper Johns, the map has exercised a fascination over the minds of artists. A cartography of uninhabitable places seems to be developing - complete with decoy diagrams, abstract grid systems made of stone and tape (Carl Andre and Sol le Witt), and electronic 'mosaic' photomaps from NASA...Lewis Carrol refers to this abstract kind of cartography in his *The Hunting of the Snark* (where a map contains 'nothing') and in *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* (where a map contains 'everything')'. (*CW*, p. 92)

> and fractured world surrounds the artist. To organise this mess of corrosion into patterns, grids, and subdivisions is an esthetic (sic.) process that has scarcely been touched.[66]

Here the artist confronts chaos or as Smithson calls it, the 'undifferentiated', in front of which he organises grids and patterns, his 'abstract geology', as the precondition for thought and creativity.[67] This is the 'primary process' of 'making contact with matter', a process which Smithson feels is often overlooked in favour of the 'finished' piece.[68] Indeed, according to Smithson, critics such as Michael Fried disparage the encounter (the 'abyss' fills them with fear) choosing instead to cast their gaze at the second moment, the construction of that which 'fences in' the abyss (that which halts becomings).[69] Smithson is not nihilistic, he does not plunge into the abyss, but like Deleuze he favours that art which has something of the abyss, of chaos, about it.[70] Hence his preference for material and for forms which arise from the earth itself.

As a case study of this process we might take Smithson's most well known earthwork: The *Spiral Jetty* (Fig. 3). Like 'Incidents of Mirror Travel in the Yucatan' it has now disappeared (although it still 'exists' under the waters of the Great Salt Lake in Utah), but like the latter 'The Spiral Jetty' is also an essay which itself constructs the *Spiral Jetty* via words.[71] The essay then records and recounts Smithson's selection,

66 *CW*, p. 100.

67 Smithson's 'theoretical' resources here, as he himself remarks elsewhere, are Freud (notions of the 'oceanic') and the Freudian psychoanalyst Anton Ehrenzweig (notions of the unconscious as 'de-differentiated'). See A. Ehrenzweig's *The Hidden Order of Art: A Study in the Psychology of Artistic Imagination* (London: Weidenfeld, 1993). See also Lyotard's preface to the French edition, 'Beyond Representation', trans. J. Culler, republished in *The Lyotard Reader*, ed. A. Benjamin ((Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

68 *CW*, p. 103.

69 *CW*, p. 103-04.

70 For Smithson art does not involve a wild destratification, but what we might call the development and maintenance of a 'strategic zone'; a space of experimentation *between* the strata and the outside (in fact a place in which one might *encounter* the outside). See Deleuze's book on *Foucault*, trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988), especially pp. 120-22.

71 In fact, according to recent reports, *Spiral Jetty* is now re-emerging from the lake as the water level drops (See for example J. Dickie, 'Something in the Water', *Independent on Sunday*, 20 October 2002, and for a record of a trip there (with photographs of the now white jetty) S. Husband's 'Ever Decreasing Circlers',

construction, and 'activation' of *Spiral Jetty*. Like 'Incidents' it is also a kind of philosophy, a practical philosophy, in the sense that it draws concepts the ('spiral' or the 'helicopter' for example) across an already constituted plane of immanence, understood here as both Smithson's attitude to the salt lake *and* the salt lake itself.

The first stage then, as the essay tells us, is the search for the 'site' (we might say the 'throwing down' of the plane, or the construction of the BwO). The search is careful, not just any place will do, but somewhere which 'grabs' Smithson (which 'selects' him as it were). It is in fact the 'site' that will determine the earthwork. Eventually Smithson locates it:

> About one mile north of the oil seeps I selected my site. Irregular beds of limestone dip gently eastward, massive deposits of black basalt are broken over the peninsula, giving the region a shattered appearance. It is one of the few places on the lake where the water comes right up to the mainland. Under shallow pinkish water is a network of mud cracks supporting the jig-saw puzzle that composes the salt flats. As I looked at the site, it reverberated out to the horizons only to suggest an immobile cyclone while flickering light make the whole landscape appear to quake. A dormant earthquake spread into the fluttering stillness, into a spinning sensation without movement. This site was a rotary that enclosed itself in an immense roundness. From that gyrating space emerged the possibility of the Spiral Jetty. No ideas, no concepts, no systems, no structures, no abstractions could hold themselves together in the actuality of that evidence ... No sense wondering about classifications and categories, there were none.[72]

For Smithson then there is not so much a *before* to the selection, an idea that might be *re*presented in a given site. In fact the site itself functions to suggest the work, and as such might be said to already hold within it a *potentiality* (precisely the *Spiral Jetty*) which is then brought out in the resulting construction.[73]

Observer Magazine, 25 April 2004.

72 *CW*, p. 146.

73 Craig Owens makes a similar point in his essay 'The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism', republished in *The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology*, ed. D. Preziosi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Here he is discussing *Spiral Jetty* in relation to allegory: 'The site-specific work often aspires to a prehistoric monumentality; Stonehenge and the Nazca lines are taken as prototypes. It's "content" is frequently mythical, as that of the *Spiral Jetty*, whose form was derived from a local myth of a whirlpool at the bottom of the Great Salt Lake; in this way Smithson exemplifies the tendency to engage in a *reading* of the site, in terms not only of its topographical specifics but also of its psychological resonances' (ibid., p. 318). Although agreeing in kind with Owen's notion of allegory in relation to Smithson, one might want to question whether *reading* is the right term for Smithson's *encounter* with the site. Indeed, it would seem that Smithson's response and attitude is precisely one of *not* reading.

The second moment commences with the construction of the jetty itself. The tail and spiral are staked out and then the machines – two dump trucks, a tractor and a front loader – move the earth and fill the jetty in. Smithson's use of machines is important. This is not a return to some kind of primitive pre-modern practice, or rather it is not *just* this. Indeed *Spiral Jetty* involves a mobilisation of the technology of modernity but precisely to produce, to *actualise*, something *different* (a *novel* assemblage). The landscape Smithson works on is likewise less a raw 'nature' than an always already 'contaminated' terrain, a terrain moulded as much by modern man as by elemental forces. Indeed it is particularly these industrial wastelands that attract Smithson, and which provide the ground for his constructions. Again, we might say that these kinds of terrains are already overflowing with potentialities of which the work actualises just a selection.

Third moment. In standing on the jetty, there is a switching of registers, the switching of what Smithson calls 'scale' ('To be in the scale of the Spiral Jetty is to be out of it. On eye level, the tail leads one into an undifferentiated state of matter').[74] This involves a further 'activation' of the earthwork, the passing of intensities 'across' the body-without-organs, understood here as a body-brain-earth assemblage:

> On the slopes of Rozel Point I closed my eyes, and the sun burned crimson thro2ugh the lids. I opened them up and the Great Salt Lake was bleeding scarlet streaks. My sight was saturated by the colour of red algae circulating in the heart of the lake, pumping into ruby currents, no they were veins and arteries sucking up the obscure sediment. My eyes became combustion chambers churning orbs of blood blazing by the light of the sun. All was enveloped in a flaming chromosphere.[75]

74 *CW*, p. 147.

75 *CW*, p. 148.

Finally in the helicopter ride over the jetty the earthwork is further activated. Scale is again introduced (registers are switched). Questions of natural versus artificial become redundant here as Smithson reaches degree 0, *THE* plane of immanence understood here as precisely a state of non-organic life:

> The helicopter manoeuvred the sun's reflections through the Spiral Jetty until it reached the centre. The water functioned as a vast thermal mirror. From that position the flaming reflection suggested the ion source of a cyclotron that extended into a spiral of collapsed matter. All sense of energy accelerated expired into a rippling stillness of reflected heat. A withering light swallowed the rocky particles of the spiral, as the helicopter gained altitude. All existence seemed tentative and stagnant. The sound of the helicopter motor became a primal groan echoing the tenuous aerial views ... I was slipping out of myself again, dissolving into a unicellular beginning, trying to locate the nucleus at the end of the spiral. All that blood stirring makes one aware of protoplasmic solutions, the essential matter between the formed and the unformed, masses of cells consisting largely of water, proteins, lipoids, carbohydrates, and inorganic salts.[76]

We might say that the above narrative is merely a fiction, after all *Spiral Jetty* is at least on one level just earth and rocks deposited in a lake. But *Spiral Jetty* is also a machine which produces a different experience of the world and thus a different, or altered, consciousness. It is in this sense that the film of *Spiral Jetty* is as important as the essay. The film – a kind of *geo-cinema* – is a construction just as the essay and the jetty themselves are (all involve the manipulation of matter). Through the use of montage, close-ups and stills (for example of maps and charts, of the ripples of the lake, of the sunlight), as well as the different 'view points' of the car speeding through the desert towards the lake, the slow motion and low camera angle of the dump trucks constructing the jetty (themselves paralleling the dinosaurs in the Natural History Museum) and the helicopter's birds eye view over the jetty itself, the film actualises the different durations and different scales written about in the essay. The camera then operates here as a machine eye opening us up to other non-

76 *CW*, p. 149.

human worlds.[77] The soundtrack also works to produce different and fractured temporalities from Smithson's mantra-like reading of the directions of the compass to the silences of the National History Museum and the sound of the helicopter blades. We might say then that the film parallels the work of the essay, which itself parallels the construction of the jetty: each are components of the *Spiral Jetty machine* whose operative field we might give here a new name: *geoaesthetics*.

77 As Smithson remarks in 'A Cinema Atopia', echoing Deleuze's own thoughts: 'One thing all film has in common is the power to take perception elsewhere' (*CW*, p. 138). In this essay Smithson outlines a kind of geo-cinema in which 'all films would be brought into equilibrium – a vast mud field of images forever motionless' (*CW*, p. 142). Smithson also outlines the construction of a literal *geo-cinema*, made in a cave or cavern, and made out of crude materials. This geo-cinema shows just one film – a record of its own construction.

Pli 16 (2005), 56-78

'The Face is a Horror Story': The Affective Face of Horror

ANNA POWELL

> [T]he affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face.[1] (Deleuze)

Near the end of *The Blair Witch Project*, camera operator Heather auto-records her voice and image on video. In her traumatised state, she neglects the rules of classical composition. She directly faces a camera set-up on an extreme close-up of two-thirds of the top half of her face. Overcome by terror, Heather breaks down and the camera continues to record. The minute physical signs of her distress appear as her face fragments. Her skin texture is rendered in sharper focus than normal distance and its imperfections are emphasised. Tears ooze from her eyes and trickle down her cheeks, her nostrils quiver and nasal mucous runs over her mouth and onto her chin.

In this painfully intimate and intrusive composition, the face on the screen is at the same time defamiliarised *as* a face. It is no longer Heather, the once blasé young student now close to losing her sanity as well as her way in the woods, but has become a vibrating map of affect. This map is both constrained by the edges of the frame and stretches beyond its confines via its machinic connection with us. The special potency of this image is attested to by its centrality in the film's publicity material. Rather than discussing plot, theme or characterisation, I want to use this filmic event to explore the horror genre in the light of Deleuze's claim that film close-ups are the affection-image *par excellence*.

1 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) p. 87.

Deleuze describes the initial critical task as mapping assemblages of aesthetic regimes.[2] The aesthetic critic should identify the plane of consistence which intersects regimes and highlight the mutual operations of contiguous particles on a plane of immanence.[3] Content and expression are no longer distinguished. They are melded by 'diagrammatic components' of style, such as the spiral in Alfred Hitchcock's film *Vertigo*.[4] These components are both the working parts of the film and the spectatorial part of the filmic process. In this piece, I suggest the face as a diagrammatic component of the horror film assemblage.

In *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze elides the affection-image, the close-up and the face. Horror film is a genre potent with affect. It reveals faces with only a fleeting resemblance to human features, or none. To keep audiences in suspense, the faces of monsters appear sparingly on screen, often being reserved for the ultimate revelation of a close-up. The faces of victims in extremes of fear and despair are much more common. Alternatively, they might display blankness, a mask-like catatonia which lies beyond these extremes. I will be using horror film faces as perversely literal applications of Deleuze's concepts of faciality. The face is part of the broader assemblage of cinematic affect.

The Affection-Image and Film Aesthetics

Deleuze focuses on the materiality and affective force of the medium. Signification and 'meaning' are displaced by the rhythms of movement, the dynamics of framing and the modulations of light. Cinematic signs are objects of experiential encounter which take place in the interstices as well as the images themselves. Rather than following an associative chain of images, Deleuze's technique is the 'method of between' which explores components such as sound and vision, in order to 'make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible'.[5] The 'frontier' borders the metaphysical dynamic of duration.

2 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 'Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyse' in *Dialogues II*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 22.
3 'Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyse', p. 22.
4 'Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyse', p. 22.
5 *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (London: Athlone, 1995) p. 180.

Deleuze insists that we respond to signs not as symbolic representations, but as elements of movement and vibrations of force. Shades of colour, intensities of light and timbres of sound are potent with material affect. Each singularity is rich with gradations and shades which interact at micro and macro levels with other filmic elements. Colour, sound and composition are components of the machinic assemblage of the whole and their affective properties stimulate the embodied spectator's responses.

Perceptual and neurological processes, such as kinaesthesia (the sense of movement and bodily orientation in space); synaesthesia (the mixing of different sense modalities); and hapticity (interaction between vision and bodily feeling or tactility) are operant for us as well as thought. In our experience of the film, we interlink our corporeal machine and the film's technological and aesthetic machine. If our engagement is intense, we think in, and through, the body. Cinema embodies modes of thought specific to the movement-image and enables us to perceive the workings of both space-time and duration on screen, both in the world and in our 'selves'.

All cinematic images are movement-images. Images move within the frame via the camera's motion, and between frames in the rhythms of editing. The frames move before us on screen by the projector and its flickering light. As we view, our own response is facialised. Our faces physically collaborate in the screen event, and intensive affect is manifest in muscular shifts of expression and possible exudation of saline solution or saliva. The viewer's eyes move in collusion with the phi-phenomenon and on their own behalf as neurological components of perception. Blinking, widening in disbelief or closing in horror, our eyes modify the film's movement-images and construct their own intensive versions as part of the assemblage.

I am aware that my continued use of the terms 'spectator', 'viewer' and connected forms is inevitably problematised by my emphasis on the mind/brain/body/text engagement in film. We do not experience films from the detached perspective of a disembodied set of eyes. My approach moves in the opposite direction. Our eyes are embedded, and embodied in flesh as only one part of the complex perceptual apparatus stimulated by film. They feed our other senses with 'outside' information, but as this process occurs, the information no longer remains purely visual in nature. The eyes are an extension of our brain; part of the imagination's

operations; part of the camera's machinery; and part of the cinema machine. No longer transcendent signifiers as 'the mirrors of the soul', they are also our face's black holes.

My use of 'I' is, of course similarly problematic. We cannot speak for any other spectator, or even for 'ourselves' as self-enclosed subjects. Each person's experience of each film is distinctive every time s/he views. Deleuze, or any other theorist can only suggest contingent perspectives. I prefer to retain sentences with a 'subject' for aesthetic reasons of smooth construction. When I use 'we', as I frequently do, I am not assuming all audience members share my viewpoint, but that 'I' am both a singularity and a collective assemblage with other singularities who make up a heterogeneous audience-becoming. I can only posit that 'they' might collectively share certain affective responses to certain technological stimuli with 'me'. I have continued to use the personal pronouns, because, as they are a basic currency of film studies, they help me to communicate my arguments. I admit to not having yet found satisfactory substitutes.

Subjectivity is reconfigured as a material event or 'affective contagion'.[6] Deleuze's spectator rarely exists as a separate entity. The spectatorial function is subsumed into his textual readings. Unlike the concept of suture or imbrication, which stitches the spectator into the film's reactionary ideology, the assemblage of viewer and text is a dynamic experience of processual becoming. The spectator might be fictional as well as invisible, but at the same time, Deleuze's own film theories are inevitably indicative. Ideally, 'we' should approach film in a radical way, prepared not just to view film otherwise, but to open ourselves up to a paradigm shift. Deleuze's spectator is 'dead' along with the fiction of the autonomous, self-enclosed subject, yet alive as never before.

Deleuze applies what he calls Henri Bergson's 'metacinema' of mind/matter to film/philosophy. He deploys Bergson's grammatical equivalent of action-images as verbs, perception-images as nouns and affection-images as adjectives. For Bergson, the perception-image has extensity, but the affection-image is unextended, measuring the body's power to absorb rather than reflect.[7] The affection-image is located

6 Felix Guattari (1995), *Chaosmosis: An Ethico Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. P. Bains and J. Pefanis (Sidney: Power Publications), p. 92.

7 Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991) p. 55.

between perception and action. It involves the interior 'co-incidence of subject and object' and is 'qualitative, not quantitative' in nature. Affect is distinguished from emotion by its 'autopoesis', a pre-or trans-personal process of self-enjoyment.

Like Bergson, Deleuze presents affection as a facet of human evolution in the field of perception. As humans evolved, we 'specialised one of our facets or certain of our points into receptive organs at the price of condemning them to immobility'.[8] These facets engage in refraction and absorption rather than reflection of images. The affection-image is experienced by our immobilised organs of reception. It is Bergson's 'motor tendency on a sensitive nerve'[9] and Deleuze's own photographic definition of a 'motor effort on an immobilised receptive plate'.[10] Affect is more than a nerve vibrating in physiological response. We are also conscious of an intense sensation within our 'personality', recognising the 'irresistible reflex movements to which it incites us, or by the powerlessness with which it affects us'.[11] Intensity is between 'extensive magnitude' or quantity; and quality, which brings from the 'depths of consciousness, the image of an inner multiplicity'.[12]

Both the moving body and the eye/brain are images embedded in moving matter, and 'the movement-image and flowing matter' are identical.[13] The living human image is located in the 'interval between a received and an executed, movement.[14] The affection-image is likewise interstitial. Between perception and action, it occupies the interval itself, 'without filling it in or filling it up'.[15] Rather than being in a fixed 'geographical' location, affection is in dynamic motion between perception and action.

Affect is internal and self-reflexive, but remains corporeal, being 'a co-incidence of subject and object', as the subject experiences itself from inside. The affection-image is not a failure of the perception-action

8 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 65.
9 *Matter and Memory*, pp. 55-6.
10 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 66.
11 Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971) p. 40.
12 *Time and Free Will*, p. 73.
13 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 59.
14 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 62.
15 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 65.

system, but 'a third absolutely necessary given'.[16] Affection, in which the subject and object coincide, is 'pure quality'.

The affective force of art, which impresses rather than expresses feelings, is shared by 'physical contagion'.[17] Art has special access to duration and can convey its quality to the engaged perceiver. The most powerful art according to both Bergson and Deleuze affects us on more complex levels than 'inferior' work in which 'analysis often fails to discover in a sensation anything beyond the sensation itself'.[18] A 'novel' work of art conveys 'a state unique of its kind and indefinable' by 'enabling us to experience what [the artist] cannot make us understand.[19] It works with the most potent affective tools, which our body imitates mechanically, 'so as to transport us all at once into the indefinable psychological state which called them forth'.[20]

The autonomous quality of the affection-image in perception has its correspondents in cinematic style. The image's symbolic, social meaning is distinct from its 'quality'. Referring to a scene from Pabst's *Pandora's Box* featuring Lulu with her nemesis, Jack the Ripper, Deleuze acknowledges the obvious presence of diegetic actuality, with 'real' individuals in social roles. As well as these fictional representations, there are qualities which 'in themselves, or as expressed' constitute 'the event in its eternal aspect' such as 'the brightness of the light on the knife, the blade of the knife under the light, Jack's terror and resignation, Lulu's compassionate look' which are 'pure singular qualities' or pure 'possibles'.[21]

Although power-qualities relate to narrative causes which *make up* the state of things, they refer primarily to themselves as *expressing* the state of things. Particular affects are 'Dividual', they vary their quality according to the connections they enter into and the divisions they undergo.[22] Emotions like terror and sensations like brightness actualise power-qualities, which are virtualities, waiting to be actualised in particular

16 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 65.
17 *Time and Free Will*, p. 15. The image of infection is echoed by Guattari's 'affective contamination'.
18 *Time and Free Will*, p. 17.
19 *Time and Free Will*, p. 18.
20 *Time and Free Will*, p. 18.
21 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 102.
22 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 105.

conditions. The quality of an image depends on both its context in the film and its particular affect on the spectator.

Deleuzian film/philosophy focuses on stylistic expression. *Mise-en-scène* analysis evokes the affective quality of aesthetic components. For Deleuze, 'a colour like red, a value like brightness, a power like decisiveness, a quality like hardness or tenderness, are primarily positive possibilities which refer only to themselves'.[23] It is possible to shift focus by dis-locating these affects from their narrative context and break the spell of fictional interpellation. As well as being an aesthetic quality, the affection-image can stimulate a particular quality of thought.

The affection-image might appear as an autonomous 'virtual conjunction' which moves away from character psychology and plot. In a Hammer Horror film, Terence Fisher's *The Brides of Dracula*, Fisher extends the affection-image's autonomy when he makes Dracula 'perish nailed to the ground, but in virtual conjunction with the sails of a burning windmill which project the shadow of a cross at the exact place of the torture)'.[24] Here, the collusion of *mise-en-scène* elements in the vampire's demise abstracts subjectivity from the character and adds participatory animation to external objects.

The Deleuzian Horror Film

Although examples from popular horror film are rare in Deleuze's critical writings, wider interest in the aesthetically horrific is present. He explores the operations of what he calls the 'unbearable' in such diverse cases as Francis Bacon's paintings, Melville's *Moby Dick* and Emily Bronte's novels. Extreme affect can, he claims, push consciousness into an extra-mundane state, in which a sense of the numinous is accessed, as 'the unbearable itself is inseparable from a revelation or an illumination, as from a third eye'.[25] This belief is in keeping with his general valorisation of avant-garde aesthetics and their power to radicalise consciousness.[26]

23 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 106.
24 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 112.
25 *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 18.
26 For an analysis of avant-garde aesthetics, see Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-garde*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

In my view, not only art-film, but more generic horror may undermine the subject/object divide. Formulaic mainstream films initially appear to be less rich in Deleuzian concepts than stylistically adventurous works, which offer more loopholes for duration to enter. The spectator has to work harder with mainstream films. We input more affective response because we are 'trapped' in a set of conventions and strive to experience them differently. If we response afresh to mainstream films, we might well produce a more potent creative assemblage than if the work of defamiliarisation has already been done on our behalf.

Whether defamiliarisation is built from scratch, or ready-made, the horror film seeks to frighten us 'out of our wits'. Affective excess undermines cognition as our optic nerves and auditory membranes struggle to process confusing data. The spectator's own coherence is undermined as we slide into a molecular assemblage with the body of the film. Formal properties, like the blur and shake of *The Blair Witch Project*, intensify this sense of melding. The viewer's sensory participation intensifies by viral infection as the film literally gets inside us, sets up home and continues to live there.

In the viewer/screen event, the interface thins or disappears. The same molecular material composes and the same force flows through congruent elements. Despite the immaterial nature of cinematic images, the viewer responds corporeally. This is a very different process to aesthetic contemplation, or to the subject/object split in theories of the spectatorial gaze. The intimate contact is a *mimesis* that both copies and materially connects objects together. The psychophysiology of cinematic experience and the ways in which vision and sound stimulates the nervous system is still under-researched, but we can usefully deploy Deleuze's philosophical speculations on the affective phenomena of film.

Psychoanalytic interpretations of horror use the viewer or the text as a case study of subjective psychic scenarios, ignoring immediate affect. Deleuze, on the other hand, asserts that the body of affect is 'irreducible' and autonomous. It is pre-subjective, prior to individuation and agency. Deleuzian applications analyse the direct, material experience of the horror film in its colours, sounds and movements. By over-saturated colours, distorted sounds and hallucinatory images, horror cinema bombards the sensorium. The dynamic interaction of text and viewer also has cerebral reverberations.

One of the chief techniques used to suture the spectator into the fictional world is 'identification' with characters. This is engineered by frequent facial close-ups to create intimacy with the character, who becomes a kind of imaginary role-model or locus of projected desire and/or fear. For psychoanalytic film theorists, this identification is either Oedipal in nature (Freudian) or the phantasied misrecognition of an ego-ideal (Lacanian). For Deleuze, the face in film has a very different function, which is part of his wider concept of 'faciality'.

The Face, Faciality and Cinematic Affect

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari devote a chapter to the face and faciality, or the quality of face-ness, which throws light on its cinematic function. The face is initially a *tabula rasa*, 'a suggestive whiteness, a hole that captures'.[27] Faces are not personal or individual, but 'define zones of frequency or probability'.[28] By the operations of the '*abstract machine of faciality*' in the service of political power, the face can also be a politics.[29] Both signifiance and subjectification are projected upon this 'white wall'. Signification becomes indexed to traits of faciality, which are then 'read'. Subjectivity is likewise formed by faces which act as 'loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality'.[30] Not only the human face is facialised, but we facialise everything 'in our own image', facialising the rest of the body first, then projecting facialised characteristics upon the thing-world.

Despite this reactionary political appropriation of the face, it retains the potential for more radical forms of deterritorialisation. This is because it is deterritorialised already, due to its liminal status between organic body part and social signifier. For Deleuze and Guattari, the face represents '*absolute* deterritorialization' which 'removes the head from the stratum of the organism, human or animal, and connects it to other strata, such as signifiance and subjectification'.[31]

27 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone, 1988) p. 168.
28 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 168.
29 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 168.
30 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 168.
31 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 172.

Widely regarded as the most 'personal' and 'individual' part of the human, the face is also potentially 'the inhuman in human beings' and thus a means of exceeding the current limits of the human.[32] Radical deterritorialisation of the face begins with defamiliarisation. This involves rejecting customary ways of 'reading' the signs of the face i.e. 'finding' pre-projected social and political meanings and subjective depth. Before the latent force of the face can be released, the current face must first be taken apart.

The characterisation of the face by Deleuze and Guattari uses cinematic terminology. The key image of black hole and white wall connects the face as it currently exists in cinema. Not only is the face a frame or screen for social meaning, but it is also 'the black hole of subjectivity as consciousness or passion', characterised as 'a camera, the third eye'.[33] The crux of these cinematic parallels is the close-up. The face 'is by nature a close-up, with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness'.[34] The close-up of the face defamiliarises it 'primarily as a landscape' in an alienation device.[35] Horror cinema is rich with affective close-ups of facial landscapes which illumine Deleuzian faciality. Of these, I select three types: the dismantled face of the literal body-without organs; the frozen face of the witness; and the faceless face of the mask.

The Dismantled Face and the Body-without-Organs: *Hellraiser*

Clive Barker's film *Hellraiser* offers a horribly literal example of the deterritorialising of a human face. The film foregrounds the abjection of the flesh and disintegration of subjective wholeness by the enforced removal of body parts. Affective images of sado-masochistic torture are central. Bodies are displayed literally without organs, having had them removed or displaced.

Early in the film, a demonic Cenobite appears in the cold blue light of an infernal torture chamber. An immaculately attired creature, his pallid face extends into a shaven head. His face/head is decorated by elaborate

32 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.
33 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 168.
34 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.
35 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 172.

rows of pins, piercing his flesh in a becoming-metal. When his fellow Cenobites appear later, their membranous clothing grows into the bodies beneath. Patterns on their torsos resemble wounds which suggest that they are wearing the displaced and incorporated faces of victims. Among the shreds of flesh on the ground, Pinhead finds parts of a human face. The split, dismembered features have been drawn out by chains and quartered. Its sense organs have been violently parted from each other, with the ears, eyes and mouth ripped into separate quarters. He wraps the features back together, carefully enclosing them in an inlaid box.

Frank, the original 'owner' of the face, begins to piece his decimated body together again, magically powered by stolen blood. His face slowly grows back without bone or skin, just pallid tendons holding the brain and muscle together. Despite his tenuous incorporation, a pair of dark, impenetrable eyes are now completely formed as 'black holes' in his remnants of face. Frank tacks the facial skin of his dead brother Larry over his own incomplete flesh after murdering him, leaving a bloody rim. By stealing the face, he appropriates his brother's voice and facial expressions. When Larry's daughter, Kirsty, claws at this face, she reveals how thinly Larry's identity has been stuck over Frank's incomplete body. The glaucous, pulsing mass of organs and tendons emphatically presents skin as clothing, and the face as a mask.

Frank-as-Larry is tortured and executed by the Cenobites a second time. His whole body is pierced by hooks on chains and spread eagled. His stolen face is torn off as 'Larry' also dies a second time. This exposes raw tissues beneath, making Frank's whole body into a wound. With his facial remnant, he grins and licks his lips in perverse pleasure, murmuring 'Jesus wept' in an ironic embrace of his penchant for extreme sensation before his head is ripped off and his body explodes. *Hellraiser* delights in displaying the parts, bit by glutinous bit, of Frank's horribly literal body-without-organs, which he painstakingly sticks back together again only to have it re-decimated.

The term and the concept of the 'body-without-organs' originates in the work of Antonin Artaud, who blames a repressive deity for alienating us from our true, anarchic body-without-organs and replacing it by an 'organised' body on which he can exercise his judgment. According to Deleuze, Artaud's concept of judgement is opposed to our fully human existence on five points, '*cruelty versus infinite torture, sleep or intoxication versus the dream, vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a will to dominate, combat versus war*'.[36] Both infinite torture and the will to dominate are reminiscent of the Cenobites, who perversely enact God's punishment.

Deleuze and Guattari, building on Artaud's insights, have remapped the body's terrain as the body-without-organs across their work. It is 'an affective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, thresholds and gradients. It is traversed by a powerful, nonorganic vitality'.[37] This amoeba-like body allows openness to the surrounding matter that may have been excluded by the psychoanalytic ego-defences. Deleuze's affective aggregate of schizophrenization, enables 'a limit-process in which the identity of the individual is dissolved and passes entirely into the virtual chaosmos of included disjunctions'.[38] Instead of a fixed, biological entity, Deleuze and Guattari regard the body-without-organs as a set of speeds and intensities conceived in relation to other entities.

Deleuze and Guattari use the term 'body' as a shifting, composite, which may be cultural, social, technological, molecular or organic. As well as having distinct particularities, all bodies are interconnected with each other at an atomic level. Each body is a modified form of one fluid substance. Male and female bodies without organs, for example, have mutated beyond fixed gender oppositions. They can potentially connect with all other bodies to form new assemblages, whilst retaining specificity, or singularity.

The body-without-organs is open to multiple becoming-other. It is no longer constrained by the medical profession's designated layout and its consequent mental and social topography. The main characteristics of the body-without-organs are 'openness, change, mutability, fluidity, feedback, complexity'.[39] In order to meld with an initial body-without-organs, the second singularity must be open-ended to transformation. Mutual becomings lead to the formation of new, composite entities, themselves bodies without organs, each with potential for further becomings.

36 Gilles Deleuze, 'To be Done with Judgement', *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London and New York: Verso, 1998) pp. 126-136, p. 134.
37 'To be Done With Judgement', p. 131.
38 Daniel Smith, introduction to *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. xxix
39 Barbara Kennedy, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p. 99.

More than anything, Frank wants his own, molar body and face back after they have been radically dispersed by demonic forces. Horror film obsessively returns to the trope of wholeness, its graphic disintegration and possible renewal. The monstrous body's unnaturally re-animated life is the apex of reactionary horror rather than the aspiration of the anarchic radical. The stealing of faces is presented as the ultimate violation. The theme of stolen or altered faces in horror film implies that the personal 'self' resides in the face and, more particularly, the eyes. The violent decimation of subjective wholeness offers a perverse enactment of Deleuze and Guattari's call to dismantle faces. The facial depredations of horror do not depend on the physical torture of the face to convey affect. Intensive quality may also belong to the frozen face of the helpless witness in Carl-Theodor Dreyer's *Vampyr*.

The Frozen Face of Witness: *Vampyr*

David Gray, the passive 'hero' of the film, keeps a fixed expression of facial intensity. His face both reflects and refracts the horrors he encounters in the anomalous world of Courtempierre. His expression registers intensive affect even before encountering the occult manifestations of this any-space-whatever. Gray's sleek dark hair is slicked straight back as a facial frame which offsets his frozen features. His full, sensual lips never smile, but remain slightly parted in surprise. His liquid, protuberant eyes seem to bulge ever wider with disbelief as events progress. Though light glistens onto them, their expression never changes.

Gray's name reflects his status as one of Dreyer's 'grey men of uncertainty'.[40] He embodies the force of grey, which, according to Deleuze, represents our uncertainty and seeking.[41] Gray is not a traditional hero whose actions move the plot along by solving mysteries and fighting adversaries. As a stranger forced to investigate and experience the mystery of the place, he is our diegetic surrogate as helpless witness. Gray is powerless to intercede in the sinister plot, delayed by the illusions of temporal and spatial distortion. He is hypnotised by tricks of light in a blurry *grisaille* where sourceless shadows keep him from action by

40 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 114.
41 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 117.

fascination. Contemplation and reverie have replaced physical bravery and decisive deeds in the intensive rather than extensive world imaged in his face.

Although Gray witnesses uncanny events, we are not always provided with his reaction shots. This reduces identification with him and undermines the validity of his viewpoint. At the same time, it invites spectatorial input in the gap. We provide our own reaction-shots in the absence of his and thus engage more deeply in the experiential process. Sporadically, we see his responses reflected in an amazed and fearful face which undergoes little modification. Although he is incapable of effective spatial action, Gray's intensive vibrations of affect are revealed by the interaction of light or superimposed patterns on his face, as though it were itself a screen. When he lies fitfully sleeping, he is back-lit by rapidly flickering, proto-stroboscopic light to convey the disturbed, premonitory nature of his dreams. His face is distorted, defamiliarised by the broken light in the lozenges of glass in the leaded windows of the manor, and later by the wire mesh in the mill.

Gray's opaque facial surface lends itself to the radical splitting of his image in film's climactic scene of horror. It also enables the spectator to slip behind his eyes. As he sits in the meadow, stymied by the vampire's magic, a ghostly double of him is manifest by double exposure. He is forced to split, and his *doppelganger*, leaving his sleeping form behind, continues on to the vampire's house. The door reflects Gray like a mirror, splitting him further. He discovers his own face - this time in sharp focus- with the staring eyes of horror on a living 'corpse' inside a coffin.

Gray watches 'himself' being closed up in the coffin as the lid is hammered shut over the face. The camera shifts to the point of view of the corpse and we watch events from inside. Through the glass pane, we see the lid being lowered and screwed down. Candles are placed on the glass and lit and the vampire's malevolent face peers down. In disorienting slow motion, we share Gray's alert, horrified point of view from the coffin in a distorted, low angle vista.

Gray is a living image of Deleuze's intensive faciality. In his discussion of the close-up, Deleuze distinguishes two types of motivation for facial expression, feeling and thought. Grey's face veers towards Deleuze's category of the face which 'thinks about something, is fixed on to an object, and this is the sense of admiration or astonishment that the

English word wonder has preserved'.[42] Gray's face has a 'reflective unity which raises all parts to itself'.[43] Its horrified expression never changes, as though his affective reaction is frozen not at zero, but at maximum intensity throughout. The frozen face of witness is further extended via the image of the mask in which the face has, literally, lost its features.

The Intensive Affection-Image in *Les Yeux sans Visage*

> [T]he face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled.[44]

The body-without-organs is not a set of reconstituted fragments. Deleuze and Guattari's description of 'a demented experimenter who flays, slices, and anatomises everything in sight, and then proceeds to sew things randomly back together again' is uncannily reminiscent of the 'mad scientist' experiments of the plastic surgeon Dr Génessier of *Les Yeux sans Visage*.[45] By literally removing faces, the film's plot suggests that liberation from facialisation described in *Anti-Oedipus*, which seeks to 'escape the face, to dismantle the face and facialisations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine [...] by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal'.[46] As a horror film, the perverse cruelty of the process is stressed, but some 'spiritual and special' aspects remain.

The villains use young women like laboratory animals. They seek to repair the damaged face of the heroine/victim Christiane, who had her face burned away in a car accident caused by her father. The victims are enforcedly without-organs, having had their most expressive organic assemblage, the face, removed. The skin, and its underlying tissue, is an enforcedly mobile and transferable organ grafted by violence onto others belonging to a different body. The controlling Sadeian eye of the camera moves by a slowly insistent glide. It savours strongly affective close-ups of the cutting away and grafting of one face onto the raw flesh of another. The police and forensic scientists who discover a discarded body describe

42 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 88.
43 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 88.
44 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.
45 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.
46 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.

it as vampirically 'drained of every drop of blood', with 'a vast open wound in place of a face'.

Bergson notes the 'unextended' nature of the affection-image. For Deleuze, unextended 'power-qualities' are 'expressed for themselves, outside spatio-temporal co-ordinates, with their own ideal singularities and their virtual conjunction'.[47] The power qualities of the affection-image are expressed by faces or their equivalent in close-up.[48] The face epitomises the affection image's 'motor effort on an immobilised receptive plate'. By the magnifying properties of close-up-and extreme close-up, shapes, textures and muscular movements reveal an interrelated map of modalities, in 'parts which are hard and tender, shadowy and illuminated, dull and shiny, smooth and grainy, jagged and curved'.[49] Via an 'internal composition of the close-up, that is a genuinely affective framing, cutting and montage', these elements interact at a micro- and a macro- level.[50]

The face in close-up interrogates the nature of subjective identity. By suspending individuation, it attains a trans-personal quality. The 'pure affect, the pure expressed of the state of things' relates to the face which 'gathers and expresses it as a complex entity'.[51] Deleuze identifies two types of face. The intensive face expresses 'pure Power...defined by a series that makes us pass from one quality to another', whereas the reflective face 'expresses a pure Quality...a "something" common to several objects of different natures'.[52] Intensive faciality opens onto both time and space. Its space-time appears either in depth or on the surface 'as if it had torn it away from the co-ordinates from which it was abstracted' and thus it acts 'like a short circuit of the near and far'.[53]

The face full-on is absent from those mainstream films without an alienation agenda. Faces are usually moving degrees of profile which maintain the illusion of a self-contained fictional world. The modulations of facial affect are expressed by turning-towards or turning-away. Facial obliteration, however, 'goes beyond the threshold of decrease, plunges the affect into the void and makes the face lose its features'.[54] Christiane is

47 *Cinema 2: The Movement-Image*, p. 102.
48 *Cinema 2: The Movement-Image*, p. 146.
49 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 103,
50 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 103.
51 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 103.
52 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 90.
53 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 104.
54 *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 104-105.

introduced to us turned away from the camera, reduced to a non-person filled with self loathing and despair, deliberately hiding her face in the pillows in a gesture of self-obliteration. This concealment piques our curiosity to see her face. When she turns, to whatever degree, we learn little more about her face, which is bereft of most of its features.

Our first sight of Christiane's 'face' conceals it, or, rather reveals it as the blank white mask she is compelled to wear. It resembles a fashion mannequin archetype of perfect features, not an expressive and individuated human face. The mask, however, enables her face to become the intensive face of 'pure quality' in an overt manner. The viewer seeks in vain to read the marks of emotion and personality in the face itself. By being both visually isolated, and blanked out, Christiane's face is made potent and draws on our ability to superimpose absent muscular movements when there is no mobility. The mask is topped by vibrantly waving hair and pierced by large, liquid and expressive eyes, which it throws into sharp relief. This, along with her melodious voice and a stiffly gliding bodily mobility, indicate suppressed life. Our empathic sharing of Christiane's emotion is intensified by our own affective input, which we relay to and fro via the miniature blank screen of the mask.

Christiane's lack of face has led to her social invisibility and virtual imprisonment by her father. She is, however, highly self-reflexive. She is aware of her own nullified status and has seen her own hidden face, both with and without the mask. She frequently reflects upon her loss. Despite the removal of all mirrors, she explains that 'if the windows are open, there are other shiny surfaces. The blade of a knife, polished wood'. She can accept her mutilated state better than the mask her father and Louise insist upon. Ignoring her stated wishes, they force her to wear an impossible frozen mask of beauty, to render her appearance easier for them to bear.

Skin is the most sensitive bodily organ and the facial features it covers are intimately connected to our sense of selfhood. This is renewed daily via physical and symbolic mirror reflections. Mirrors, masks and skin are the diagrammatic component cluster of the film. Fetishised skin-like fabrics, textures and effects dominate the glossy monochrome *mise-en-scène*. Louise's shiny black oilskin raincoat glistens with the dampness of mist reflecting the gleam of car headlamps. The polished bonnet of Génessier's Citroen forms a reflective surface for trees and buildings. In the mansion, the shimmering of plate glass windows; the gleam of tiles;

and the shine of the metal lamp in the operating theatre likewise offer reflecting surfaces. They mock Christiane by the whole environment's becoming-mirror. Christiane is a moving crystalline surface. Her full-length housecoats of glittery fabrics shimmer with light, lending her an ethereal, fey appearance. Her floor length garments, which hide her feet, impel her glide as a moving statue or automaton. As well as the visual effect of shimmer and shine on light-reflective surfaces, the insistent texturing of skin, fabrics and other materials evoke tactile sensations in the viewer.

Christiane's tactility is highly developed, in compensation for her organic loss. As well as kissing and stroking the furry skin of the caged dogs, she squats to rub noses with them in a becoming-animal. She delicately strokes the face of a human girl victims, as she, too is an experimental animal. In a defamiliarising shot, we see Christiane's exposed face from the victim's point-of-view as a blackened shape with prominent pale eyes, shot in out of focus negative footage. The blood and raw flesh caused by her father are rendered in reverse chiaroscuro.

As well as enforced excision, prosthetic and cosmetic surgery consensually modifies facial features in 'face-lifts'; collagen implants; and other treatments. The doctor's métier has made him 'a man of distinction' who duplicitously profits from anxieties implanted by the beauty industry. His lecture audience comprises wealthy older women and their younger male companions. Potential patients are prepared to repeatedly suffer excruciating agony in the process of exsanguination, and risk cancer from radiation bombardment.

Doctor Génessier also assumes a mask in the operating theatre. The half-mask emphasises his hard, hawk-like eyes, and his brow dripping with sweat from the tension of difficult incisions. Like a beautician preparing make-up, he draws around the victim's face with a marker pencil. He takes the scalpel and in painfully tactile close-up carves along the line he has drawn, transforming the real face into a removable mask of skin. Blood oozes out along the line left by the blade. The act of cutting and lifting the stolen face is rendered in even sharper relief by being performed in silence. We watch with fascinated revulsion as he cuts into the delicate skin around the eyes, aware of the vulnerability of the softest part of the soft machine. The scalpel makes the blood seep out and drip down.

Lifting the facial flesh by tweezers embedded around its circumference, Génessier and Louise peel back the face with a trembling movement which causes a slight wobble in the flesh. The doctor pulls and prises at it, separating the facial skin from the underlying tissue. As the face drops forward, it unnervingly appears to age, adopting a hag like aspect as the features cave inwards towards each other. Their excision leaves the raw exposed flesh beneath as the victim's face is taken from her to be grafted onto Christiane, before her still living body is discarded.

In a sense, each of the film's protagonists is drawn into the diagrammatic mask. The face of Louise is unnaturally marked by a sinister stillness which hides her emotions. She owes her present face to Génessier's surgical skills at grafting flesh and wears a pearl choker to conceal the remaining scar around her neck. Louise's eyes are strongly outlined by eyeliner and she sometimes wears a tightly wrapped headscarf round her hair. These add to her facial isolation and mask like appearance, which gives her some affinity with the motherless Christiane, despite her own grateful collusion with her lover.

The terror and distress of one victim, Enid, when she awakes on the operating bench, is likewise conveyed solely by her eyes, left uncovered by the mummy like wrappings of bandages. This shot of isolated eyes is mirrored by Louise peering through a slit in the door of the operating theatre, the rest of her face remaining concealed. Enid has been forcibly stripped of her identity and flings herself out of the window in despair, leaving her eyes staring open in silent accusation.

When Christiane first appears after her operation, her stolen face still resembles a mask, but is made of human skin this time. Her lack of muscular facial animation leads Louise to note the quality of 'something angelic' about her, again, underlining the culture's idealisation of young womanhood. Enid's grafted face has been changed in its form and expression by the underlying bone and tissue structure of Christiane. The failure of this experiment is expressed in a disturbing series of still photographs as 'necrosis of the graft tissue' sets in and Christiane's appearance rapidly degenerates from perfection to deformity and beauty becomes beast.

Christiane's despair at her role of human guinea pig and her father's cruelty leads to her demand for a lethal injection to put her out of her misery like the dogs. Her compassion for the victims finally leads to her empowerment. In a free act, she releases the last human victim as well as

the dogs, and her own pet caged birds. When freed, the dogs savage Génessier's head, leaving him, too, fittingly without a face. Christiane wanders out into the dark garden under the trees with a dove perching on her arm. A figure of surreal grace, she glides away, freed from her father and his terrible tearing of organs from bodies. Even though she still wears her mask, Christiane's act is a refusal of the kind of faciality enforced by her father, and she begins to become a Deleuzian body-without organs.

Facing the Horror: From Molar to Molecular

In this paper I have suggested the face, both human and inhuman, as the affective locus of horror. I will conclude by offering a validation of this kind of film/philosophical work via reflections on the molecular and molar in horror film studies. For Deleuze and Guattari, 'what we need to consider is not fundamentally organs without bodies, or the fragmented body, it is the body without organs, animated by various intensive movements'.[55] Rather than working out molar symbolic equations, the Deleuzian horror film offers a dynamic molecular experience of affective thought.

I do not advocate that we lose touch with what makes us afraid. It is difficult for me to shelve my sense of subjective violation when I want to look away from the horror of the image and, in psychoanalytic parlance, rebuild my ego-defences and refuse the invasive violation of self by other. I find the exaggerated depiction of psychological and emotional torture painful and difficult to watch. I admit that on one level, the extreme close-up of Heather's agonised face is not just an aesthetico/philosophical trope, but it upsets me. I am likewise disturbed by the facial close-ups of the tortured Joan in *The Passion of Joan of Arc*, to which Deleuze refers as a pivotal movement-image. At such moments, my responses fluctuate. Part of me draws back from my molecular delight in the film's aesthetics to recall molar gender imbalance, and I again become uneasily aware of the proliferation of images of suffering and terrified women in horror film.

Psychoanalysis and socio-political readings have long played a substantial role in the field of horror film studies. The structuring frameworks of these perspectives may appear to go out of focus if we look

55 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 171.

too closely at the aesthetic molecules which compose the film, yet a challenge to their hegemony is due. In suggesting that it is time to re-think the horror film from a Deleuzian approach, I do not suggest that we excise our sense of film's social and historical context, or its power to affect our lived practices. For Deleuze, art's force is crucially experiential and impacts upon praxis.

Intensive movement-images such as horror close-ups operate by 'haecceity' or this-ness. Haecceity is affective immanence in process, not outcome. For me, there is a basic tension between the optimism of Deleuzian haecceity and the emotional vortices of horror, which may be difficult to disentangle. Deleuzian theory affords a space for a hybrid response which mixes philosophical thought with cultural awareness and psycho-sexual frames. It does not advocate a withdrawal from cultural and social experience, but a total engagement in it, on all levels. We participate in a continuum of assemblages, connected in their turn to the apparatus of cinema. The assemblages include technology, economics, politics, aesthetics and their attendant relations of power. The concept of the 'interstitial' reading allows molecular and molar frames to co-exist.

Horror films overtly seek to stimulate the spectator's sensorium. They also stimulate conscious reflections on their operations in us and our operations in them. Bergson and Deleuze offer profound tools for exploring this intensive process. Deleuzian film theory lies in its experiential aesthetic focus, and its emphasis on philosophical thinking, both too long marginalized in film studies. On the other hand, philosophical applications would find a rich resource in popular film. The horror film face, ripped apart, frozen in witness or hidden behind a mask is a necessary stage in remapping faciality. For Deleuze and Guattari, 'dismantling the face is also a politics, involving real becoming'.[56]

56 *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 188.

Bibliography

Bergson, Henri (1971), *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans F.L.Pogson [1910], London: George Allen and Unwin.

Bergson, Henri (1991), *Matter and Memory*, trans Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, New York: Zone Books.

Bürger, Peter (1984), *Theory of the Avant-garde*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1986) *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1984), *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H.R. Lane. London: Athlone.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari (1988), *A Thousand Plateaux: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi. London: Athlone.

Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari Felix (1991), *What is Philosophy?*, trans. G. Burchill and H. Tomlinson. London: Verso.

Deleuze, Gilles (1995), *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta, London: Athlone.

Guattari, Félix (1995), *Chaosmosis: An Ethico Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. P. Bains and J. Pefanis, Sidney: Power Publications.

Kennedy, Barbara (2000), *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Powell, Anna (2002), 'Kicking the Map Away: Deleuze, Psychoanalysis and *The Blair Witch Project*', *Spectator*, USCLA, Fall, 2002.

Shaviro, Steven (1993), *The Cinematic Body*, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Filmography

The Blair Witch Project (1999) Meyrick and Sanchez.

The Brides of Dracula (1960) Terence Fisher.

Hellraiser (1987) Clive Barker.

Pandora's Box (1926) G. W. Pabst.

The Passion of Joan of Arc (1927) Carl Theodor Dreyer.

Vampyr (1931) Carl-Theodor Dreyer.

Les Yeux Sans Visage (*Eyes Without a Face*) (1959) Georges Franju.

Pli 16 (2005), 79-100

Cinema Three? Re-animating Deleuze

BILL SCHAFFER

At any instant

For classical film theorists as diverse as Rudolf Arnheim and André Bazin, to recall two tellingly contrasted examples, the question of the specific nature of film once seemed to provide a logical starting point for any general theory of film and its powers.[1] Arnheim chose to seize upon a defining quality of infidelity of film in its relation to natural perception; Bazin, by contrast, seized upon an intrinsic fidelity of the medium in terms of that same relationship. Today, however, the very fact that the question of filmic specificity has given rise to such contradictory forms of answer is often taken to indicate the arbitrary, purely speculative nature of the question itself. The project of specification has thus been marginalised by the trends of recent film theory, usually in the name of defending empirical diversity against the imposition of unifying norms. David Bordwell, for example, seems sure that all the moves of this particular theoretical game have already been played:

> [T]he idea of medium-specificity has not aged well. It seems unlikely that any medium harbors the sort of aesthetic essence that silent-film aficionados ascribed to cinema. ... Indeed, the very idea of an essence, which is perhaps best understood as a set of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions, is probably insupportable when applied to as variegated a medium as cinema.[2]

To retrospectively expose the limitations and prejudices of previous attempts to define the specificity of film as an art form is one thing; to legislate against the very question on that basis is another. Despite his

dismissal of any attempt to explicitly articulate the object which film theory addresses, Bordwell still acts as if he 'knows' the nature and limits of that very object, allowing himself to compare the artificially restrictive effects of any concept of specificity against the 'variegation' that properly and specifically belongs to film itself. In effect, Bordwell merely contrasts his own poorly articulated, purely negative definition of the object 'film' (vaguely referenced here as in some way 'variegated') against *any* attempt to clearly articulate and deliberately conceptualise the object addressed by theory. In other words, Bordwell tries to justify a *particular* theoretical assertion - that the specificity of film prohibits any positive articulation - by juxtaposing theoretical abstraction in *general* against the very fact of empirical diversity in *general*. The possibility that the nature of film might be specified in ways that are neither reductive nor teleological is ruled out of the question. Bordwell thus wastes no time in dismissing Deleuze's contribution to film theory:

> Deleuze's theory follows Bazin in holding that the cinema is inherently automatic, recording contingent slices of time and movement ... Orthodox historical schemas become ratified by a new teleology. Stylistic development follows not from a law of progress but from the medium's mysterious urge to fill in every square of a vast grid of conceptual possibilities.[3]

Bordwell's description of Deleuze's enterprise as one in which the medium is made to 'fill in every square of a vast grid of conceptual possibilities' is transparently prejudicial. The metaphor suggests, but does nothing to demonstrate, a kind of colour-by-numbers procedure in which a pre-existing conceptual matrix is mechanically superimposed upon the history of film. Deleuze is chided here, in effect, merely for producing an analysis of film that remains consistent with its own premises. Moreover, although it is inevitably (and unexceptionally) the case that the examples which Deleuze focuses upon are presented so as to develop his own general assumptions, it is nonetheless a conspicuous fact that he continually *invents* new concepts in the encounter he stages between philosophy and the history of film. It is also evident to any sensitive reader that Deleuze rarely, if ever, simply reproduces any existing argument from the history of film theory or philosophy.[4] Far from being an attempt to derive the history of film from a single pre-given idea, as Bordwell avers in his talk of conceptual back-projection, the explicit stake of Deleuze's division

between the movement-image and the time-image is to show that there *must* be *more than one way* of conceiving the possibilities of moving images. This theoretical gambit structures all of Deleuze's work on film; to the extent of requiring two separate books, each explicating its own 'pure semiotic'. Moreover, nothing in Deleuze's exposition legislates against the possibility of conceiving these possibilities in yet more ways. Indeed, Deleuze encourages this:

> I don't think cinema can be reduced to the model of an open totality. That was one model, but there are and always will be as many models as cinema manages to invent.[5]

Deleuze's specification of film is profoundly original, not only in the particular answer it gives to the question of film, but in the very form of that answer. In particular, Deleuze does not impose a teleological norm upon the possibilities of film form, but effectively formalises a *specific threshold of variation* that circumscribes and delimits *any* possible norm in advance. What is specified in this way is not some 'pure object', but, precisely, a *variable machine* that can connect with any content whatever. Cinema is defined for Deleuze precisely by the use of the analytical principle of 'any-instant-whatever' as a means for the synthesis of moving images:

> The cinema is the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity.[6]

Rather than deducing the phases of movement from pre-established 'transcendental poses', an approach Deleuze asserts had previously dominated Western conceptions of movement, the logic of the any-instant-whatever depends upon the automatic sampling of movements through time at a rate which is standardised and independent of content. Each moment of the movement under analysis is initially given equal weight and registered purely as 'any instant', rather than being selected as offering a significantly revealing or decisive 'pose' according to preconceived criteria. As soon as the logic of any-instant-whatever is used to 'reproduce movement', Deleuze tells us, there is cinema[7]. Cinema thus becomes possible when the physical result of the any-instant-whatever – a strip of regularly sampled and separated images preserved in their consecutive

order – is unexpectedly seized upon as a machine of synthesis for purposes of art and entertainment.[8] Bergson famously saw nothing more in the juxtaposition between the continuous image perceived on screen and the discontinuous frames of the film than a new way of reducing a moving continuity to a series of discrete instants. Here, as elsewhere, however, Deleuze turns Bergson's conclusions regarding film back against themselves. According to Deleuze, 'another path seemed open to Bergson'; if the ancient conception corresponds to ancient philosophy, then modern science should correspond to a new philosophy: one which thinks 'the production of the new at any moment'. In these terms, the fact of the film strip, with its regular separations, is no longer valued merely as a guarantee of the faithful analysis of movement (as it had been within the field of science) but, to the contrary, is rediscovered as an opportunity for artistic control and fabrication, generating specific powers of 'false continuity'. Film alone, then, emerges as an industrial art for which the any-instant-whatever is a *necessary* condition of possibility: it becomes the one art form *defined* by the any-instant-whatever.

For Deleuze, film is characterised by two inseparable, yet radically distinct modes of existence. On one hand, there is the raw material with editor's work: an inert sequence of separable frames. On the other hand, what we *see* on-screen is always already 'between' frames, rather than 'in' any single frame. It is in this sense that film gives us an *intermediate image* that moves *intrinsically*. As soon as it is subject to the effects of projection the content of an isolated frame can no longer be simply identified with itself or apprehended in terms of a fixed or closed space. At a verifiable threshold the filmic image automatically emerges as movement, and movement automatically emerges as image. At this threshold the isolated any-instant-whatever captured with each frame of film is automatically dissolved in an unstoppable flow of movement. This is precisely the fundamental fact of film from the side of spectatorship: it is unstoppable. The image that we see and the movement that makes it come alive may thus be conceived as strictly inseparable, rather than being abstractly added to one another. The one *emerges* through the other. The series of separate frames and the moving image come together: and the recognition of one does not cancel the other. The filmic image is defined in this way as *something genuinely new*, both historically and phenomenologically: the emergence of an image that *moves in itself*.

Deleuze's detractors and apologists alike have questioned his general specification of film. In particular, David Rodowick is openly sceptical when it comes to Deleuze's initial premises regarding the nature and implications of filmic movement. Responding to Deleuze's specification of film in terms of an *intermediate image* emerging spontaneously from the automation of movement, Rodowick writes in a footnote:

> This argument relies, of course, on the acceptance of Deleuze's bracketing of the intermediate image for analysis. A more skeptical view would continue to take seriously Bergson's critique of the film image when, on the one hand, it is artificially produced below the image by the automated passage of still images, and, on the other, it is corrected cognitively "above the image by mental processes that are still not thoroughly understood. Nevertheless, the ways in which Deleuze poses the problem of movement in relation to cinema and to the history of film theory are still very rich in concepts.[9]

The richness of Deleuze's concepts for the purposes of film theory, however, must be severely diminished if they are derived from premises as obviously incoherent and naive as Rodowick implies. Although Rodowick regards Deleuze as having 'bracketed' the intermediate image from analysis, he may himself be viewed as simply *re-asserting* the prejudice of natural perception. In effect, he merely reiterates the unquestioned conviction that movement *must* be analysable in terms of non-movement, the assumption that 'behind' merely 'apparent' movement there *must* lie something static which preserves its 'truth'. At the very least, Deleuze's explicit theory has the virtue of rendering problematic the merely implicit, commonsense assumptions to which his critics appeal. In these terms, it is Rodowick himself who *brackets immobility* from analysis in order to privilege the lifeless film strip as somehow more 'true' than the 'merely' perceived flow of the filmic image.[10]

This is not to say, however, that Deleuze's cannot be criticised at a fundamental level. In particular, Deleuze does not hesitate in leaping over the question of animation, instantly reducing its differential specificity as a mode of film to a mere example of general principles already derived from the analysis of cinematography :

Any other system which reproduces movement through an order of exposures [*poses*] projected in such a way that they pass into one another,

or are 'transformed', is foreign to the cinema. This is clear when one attempts to define the cartoon film; if it belongs fully to the cinema, this is because the drawing no longer constitutes a pose or a completed figure, but the description of a figure which is always in the process of being formed or dissolving through the movement of lines and points taken at any-instant-whatevers of their course. The cartoon film is related not to a Euclidean, but to a Cartesian geometry. It does not give us a figure described in a unique moment, but the continuity of the movement which describes the figure.[11]

In *The Tropology of Pyromania*, however, Keith Clancy argues that animation, unlike cinema, depends in an irreducible way upon 'privileged instants', which he equates with drawings, rather than 'any-instant-whatevers'. He contends that 'animation does not necessarily entail the any-instant-whatever' and goes on to claim that:

> Animation, for him [Deleuze], is cinematic only by virtue of the any-instant-whatever. I would say, however, that the animated image is made from privileged instants: the single, crystalline cel painted and drawn upon by the animator and seen only for one 24th of a second is *the privileged instant* par excellence.[12]

Clancy's piece focuses upon a real problem in Deleuze's formulations. As we shall see, there are certainly good reasons to question Deleuze's subsuming of animation under a conception of 'cinema' developed almost entirely in terms of cinematography. A critical response to Deleuze's philosophy of film from the viewpoint of animation cannot proceed, however, by merely juxtaposing the time of drawing against the time of the machine, since it is clear that interaction with the any-instant-whatever is at the very heart of the animator's practice. Abstracted from its place native to a series of any-instants-whatever, the 'single cel' may be collected, stuck in a frame and mounted on a wall, even traded internationally, yet it only ever functions as a 'privileged instant' in the unfolding of a moving image as long as it retains that place, a place in which it automatically disappears. A 'transcendental pose' attempting to realise itself as a single cel could only register for the viewer, if at all, as a subliminal flash. It is rather the question of the original relationship which animation opens up *between* these two temporalities, the manual and the automatic, which Deleuze's empirically restricted formulation of filmic specificity does not address. Deleuze uncritically replicates a traditional

prejudice of film theory when he precipitously equates filmic movement in general with a principle exemplified by cinematography: the automated 'extraction' or 'translation' of movement from pre-existing bodies by cine-cameras. At this level, far from being of merely 'scholastic' import, the recognition that the any-instant-whatever implies a *general* threshold of transformation becomes a matter of creative necessity.

Manipulating the difference

> If I were asked for a definition of animation it is where you can stop between any frame of film and the next frame of film and make a controlled adjustment ... it is manipulating the difference.[13]

McLaren's formulation here could not be more felicitous for my purposes, especially in the way it brings together a seemingly banal observation concerning the technical threshold of animation – 'you can stop any frame' – with a startlingly concise evocation of the unique possibilities implied by the animator's relationship to the any-instant-whatever – 'it is manipulating the difference'. What distinguishes animation from cinematography is not the 'stuff' of each frame, but *the way the animator puts himself in between frames*, lodging himself in the *interval of control* which the any-instant-whatever opens up 24 times a second once it is severed from cinematographic reference. Bob Clampett, speaking from the perspective of Warner Bros. commercial character animator, emphasises more or less the same point concerning the unique powers of animation: 'There is no other medium that allows the creator to control every little detail on every frame so completely.'[14] Chuck Jones, Clampett's one-time colleague at 'Termite Terrace', somewhat more expansively underlines the unique joys and burdens of the animation director's relation to the any-instant-whatever:

> Each scene cut, each step, each phoneme of dialogue, each hand movement, bite, explosion, laugh, was meticulously timed to the twenty-fourth of a second, each of five thousand drawings accounted for, each piece of action carefully and planned and time. The director is the composer.[15]

From the point of view of production, then, what decisively differentiates animation and cinematography in *general*, considered as alternative modes of film, is the fact that the animator takes responsibility for each frame and deliberately provides its graphic content, controlling the relationship between successive frames functioning as any-instants-whatever in the movement of a whole. Live action film composition is, of course, itself an art of the any-instant-whatever – editing also can take place at any instant whatever – but its interventions are selective and tend to assume the prior existence of bodies whose movements have been automatically analysed and 'extracted'. Animation, by contrast, is the uniquely *generative* art of direct interaction with every interval of the any-instant-whatever generated by film, even when the animator chooses to leave many frames strategically blank:

> ...*Blinkity Blink* intentionally set out to investigate the possibilities of intermittent animation and spasmodic imagery. This meant that the film was not made in the usual way, one frame of the picture following inexorably after the next, each second of time crying out for its pound of visual flesh – its full quota of 24 frames; instead, on the blackness and blackness of the outstretched strip of celluloid on my table top I would engrave a frame here and a frame there, leaving many frames untouched and blank – sprinkling, as it were, the images on the empty band of time; but sprinkling carefully – in relation to each other, to the spaces between, to the music, and to the idea that emerged as I drew.[16]

One sees here, in the words of an *avant-gardist,* the animator's typical experience of the any-instant-whatever as a matrix of emergence and self-affection which transforms the act of drawing and all other forms of manual manipulation. Released into intermediacy and variation, each 'sprinkling' must be carefully executed 'in relation to the other' and it is this immanent relationship that will have conditioned 'the idea that emerged as I drew'. Throughout McLaren's career, animation is continually rediscovered as a kind of 'meta-art' whose primary object is the creative process itself, unfolding in time, as the paradoxical discovery of something which emerges and exists only in this very process of discovery. It is evident that such a process cannot be thought *simply* in

terms of *intention.* At the very least, it also implies the *success* of an intention *not* to be confined to the possibilities of one's own intentions.

The avant-gardist as much as the commercial animator knows that his manual gestures are transformed by the any-instant-whatever – even when he self-consciously defies the cinematic example and its demand for saturation of every frame in terms of rational linkage. In the context of animation, however, as distinguished from that of live action, the effect of the any-instant-whatever is 'referred' to a different *temporality.* One must now say that each frame *will have been* an any-instant-whatever in the movement of a body generated by the process itself. A specifically animatic temporality thus informs the possibilities of cartoon composition and characterisation. The animation process *always* involves an encounter with 'the empty band of time' which McLaren's experimental work makes explicit. This empty band is automatically generated by the any-instant-whatever as soon as it is deprived of a cinematographic object from which to 'extract' some initial quantity of continuous movement.

The *cinematic*, is characterised, at least initially, by automatic correspondence of analysis and synthesis; the *animatic*, by contrast, is characterised by a necessary encounter between the manual and the automatic, implying the asymmetry of analysis and synthesis. These two dimensions of reference are distinct but ultimately inseparable poles defining the continuum of filmic specificity. Animation cannot replicate that temporal isomorphism between the processes of recording and projection which, prior to editing, characterises cinematography; cinematography cannot replicate the generative powers of animation. Animation and cinematography are thus completely distinct at a genetic and compositional level, even if film itself is able to mix the two without limit at the level of synthesis. A theory of the medium capable of accounting for the fact of animation must therefore acknowledge that film in general is capable of accommodating two quite distinct dimensions of the moving image.

Invisible hand

From the point of view of the animator's practice each individual frame presents itself as an *interval of control*, of indefinitely extendable duration on the side of production, yet automatically related to the intervallic

measure of the any-instant-whatever on the side of projection. The animated image has in this sense two faces: on the one side, invisible for the viewer, there is an open interval of manual manipulation; on the other side, a visible image moving inexorably and continuously. The manual time of composition thus enters into a complex and specific relationship with the automated time of film that has no obvious parallel in the arts of drawing or cinematography, even when it precisely involves bringing the two into intimate relation. The animating hand becomes invisible not just, as with the camera in cinematography, because it is an object in space occupying a point of view that can never directly appear in its own field, but because the very *time* of its generative, creative activity has *necessarily* been elided in the continuous flow of a moving image. The time of the hand is uniquely implied and potentially alluded to with every instant of animated film, yet, at the same time, this time of intimacy and creation is automatically erased. In a further twist, however, the artist's manual interactions are in a sense 'remembered' by the very same intervallic process that obliterates every trace of manual intervention.

> ... if you looked at a single frame of film you'd say that doesn't mean anything there, there's no images there, but once the thing goes into motion, the things that are there, no matter what kind of shape they may be, can behave in a human or animal way, which echoes something quite human in a person.[17]

As McLaren's remarks here on the vanishing threshold between abstraction and figuration emphasise, the process of animation nonetheless leaves its trace within the image as *implied motivation of movement.* Hence the specific achievement of animation in the history of drawing: firstly, the evidence of the manual act is captured/erased by an automated time; secondly, this time is imposed upon the viewer. The early *avant gardist* work of Hans Richter almost immediately demonstrates this lesson, which we have already seen affirmed in the later testimony of Norman McLaren. As Richter shifted to film proper from earlier experiments with painting on scrolls, he is said to have shown that:

> This matter of speed is very important. Unlike the scrolls, where we are free to compare and carry data back across blank intervals of canvas, the film forces its time on us. Thus memory becomes involuntary, since we cannot conceptualise and remember very clearly (only after seeing the film repeatedly do we begin to see its structure). The rapid succession of images 'collages' our memory ...[18]

The 'matter of speed' at stake here is evidently the threshold of filmic intermediacy. Beyond this threshold, images open up new possibilities of relationship for creator and viewer alike. Animated composition becomes as much a matter of the orchestration of time as the definition of figures. In a certain sense, it is the viewer's own memory that is manipulated by the animator from moment to moment.[19] To 'manipulate the difference' between each frame is to 'collage' memory itself. Drawn animation, then, constitutes an irreducibly temporal graphic art form that is actually *practiced and experienced* at a higher level of abstraction than the fixed frame. The cartoon film may be based on drawing; but the animator's practice becomes unlike any other form of drawing, becomes, that is, *animatic*, as soon as he ceases to relate to the drawing taken in isolation and projects himself into the automatic in-between of the any-instant-whatever. Chuck Jones says more or less the same thing:

> One of the odd misunderstandings about animation even by those who work in the field is that an individual drawing has the same importance as an illustration. Animation is a chorus of drawings working in tandem, each contributing a part to the whole of a time/space idea. If a single drawing, as a drawing, dominates the action, it is probably bad animation, even though it may be a good drawing.[20]

It is in precisely this sense that in the cartoon film 'the drawing no longer constitutes a pose or a completed figure, but the description of a figure which is always in the process of being formed or dissolving'. Fated to intermediacy, the animated figure finds itself always 'opened' up to the next interval by the same force which would 'close' it in relation to the preceding interval: the force of a movement to which its own life is immanent. The *animated figure*, always already caught up in the any-instant-whatever as in its own life, can never be definitively 'figured' on any single frame of the film strip. The animator, too, thus finds himself fated to a kind of intermediate practice in which the exercise of total control and immersion in a process that exceeds conscious control come together. The film *Norman McLaren: Creative Process* makes visible this irreducibly intermediate condition of the working animator as it is experienced from the independent, self-consciously experimental end of

the animatic continuum. As we watch McLaren inking directly onto the film strip, the anticipated accompanying musical soundtrack is previewed for the viewer. This music effectively reminds us of the rhythmic, continuously varying image that the animator aims to produce, but it is also made to stutter and grind to a halt as McLaren moves from to frame, rendering tangible for the viewer the strangely interrupted continuity that animators must internalise. Alongside the film strip on which McLaren works, we observe the 24 numbered registration points necessary for each second of film. In search of spontaneity, McLaren moves quickly from one frame to the next, as if trying to reiterate the momentum and integrity of a single unfolding gesture across 24 frames – but each new second's worth of film requires that this momentum be suspended and interrupted at a higher level as the entire set-up is re-aligned. McLaren is at one level like a god surveying the extent of his creation as it emerges, but only within the span of a single second.

> I wasn't aware of the general line of what was going to happen 10, 20 seconds from now. I was always aware of how things were developing, this was going to happen in the next five seconds, but a minute from now in the film, what was going to happening, I just didn't know.[21]

The conditions of creativity in the context of animation, according to McLaren, always involve a kind of rhythm between manual spontaneity and the indifferent measure of the any-instant-whatever. This rhythm, which articulates the paradox of a controlled loss of control, an intended escape from intention, apparently takes the isolated animator beyond himself, just as it takes the isolated graphic figure beyond itself. McLaren's own words, indeed, suggest that the peculiar forms of creativity associated with the animation process can only be understood in relation to, rather than despite of, the mechanical regularities imposed by the film strip. The creative process in animation implies an irreducible double-bind whereby subjective spontaneity is at once compromised *and* facilitated by mechanical regularity.

Becoming cartoon

Four very different evocations of creative process begin to resonate irresistibly here. The first of these comes to us from the animator and puppeteer, Bob Clampett; the second from stop-motion animator, Lou Bunin; the third from Norman McLaren; the fourth is from Peter Canning's paraphrasing of Deleuze's philosophy of time:

> If I'm doing Porky Pig I don't stand off removed from Porky directing him; I get inside of Porky and I think Porky. I talk like Porky. I have a s-s-s-s-speech problem. I walk like Porky, and I feel like Porky... I'm helpful, trusting, concerned, kindly and sometimes a trifle pu-pu-pu-put out. S-s-s-s-shucks, I am Porky... Bugs' personality is quite the opposite of Porky's. And much more fun to do. When I do Bugs Bunny I get inside of him, and I not only think like, feel like, and walk and talk like Bugs [whispers] but confidentially, Doc, [yells] *I am the wabbit*![22]

> If you interpret somebody else's acting ideas, the result can't possibly be important. If you have no inner reaction that you can express by becoming the puppet, then you have no way to transmit vital elements to a performance. You have to be the character in order to make it believable. Suddenly as a performer, if you have the good sense to follow the performance of the puppet while you are that character, you sense what is right, what is funny or dramatic. You can't anticipate that on your exposure sheets ...Then you get that creative feeling that is so familiar to every good animator I know; you become the performer in a strange shape, and become the audience at the same time. You are amazed at what is happening, the thing that you yourself are doing. I don't know of another art form that gives such a dual experience to the artist.[23]

> When doing *Hen Hop* for instance, I felt that I was .... that .... doing the dance ... I sort of got imbued with the spirit of henliness, I think. So, in a way when you're animating a creature, if the creature is moving, you are that animal, you feel the motion.[24]

> [T]he strings of the marionette or the body of the actor are not connected to the will of the puppeteer or actor or author, but to the second order automaton of the human body-brain rhizome... From virtual to actual and back, in the ever-renewing feedback loop of self-motivation. [....] The difference 'of' immediacy 'with' itself 'in' time forms the smallest internal circuit between the self and itself...as in the mirror or mime.[25]

The artist *becomes* the emerging character. To evoke the idea of 'becoming' in this context is not, of course, to make the absurd claim that the animator's physical body somehow metamorphoses to resemble the cartoon character's body. Nor is it a mere matter of metaphor.[26] In a quite specific sense, the animator or puppeteer discovers the character acting in himself, in the virtual, from moment to moment. There is a temporal loop between two bodies, one actual, the other virtual, which must be qualified as neither separable nor identical in their relationship to each other. The moments of acting out oneself and witnessing the bodying forth of another become entwined, and begin to chase each other in an open loop of creativity. The self-affective element implied in all acting (indeed, for Bergson, in all creativity) is taken to a specific limit and instantiated in a uniquely animatic feedback circuit between 'human inwardness' and 'mechanical externality' that is played out, experienced, recorded, *and* erased *as* time. Indeed, the implications of this circuit may yet oblige us to re-conceive the very nature and finality of 'inwardness' insofar as it seems to begin by suspending any opposition between such polarities as subject/object, inner/outer, depth and surface.

The animator, as Clampett's words make very clear, finds himself re-animated in turn by the characters he animates and feels himself becoming a cartoon. He allows himself, in McLaren's testimony, to become 'imbued with henliness' when animating a hen. The character must come to life within the body of the animator if it is to have any chance of coming alive for the viewer. Rather than remaining above and separate to the material he transforms, the animating artist puts himself into a circuit from which new forms of movement and motivation emerge. The animator's or puppeteer's experience of his own creativity is thus shaped by an irreducible paradox of control in time that hardly could be stated more boldly than by Bunin: he follows the character, even though the character exists and moves only as an effect of the animator's own controlling movement. The animator becomes the performer, the character and the

audience, simultaneously following himself and pre-empting himself as other-in-himself, self displaced from self from moment to moment. The animator *himself* becomes an image of variation and intermediacy. Character and performer thus become indiscernible and meet in the emergence of 'a strange shape'.

According to Canning, explicator of Deleuze, the multiple strings of the moving puppet are never simply controlled from a single point embodying the 'will' of the puppeteer. Powers of influence are ramified in every direction across all the scales of a network of control that cannot be monitored from any point simply external to itself without killing the entire process. The puppeteer or animator may initiate this dance of strings and displaced bodies, but once set in motion, it reverberates unpredictably, takes on a life of its own, one in which the artist's entire body becomes but one of many dancing limbs. Resonances of influence are conducted back through the pencil into the vibrating network formed by the strings of the artist's nervous system. We approach, here, the heart of the paradox of animatic intention already encountered in McLaren. It is as though the emerging character draws out an inner reaction which at the same time functions as an intentionality directed toward drawing the character itself out of the void of each cel. This feedback loop applies across cartoons, as characters are invented and consolidated, as much as it does across frames during the animation process itself. As Jones has it:

> As you develop any character, you are, of course, looking into a mirror, a reflection of yourself, your ambitions and hopes, your realizations and fears. [....] You see, that's the whole wonder of animation directing. If you're not something you want to be, or *are* something you don't want to be, you can through drawing, through action, create a character who will take care of the matter.[27]

It is in this light that I would view the animator's own experiment with the 'mirror stage', as enacted in the classical cartoonist's technique in which a character's takes and double-takes are modelled on the artist's own facials caught reflected in a mirror. For it seems impossible, here, to decide whether the human is moulding the image by forcing it to mimic his own face or rather, to the contrary, the virtual image of a moving body that does not yet exist is *modulating* the human face by forcing it to anticipate and mimic its own absurd dynamic. This kind of creativity seems to

involve the setting-up of a feedback circuit in which linear distinctions between cause and effect, form and content, subject and object become ineffective. All the terms involved in this automimetic loop by which the animator becomes his own special effect – face, model, mirror image, character – exchange identities in a cycle of ever-exacerbating effects, an open circuit in which, finally, the only controlling term is the speed of light interval simultaneously separating and re-linking all the others. A circuit of self-affection is discovered in the experience of *animatic acting*:

> Animation is acting and the animator must respond to the same exacting disciplines as an actor does. [....] Full animation *is* acting. Just as the actor demonstrates a part *not* by what he looks like but by *how* he moves, so the animator takes simple graphics and brings them to life in the *way* they move and by the intricate timing necessary to achieve that life.[28]

The animator gets as close to the character as an actor is to his own body, as if divided only by the irreducible time of self-relation, but he is also, *and at the same time*, obliged to maintain the kind of distance which a scientist might adopt in order to control those matters of 'intricate timing' necessary to 'achieve life'. The paradoxes of automimetic creativity implied in all acting are thus taken to a new level in puppetry and character animation, alike, insofar as both involve the art of *acting through a body other than one's own.* Analogies between conventional puppetry (considered as a traditional art form) and animation must, however, again be qualified in terms of filmic specificity.Jones again:

> When you are engaged in full animation, or in character live-action comedy, the character takes over, pushes you aside; you become the interpreter of his actions. You are no more a cartoonist in the static sense than Chaplin was a still photographer. You respond to another personality, moving it as it *needs* to go--as it *must* go. Drawing becomes as unconscious a necessity to you as body mechanics are unconscious to the dancer during performance. You cannot practice mechanics during a performance because you are now the life force, the moving response. You *are* the interpreter of actions which surprise both you and the character you vitalize; you and he together become the series of surprises that is animation.'[29]

The paradoxes of self-affectivity which arise in puppetry, as a form of acting through another body, are taken to a new level and transformed by the art of animation, since the analytic requirements of automation and the any-instant-whatever inevitably *sever the sensory-motor link between actor and object.* As Paul Wells reminds us:

> 'Acting' in the animated film is an intriguing concept in the sense that it properly represents the relationship between the animator and the figure, object or environment he/she is animating. The animator must essentially use the techniques employed by the actor to project the specificities of character through the mechanistic process of the animation itself.[30]

In animation, unlike puppetry, there can be no spontaneous 'real-time' circuit communicating impulses, actions, and responses between the human actor and the object through which he relates to himself. The puppeteer typically enjoys a more or less continuous, organic, intimate relationship between his own movements and the movements of the otherwise inanimate bodies through which he acts. The strokes made by the animator's pen, as it moves from one local task to another, by contrast, seem entirely incommensurate with the balletic or catastrophic movements eventually performed by the character as a whole. The entire laborious process of animation thus seems designed to break any possible thread of spontaneous reciprocity between creator and character. Clampett's and Bunin's evocations of the creative moment ultimately seem to imply not only that animators must relate to their characters as puppeteers do to their puppets, but that they must do so precisely in the absence of the conditions which might be thought to make this possible. The difference internalised by the animator, then, is not just that between his own body and the dummy which he controls from moment to moment – as in puppetry – but also that between two heterogeneous streams of time which nonetheless feedback and communicate at some higher level. In one temporal stream animators must somehow sustain the puppeteer's creative split within themselves, even in the absence of any immediate feedback; in the other they must continue to function in the performance of those highly regulated, analytic procedures demanded by the any-instant-whatever.

> Animation is not a simple form to pin down; it has surprisingly little to do with other graphic arts, because it adds that elusive element – time. (Chuck Jones[31])

> We were in a new medium altogether. It was not only the orchestration of form but also of time-relationship that we were facing in film. The single image disappeared in a flow of images, which made sense only if it happened to articulate a new element – time. (Hans Richter[32])

Reflecting on their experience of animation, Chuck Jones and Hans Richter say almost exactly the same thing, even down to the way they leave the word 'time' dangling from a dash at the end of their sentences – like a cartoon character who has just gone charging over an abyss. The self-affective, intrinsically temporal nature of creative process is, of course, not confined to animation. In Deleuzian terms, it is at the basis of all art. Nonetheless, the paradoxes of self-affectivity are taken to a new level by the practice of animation, to the point where self-division becomes a kind of graphic obsession within a popular art form.

Notes

[1] Rudolf Arnheim, *Film as Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957) and André Bazin *What is Cinema?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[2] Bordwell, *On the History of Film Style* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 34-5.

[3] David Bordwell, *On the History of Film Style*, p. 116.

[4] Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier calls attention to this pervasive atmosphere of cinema-miming 'free indirect discourse' in Deleuze's own text: 'Deleuze's final decision (and by no means his least interesting) consists of using as the materials for his analysis nothing but analyses that have already been completed, whose authors and bibliographic references he scrupulously notes..... By manipulating fragments that already have an established meaning - hypotheses, ideas, or viewpoints inspired by screening films - Deleuze makes it possible for himself to put them into movement, to make their meanings circulate... Constantin Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, eds., *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 259. On this internal destabilisation of enunciation in Deleuze generally, see Constantin Boundas, *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, p.82: The commentaries that Deleuze devotes to those he loves are cases of free indirect discourse, and the untimely thinkers who are the objects of those commentaries are veritable intercessors, permitting him to say what he wants. That is why in the rest of my essay I find it easy to work with the composite name 'Deleuze-Bergson'.

[5] Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations 1972-1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 64.

[6] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 5.

[7] I will criticise and qualify this formulation at length. In particular, we will see that the any-instant-whatever *generates* movement in the context of animation.

[8] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 4.

[9] Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, p. 216, Note 2.

[10] The stakes of this debate over the status of filmic movement crystallise, indeed, around the very ambivalence of the word 'apparent', an adjective which in this context harbours two quite contradictory possibilities. For Rodowick, filmic movement is ultimately 'merely apparent', a matter of deceiving appearances; for Deleuze, filmic movement is 'apparent' in the sense of being self-evident, providing sufficient evidence for its own effectivity, its own reality. There is perhaps more at question here, in other words, than a mere matter of pedantic definition, nor even a matter of purely film theoretical controversy. It may ultimately be a question of ontological decision concerning the status of the 'apparent' as such. Such questions may never be empirically resolvable, in so far as they concern the very nature and finality of experience itself.

[11] Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, p. 5. When Deleuze discusses 'transcendental poses' in relation to animation he is evidently alluding in part to the use of dual magic lanterns in the pre-history of cinema and animation. Such systems, which are effectively duplicated today with the use of synchronized slide projectors, created a limited effect of movement in images by moving or fading at least two projected

images across or into one another. Here, the viewer watches images slowly fading or 'transforming' into one another. In animated cartoons, however, as with film in general, frames representing 'any-instant-whatever' are arrested at the projector gate in a linear sequence and 'shown' in isolation at regular intervals, at a rate of at least 18 frames per second. Thus, we need to distinguish between the gradual 'transformation' of poses or exposures through convergent projection and the very different process through which described figures are instantaneously and simultaneously 'formed' and 'dissolved' in relation to the any-instant-whatever.

Deleuze's comments regarding the relation between figure and movement in the cartoon film seem also to allude to Norman McLaren's famous assertion that 'animation is not the art of drawings-that-move, but rather the art of movements-that-are-drawn. What happens between each frame is more important than what happens on each frame'. Quoted in Charles Solomon, 'Animation: Notes on a Definition', *The Art of The Animated Image*, ed. Charles Solomon (Los Angeles, The American Film Institute, 1987), p. 11. We will have occasion to examine the implications of several other comments made by McLaren which similarly stress the irreducibility of movement as and in the in-between.

[12] Keith Clancy, *PSHTR*: The T(r)opology of Pyromania', *The Illusion Of Life: Essays on Animation*, ed. Alan Cholodenko (Sydney: Power Publications in association with the Australian Film Commission, 1991), p. 257.

[13] McLaren, *Creative Process: Norman McLaren.*

[14] Jeff Lenburg, *The Great Cartoon Directors* (North Carolina: McFarland, 1983), p. 64.

[15] Chuck Jones, *Chuck Amuck: The Life and Times of an Animated Cartoonist* (New York: Avon, 1989), p. 180.

[16] Norman McLaren, 'Technical Notes, 1955' reprinted in Russett and Starr, *Experimental Animation*, p. 127.

[17] Norman McLaren, *Creative process: Norman McLaren* (Videorecording) (A National Film Board of Canada production in

association with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Channel Four Television, 1990)

[18] Brian Doherty, *Hans Richter* (1968) extract reprinted in Russett and Starr, *Experimental Animation*, p. 55.

[19] O' Doherty's observations here address only the compositional implications of the practice of 'collaging memory'. This power of filmic manipulation need not be taken to imply, however, that the image has the power to determine its own reception – quite the contrary. My conceptualisation of filmic address, following Deleuze, is premised precisely on the irreducible 'interval of indeterminacy' which each spectator contributes to the relay between human and machine implied by the filmic set-up. Filmic composition is thus never merely a matter of programming responses, but also more or less one of determining situations which allow spectators to experience the indeterminacy of their own responses to such provocation. It is in this sense that film spectatorship may be considered a form of self-affectivity and creativity: not because it is 'active', as certain practitioners of cultural studies would aver, but because it is unprecedentedly and profoundly passive. What emerges from moment to moment are not just the vicissitudes of an image that remains separate from myself, but the evidence of my own response: the destiny of my affect.

[20] Chuck Jones quoted in John Cawley and Jim Korkis, *How To Create Animation* (Las Vegas: Pioneer, 1990), p. 39.

[21] Norman McLaren, *Creative Process: Norman McLaren* (Videorecording) (Canada Film

[22] Lenburg, *The Great Cartoon Directors*, p. 57.

[23] Lou Bunin quoted in Shamus Culhane, *Talking Animals and Other People* (New York: St Martins, 1986), pp. 381-2.

[24] McLaren, *Creative Process.*

[25] Peter Canning, 'The Crack of Time and the Ideal Game', *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, eds. Constantin Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 79.

[26] Becoming' is a pervasive theme of Deleuze's work. See Constantin Boundas, *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, p.124-125 'In the becoming-wolf of the Wolf-Man' Freud hears only 'I am transforming myself into a wolf,' 'I am in the process of becoming a wolf.' But Deleuze and Guattari show that the becoming-animal does not amount to becoming an animal; real becoming does not correspond to the traditional definition, namely a mediation on the way to an end or predetermined production. Becoming does not come to an end in the being that has become: 'the human being does not "really" become an animal any more than the animal "really" becomes something else ... What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.' (*A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 238).

[27] Jones, *Chuck Amuck*, pp. 263-4.

[28] Jones, *Chuck Amuck*, p. 181.

[29] Jones, *Chuck Amuck*, p. 263.

[30] Wells, *Understanding Animation*, p. 104.

[31] Chuck Jones, back cover dedication to Norman Klein, *Seven Minutes*.

[32] Hans Richter Easel-Scroll-Film 53: on his Rhythm 21 and Eggeling's Diagonal Symphony (first experiments in film, 1921)

Pli 16 (2005), 101-113

Deleuze's Kiss: The Sensory Pause of Screen Affect

FELICITY J. COLEMAN

"When you kiss me, the world grows so large
that the horizon itself disappears."
(Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which is Not One*)

Imagine, if you will, that screening on the wall in front of you is American artist Andy Warhol's 1963 film *Kiss*. Warhol's anthropological documentary-style fifty minute film is of fixed camera head-shots of same and opposite sex couples french-kissing; passionately. The duration of the kiss on screen is dependent upon the length of 16mm film that Warhol had in his silent Bolex camera at the time, usually 100 feet - enough to make four minutes of screen kiss time.[1] *Kiss* invokes the screen issues for the reading of this essay: desire, gender, duration, spectatorship, and affect.

The *realms* of desire in operation form the broader context for responding to any screen experience. Watching a kiss, reading about a kiss, and experiencing a kiss are not equivalent experiences, but all three contain the potential of a breadth of experiential mechanisms of affect. Irigaray's observation on the affective spatial mechanism of the kiss provides an embodied frame for this essay's comments on specific elements of a cinematic or any screen space, as spatial configurations that enable an affective modification of the whole screen experience. This essay sets out to describe Gilles Deleuze's concept of the opsign and sonsign, as specific screen mechanisms that rhythmically and irregularly punctuate and parse screen affect; what I will term Deleuze's *kiss*.

1 C. Angell, "Andy Warhol, Filmmaker", *The Andy Warhol Museum*, (Pittsburgh, The Andy Warhol Museum, 1994), pp. 125-26.

In his book *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (*L' Image Temps* 1985, translated into English 1989), Deleuze's description of screen experience is through the cinema's spatial configuration. Screen space is a fourth dimensional, perceptual space invoked by optical and sonic breaks. More than a simple fracture to the screen space, Deleuze describes these interruptions as the opsign and the sonsign - screen fissures that provide vital and affective passages within the whole.

Deleuze posits ideas that are concerned with the spatial and temporal dimensions of affective and emotive outcomes of the cinema. Following French philosopher Henri Bergson, Deleuze explores the "differences in kind" between the terms of affection and perception.[2] Deleuze addresses affectivity in terms of the crystal-image's expressive ability - expressive, not emotive. However, I believe that the expression of a belief system is a passionate activity, in the sense of the concept of the 'passions' as expressive of lived and embodied emotions. It is with this subtext in mind that I am addressing Deleuze's framework behind his concept of the opsign and sonsign, which Deleuze described as a "new breed of signs" – neither indexical, nor syntagmatic.[3] As I perceive it, the opsign and sonsigns are the points where the smooth space of the screen makes its "intensive" (often emotive / historical) breaks, enabling the turning points in narrative equilibriums, catalytic events, that knife in the heart, the point of death, the kiss.[4]

The sonsign and opsign are asymmetrical splinter components of the cinematic crystalline structure. In his glossary to *The Time-Image*, Deleuze defines the opsign as: "an image which breaks the sensory-motor schema, and where the seen is no longer extended into action".[5] Deleuze realises the force behind the opsign and the sonsign in cinema from the 1940s neo-realist period, where the sound and image alone is revelatory of the cognition of thought and the perception of ideas; histories, ideologies, aesthetic preferences, and the affective ranges of these signs. As Richard Smith noted, Deleuze's "politics of location" does indeed affect the

2 G. Deleuze, *Bergsonism* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone, 1988 [1966]), p. 23.

3 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 6; hereafter *TI*.

4 Deleuze and Guattari discuss the affectivity of intensive smooth spaces in plateau 14: "The Smooth and the Striated" *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* trans. B. Massumi. (London: Althone, 1992 [1980]), p. 479.

5 *TI*, "Glossary", n.p.

"aesthetic trajectory" of Deleuze's consideration of certain types of cinema produced after World War II in *The Time-Image*.[6]

Deleuze utilised the opsign and sonsign to describe effectively the physical alteration of space. Simply put, the op/sonsigns are the temporal modalities (keys) that reconfigure (unlock, and expand or condense) the existing spatial milieu and topographical affectivity of a viewed and audited field. Describing these signs and their functions using a range of allegorical and scientific language, Deleuze's op/sonsigns function to interpret meaning symptomatically in the cinematic texts of distinctive and innovative eras of filmmaking: Italian neo-realism; cinema verite of the 1960s; experimental American cinema of the 1960s; the neo-realism of Alain Resnais; the period of post World War II to cinema of the mid 1970s.

The cinema is a screen medium capable of manipulating the viewer / auditor's actual and virtual, habitual and experiential epistemologies and memories. The screen creates a temporal topology of event-vectors of variable durational forces that Deleuze describes as capable of affecting the spectator's "belief in the world".[7] That belief system may be founded upon narrative constructions ranging from the fantastic to the false, cultural trivia and market forms of leisure, socially determined power structures, and socially and politically specific periods within cultures. It is the sensory apprehension of these affective, extrinsic abstract realms that appeal to Deleuze's Artaudian sensitivities: "the power of modern cinema" he writes, is that it provides "reasons to believe in this world... to believe in [the flesh of] the body".[8] So, how does the cinema achieve this?

The restrictions imposed through the technological, economic, and aesthetic organization of a screen medium's contents produces a representation of events (including emotions) that are necessarily bound to their mode of production. Significant for film theory is Deleuze's observation of the spatial relationships of bodies both onscreen and in the field of the spectatorial, and how such ongoing affective relationships provide a registration of the passage of the affection-image.[9] In other

6 R. Smith "The Philosopher with Two Brains", *Film-Philosophy* "Deleuze Special Issue", (Vol. 5 No. 34, November 2001), http://www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n34smith, 13 April 2004, pp. 1-20, p. 17.

7 *TI*, p. 172.

8 *TI*, pp. 172-173.

9 *TI*, pp. 2-3. For discussion of Deleuze's use of affection-image, see his work on Bergson and Spinoza.

words, the screen space is organised before the formation and relations of bodies and events on screen take place; space "precedes realization [of events]".[10]

Deleuze names Japanese director Yasujiro Ozu as "the inventor of opsigns and sonsigns" for the use of specific filmic moments that enable the spectator and those onscreen to perceive the change that has occurred within the whole, within the spectator's understanding of screen-events and the histories and memories invoked.[11] In Ozu's oeuvre, spare and restrictive *mise en scènes* are reflective of both Japanese filmmaking production costs of the 1950s, wherein a small budget restricted location and limited the range of settings, and the aesthetic desire of Japanese filmmakers to adhere to a set of strict technical rules.[12] Ozu's films focus on the relations between things and people, under the regulation of durationally contingent social and political change.[13] In Ozu's films daughters grow up, arranged marriages are discussed, wives mourn for the loss of the intense familial experiences generated by the privations of war, fathers and husbands lament the subtle shifts in patriarchal authority.

Ozu's aesthetic style is emulated in American director Jim Jarmusch's 1987 film *Stranger Than Paradise,* where a silence around the kitchen table dilates the relationship between the protagonists and the spectators' recognition of the communication of things; communication between entities. In Ozu and Jarmusch, silence performs a crystalline moment, describing modification of the screen image neither through movement, nor action, a moment that appeals to thought that Deleuze will define as a sonsign. The moment of this screen form has a durational modality that evinces what Deleuze described as a "*haptique*" (translation: a grabbing); a representation of the sensory and temporal apprehension of objects and

10 G. Deleuze, "The Exhausted" *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. D.W. Smith and M. A. Greco, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 [1992]), p. 160.

11 *TI*, p. 13.

12 On Ozu's form see D.Bordwell & J.Jarmusch, "The films of Yasujiro Ozu: true to form", *Artforum International*, Oct 2003 v42 i2 p150(6), http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/652/898/50373407w6/purl=rc1_EAIM_0_A109023345&dyn=9!xrn_2_0_A109023345?sw_aep=unimelb, 20 April 2004. Also, see D. Richie, *Ozu* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974).

13 Ozu's film titles indicate durational motifs, for example, *Late* Spring (1949), *Early Summer* (1951), *Tokyo Twilight* (1957), *Equinox Flower* (1958), *Good Morning* (1959), *The End of Summer* (1961), *An Autumn Afternoon* (1962), *Late Autumn* (1973).

things, "a touching which is specific to the gaze".[14] The body of the spectator as viewer and auditor, and the bodies onscreen are positioned by the screen medium's editing of this *haptique*; the sensorial and cognitive response time to the "tactisign" (as Deleuze names it) of an embodied image.[15] As such, screen and spectatorial bodies are subjected to spatially determined visual and sonic boundaries and possibilities. Deleuze begins to describe what regulates these moments on screen, and how the edit, or fissure, is what manages affect.

Sound provides an agency to Deleuze's account of the channel between the screen space and the world. In mathematical terms, sound can be described as the n-dimension of the surface of the screen; sound reaches beyond the two-dimensional surface and accesses the auditor's perceptual knowledge, experience, and memories.[16] In his essay "Ritornellos and Existential Affairs" (1979), Guattari developed the Proustian concept of "ritornellos of times past".[17] In musical parlance, a ritornello is a term that refers to the musical refrain, an orchestral passage between verses of a song, or it can be a passage for a full orchestra in a concerto, during which the soloist is silent. Using the term ritornello as a marker for the range of "catalytic" functions of an "existential affect" upon "reiterative discursive sequences", Guattari outlined the temporal relations and expression of

14 *TI*, pp. 12-13; "*designer un toucher propre au regard*", *L'Image-Temps* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1985), p. 22. See also Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of smooth spaces and their "haptic rather than optical" perceptual qualities in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 479.

15 *TI*, p. 13.

16 In *Difference and Repetition,* trans. P. Patton (London and New York: Continuum, 1994 [1968]), Deleuze discusses multiplicity, and continuity in relation to ideas as "n-dimensional", p. 182. Deleuze and Guattari discuss space in terms of Riemann's surface in plateau 14, "1440: The Smooth and the Striated", in *A Thousand Plateaus,* trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987 [1980]), p. 476. For explanation of the n-dimension, see H. Weyl, *The Concept of a Riemann Surface*, trans. G. R. Maclane (Massachusetts & London: Addison-Wesley, 1955). For explanation of the n-dimension in relation to Deleuze, see M. DeLanda "The Mathematics of the Virtual: Manifolds, Vector Fields and Transformation Groups" in *Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy* (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), pp. 9-44. For a discussion of the axial systems of music, see Timothy S. Murphy and Daniel W. Smith, "What I Hear is Thinking Too: Deleuze and Guattari Go Pop", *Echo* (Vol 3, Issue 1 Spring 2001, www.humnet.ucla.edu/echo) 13 April 2004, section 5.

17 English translation first published in *Discourse* 12/2 1990, pp. 68-88. Reprinted in *The Guattari Reader: Pierre-Félix Guattari*, ed. Gary Genosko (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp. 158-171.

affect as sensorially experienced and expressed.[18] One could observe that Deleuze's concept of the crystalline channelling nature of the opsign and sonsigns are developed from Guattari's investigation into the semiotic scales and functions of a ritornellos' bracketing of affect.[19]

In their essay-plateau 11, "1837: Of the Refrain" in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Guattari and Deleuze's ideas on the importance of sound are described as not just territorial markers of 'forces' and 'functions', but sound performing as a topological divisive structure. [20] It is precisely this spatial apportion that Deleuze will describe as the "sonsign" in *The Time-Image*. Ronald Bogue notes that Deleuze and Guattari's use of the refrain [*ritournelle*] is expanded by them to refer to "any kind of rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory".[21]

Bogue lists these 'territories of the refrain' that Deleuze and Guattari describe in "Of the Refrain". To briefly reiterate, I will list them here: *stability* (for example, sing to yourself in a spooky place and the singing renders the unknown space familiar), *property* (singing a national anthem will quickly demarcate territorial ownership), *opening* (that rooster greeting the dawn, altering the configuration of space according to the demands of time). I think, however, that the refrain is more than just a borderline marker, as Bogue refers to it. Like an envoi, or ballad, the ritornello is a musical sound-space that is more than a semiotic bracketing. Rather, it acts as a conceptual messenger and passageway to the thought/experience of a spatial whole of a specific event or affect. Throughout *The Time-Image*, Deleuze plays with the ideas of transit and exchange of the virtual and actual, naming the crystal-image's dual circuitry of "internal limit", and "outer-most envelope".[22] Deleuze describes the op/sonsign as the points of spatial transition: "passages and conversions, tending toward a point of indiscernibility".[23] However, the ritornello is not just a divisive space, or a boundary marker, or even the edge of an outside; it becomes, in Deleuze and Guattari's usage, the inside of a division. The ritornello provides Deleuze with a way to think through

18 F. Guattari, "Ritornellos and Existential Affects", pp.162-163.
19 Deleuze acknowledges Guattari's production of the idea of the "crystals of time" and analysis of the ritornello in *TI*, p. 295, nt. 25; p. 296, nt. 34.
20 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 310-350.
21 R. Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 17.
22 *TI*, pp. 80-81.
23 *TI*, p. 9.

Bergson's barely visible, and barely audible (indiscernible) line of the coalescence of actual and virtual.[24] Deleuze's development of Bergson's thesis of movement and change, as the latter described in *Creative Evolution*, is in the application of this theory to the affective cinematic screen. The screen space is ritornellized through the "vibration, radiation" of virtual and actual elements, and Deleuze invents the pause-passageway of the opsign and sonsign to describe this perceptual movement. [25]

The literary, plastic, theatrical and screen based arts of post World War II drew a proscenium of mortality around their forms, actors, and events. Yet as outlined in Deleuze's concept of the crystal-image, within this determinate circumference, there are infinite topographical configurations of what he described as "living thought".[26] In *The Time-Image* Deleuze adopts Vittorio de Sica's durational motif of a man's bicycle from de Sica's 1948 film *The Bicycle Thief*, where modalities of ontology are tested. The protagonist of de Sica's film must engage with the forces of his screen world, engage in a mode of "combat" to reckon with his existence in the world of post war Italy. [27] The bicycle is emblematic of existence for Deleuze; discussing Alfred Jarry's pataphysics of the bicycle in an essay in 1965, Deleuze noted how Jarry's "essence" of the bike is technology.[28] In taking the trip around the streets of Rome in1948, de Sica provides a view into the patchwork of Europe at the time: the opsign of the American Marshall Plan, and its effect on the Italian National cinema industry is indicated through the Rita Hayworth posters bill-boarded onto the brick street walls by the protagonist, just as his bicycle is being stolen: Hollywood had arrived / the sociopolitical despair now has another face to its name.

We could further separate the dimensions of the son/opsign into their specific types of expression, for example the instance of words-language as a *phonic* sonsign, different from instrumental or aleatory expression of

24 *TI*, p. 70; p. 81.
25 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (London: Althone, 1986 [1983, *L'image-Mouvement*]), pp. 8-11.
26 *TI*, p. 177.
27 Deleuze describes how 'combat' is a modality of becoming, that implies no judgment in his essay "To Have Done with Judgment" in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 135.
28 G. Deleuze, "An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry" (1965) in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 93, "The bicycle is the frame, like Heidegger's 'fourfold'".

a *sonorous* sonsign, and so on. One of many sonsigns is in the actor's use of language in *The Bicycle Thief*: *"mangia, mangia"* (eat, eat), urges the desperate father to his fearful son in a heartbreaking scene of familial anguish over the space of the dinner table. To give another of Deleuze's examples, the sonsign of "*mangia*" appears in another form, as "Rosebud" in Orson Welles's 1940 film *Citizen Kane*, again another "ba(l)lad" to ontology, as Deleuze comments on the noir plot's quest to discern the "soundings", or "sound image" of what is said. [29] Kane is a dying man, who, like the child of de Sica's film, has a certain motor-sensory "helplessness", as Deleuze described, or fragility that makes them more "capable of seeing and hearing".[30] In addition to operating as *mise en scène*, plot and structural devices, opsigns and sonsigns add affective passion into the whole.[31] In *The Time-Image*, Deleuze continually stresses the importance of grasping the fundamental shift that occurs with the cognitive apprehension of movement of sensory-motor conditions. Questioning why this collapse of sensory-motor schemata gave rise to the opsign and sonsign as the now connected poles of infinite cinematic exchange of the virtual (or imaginary) and actual (or real), Deleuze provides examples that defer to spatial examples of passageways, or transitional states.[32] In turn, these associations (for example, a conversation as transitional place) create the thought of possible physical and virtual worlds and behaviours of objects therein, as evidenced in screen media. The style of the opsigns' and/or sonsigns' passage-as-pause of the discrete screen movements produces a range of modalities of temporal relations, generating the screen-space as an affective place.[33] Movement in itself is replaced by an awareness of the affective power of screen-space.

Deleuze describes the united exchange of virtual and actual as the crystal- image, and describes its specificities through the medium of cinema, which he regarded as a coalescent vector of temporal and spatial cognisance. The elements of the crystal-image are the relations between

29 *TI*, p. 105, p. 13.
30 *TI*, p. 3.
31 Deleuze discusses this in his chapter on "Thought and Cinema" in *The Time-Image*.
32 *TI*, p. 12, p. 9.
33 Deleuze's discussion in his chapter "Beyond the movement-image" in *The Time-Image* instigates discussion on divergent character archetypes, acting modalities, and the awareness of the divergent uses of topographies as territories of behaviour.

the actual and the virtual image. These relations consist of the associations generated by the ever mutating consolidation and dissolution of the exchange of a real image and its implication – that is, its virtuality, within the circuit of established meanings of recollection, not movement. Under crystalline descriptions, the "object" or image, is continually replaced, displaced, multiplied. Bergson described this process in his diagram of the circuit of 'reflective perception' which emulates an image of the spreading ripples in a disturbed body of water, or cut in half, as in a mirrored image.[34] Just as you would throw a stone into the centre of a still body of water and watch the resultant disturbance/alteration of that body of water, the implication for the insertion of a son/opsign into the screen body means that the perceptual field's circuit is dilated, becoming more specifically focussed through the magnification and multiplication of the son/opsign, as the layers enfold each other and return to an enlarged whole: engorged by virtualities.

In *The Time-Image*, Deleuze adopts a three-fold structure for the crystal-image. His logic of Augustine's "threefold present" contains the present of present things, the present of past things, and the present of future things.[35] The present of experience has Deleuze describing how the crystal-image can be conceived through a mirror; however, this arena merely enframes the quintessence of the virtual and real's nature of proxy. Within this stage, a theatrical play of contextual differences enables the crystal-image to shift and generate other meanings through its opacity and/or clarity of form, hence generating memory and a present-past. In addition to this exaggerated expression of exchange (frequently made obvious in the cinema's inflationary tendencies, as Deleuze describes it), the crystal-image, and crystalline structure are by nature self-generating, the invention of the future by the present. It is the genesis and the whole at once, or as Deleuze describes in *The Time-Image*, "the theorem and the problem".[36]

34 H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory* trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, (New York: Zone, [1896] 1988), p. 105.
35 St. Augustine *The Confessions of St Augustine* trans. E. B. Pusey, (London: Dent, [c.397] 1962), pp. 251-277; Deleuze, *TI*, pp. 100-101.
36 *TI*, p. 174.

Deleuze's crystal-image is descriptive of Bergson's relational circuit of "constant creation or reconstruction"[37], a salient point in contemporary cinema's economic use of the autopoetic nature of genre.[38]

Through these three variations of the crystal-image, Deleuze describes the cognitive and physical apprehension of time as an affectation and modification for the perceiver. The topographic milieu, produced by the crystal-image and generated from the circuit between virtual and actual, causes affective emotion. For the viewer / auditor of the screen, this affect may or may not be instantaneous (for example the affect produced by pornography/ violence/ the news may operate as a delayed neurological/cognitive/ corporeal registration). The enfolded ritornellic ripples of virtuality and actuality may not always be symmetrical; crystals can also form as enantiomorphic structures.[39]

The cinemas of Chantal Akerman and Alain Resnais utilize this non-symmetrical vision of things and solicit Deleuze's attention for their range of affective power and the possible scales of temporal indicators of the op/sonsign. *How duration moves*, Deleuze's question to the cinematic medium, requires tabulation through the range of spatial modalities of affective expression available to the digital medium, in addition to an account of spectators' bio-cognitive reception, and response.

Analysis of any experience within capitalism, and of any market produced medium is determined by an ethically produced aesthetic. Recognition of that aesthetic, the pinpointing of it within a specific location has been the project of many theorists. The links between architectonics, geography and affective experience have been extensively noted, for example, by Frances Yates, and Guiliana Bruno.[40] What makes Deleuze's crystal-image and crystalline structures different then from the infinitive (yet emotively determinate) aesthetic cartographies of, for

37 H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 103.

38 For a discussion of the nature of genre on screen, see John Fiske *Television Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1987), and Steve Neale *Genre and Hollywood* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

39 See H. Weyl's discussion on enantiomorphic crystal formations in his book *Symmetry* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 28-32.

40 F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory*, (London: Pimlico, 1966), G.Bruno, *Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film* (New York: Verso, 2002).

example, Benjamin's *aura*[41], Sartre's *nausea*[42], de Beauvoir's *instants of creative responsibility*[43], Barthes' *punctum*[44], or Irigaray's *kiss*?

In his discussion of the cinematic form as a temporal crystalline structure in *The Time-Image*, Deleuze applies a spatio-musical logic explored in the Deleuze-Guattari essay-plateau 14. "1440: The Smooth and the Striated".[45] Deleuze's *kiss*, or form of a 'punctum', appears as the crystal-image of cinema's "pure optical or sound situations", which operate as a crystalline-continuum of opsign and sonsigns.[46] Throughout *The Time-Image*, Deleuze discussed how such "situations" are evoked by their apprehension, or structural insertion, via moments that effect a "loosening of the sensory-motor link (the stroll or wandering, the ballad, the events which concern no one) to the rise of optical and sound situations".[47] With this expression of "loosening", Deleuze invokes one of his many descriptions of the movement of power and forces, of pathways to existence and experience, and how that involves a play of the dynamism of affective forces.

Deleuze's crystal-image describes the cinematic process of creating a narrative circuit. An aporetic sense of complicity is maintained through the perceptual process played and preyed upon by the cinema's suggestive nature through the op/sonsign's play with reality as abstraction and criticism of affective vision. Meaning is clarified with the recognition of component elements once the whole has been delineated for an instant within successive instants. What gives the illusion of a sense of spatial and temporal continuity for the spectator, is the sonsign as linkage point within the series of moments on screen. When Deleuze writes "The visual image will thus never show what the sound image utters", he is referring to his belief in the construction of spatial forms through Riemannian, non-

41 W. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in *Illuminations* ed. H.Arendt, trans. H.Zohn, (New York: Schocken, 1969). Guattari also pinpointed Benjamin's *aura* and Barthes' *punctum* as forming part of the "genre of singularising ritornellization", in "Ritornellos and Existential Affects", p. 164.

42 J-P. Sartre, *Nausea* trans. R. Baldick (London: Penguin, 1965 [1938]).

43 S. de Beauvoir, *The Blood of Others*, trans. Y. Moyse and R. Senhouse (London: Penguin, 1948 [1945]).

44 R. Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* trans. R. Howard, (London: Fontana, 1984 [1980]), pp. 40-59.

45 *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 474-500.

46 *TI*, p. 9.

47 ibid.

determinate components.[48] These spatial forms are not referring to physically determined or measured Euclidean dimensions; they are "non-localizable".[49] For example, the spaces implied by sound may be of a virtual, fourth, or of a durationally contextual dimension (a memory space, recollective, premonitory, *déjà-vu*, and so on, as Bergson described in *Matter and Memory*). It is possible to think of examples of sonsigns as intensifiers of the time-image produced by the screen as Deleuze describes them as having "dimensions or powers that go beyond space".[50] Deleuze's "beyond" refers to any virtual intensity experienced, as a false montage, part of the affective illusory power of the self-reflective screen of post-Classical cinema. Op/sonsigns are not action or movement, they are vector points in space that are out of "daily", regular sequence, and as such frame the vital linkage components of screen wholes.[51] Despite Deleuze's insistence on the "beyond of space", the op/sonsign's position in the sequence of imagery means an alteration of the configuration of the spatial whole of the screen text and haptic apprehension of events occurs. Deleuze regards space as perceptually scaled thought chains, and describes it as a vectored series of information, to be accessed through the iconic, the genetic, the semiotic, and the clichéd language of the screen medium's internal variation and adaptation of temporal relations.[52] Deleuze describes opsigns and sonsigns as "direct presentation[s] of time", but what makes their specificity in cinema is the concept of a body as an anchor for the relative point on the smooth, mutable screen space.[53]

In virtual and actual realms, we generally experience space through a remembered, imagined, and experiential sensory interface (the threefold kiss) - audition, hapticity, olfactory means, visual perception, emotional direction, psychological organization, simulation of gravitational laws, and so on, all of which stimulate and direct motor perception. As Bergson argued in *Matter and Memory*, there is no perception without some form of corporeal affection taking place.[54] The op/sonsign is a temporal point, a

48 *TI*, p. 279.
49 *TI*, p. 22; p. 41.
50 *TI*, p. 22.
51 *TI*, pp. 14-15. Deleuze develops the differences and linkages between the 'scalar' and 'vectorial' signs in his essay "Spinoza and the Three Ethics", *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. D. W. Smith & M. A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 138-151.
52 *TI*, pp. 22-23; p. 34.
53 *TI*, p. 41.
54 H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 17.

moment of (affective) recognition for the spectator / actor within the continuum of the whole. As Deleuze notes, the activity of pure optical or pure sound apprehension produces temporal moments that shift the "direction" of the whole spatial field of the screen. Continuity of relations occurs not because the op/sonsign function as semiotic indexical points, but because there are anchorage points for the screen surfaces, and these are the bodies of the spectators. Deleuze's use of Riemann's problematisation of space, and Bergson's concept of the "in kind" mutability of space enables a connection to be established between the multiple spatial zones and the materiality of a specific body (animate or object). As spectators of the op/sonsigns of the crystal image, we perceive and describe the same screen representation in terms of a heterogeneously configured space of "differential relations".[55] Every little space has a different sound resonance that provides access to our ethic of believing in the body. The opsign and/or sonsign provides for the screen medium a topographical pause - the pause before the affect effects its durationally contingent vectorial or scalar sign upon the body of the spectator.[56]

55 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 485; 9-11; Deleuze, *TI*, p. 175.
56 A version of this paper was presented at the "Experimenting With Intensities: Science, Philosophy, Politics, Art" Conference, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, May 2004. Thanks to Constantin Boundas for his encouragement, and the Britboys for their engaging parley.

Pli 16 (2005), 114-128

Ten Propositions on the Brain

GREGG LAMBERT & GREGORY FLAXMAN

"Many people have a tree growing in their head, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree." (Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*)

First Proposition: There Is an Evolution Specific to the Brain

The history of consciousness has grown sufficiently tired, predictable, and redundant that it is high time we turned to the incomparably more complex question of the brain, the mutations and becomings of which we are only just beginning to intuit. But what would it mean to trace the evolutions of the brain? In the first place, we might say that the brain can only be approached when we dispossess ourselves of the philosophical tendencies that traditionally define consciousness, materialism and idealism, for both of these modes effectively segregate the brain from the world, dividing inside and outside. Like Henri Bergson, who initiated a radical new philosophy of the brain, Gilles Deleuze develops his own distinct philosophy of thought, of what it means to think, at the point that thinking itself is situated within a "*machine assemblage of moving images*" from which the brain is materially indistinguishable.[1] "Every image acts on other and reacts to others," Deleuze writes, such that the brain must be taken as one among many images, the set (or, better yet, the "infinite whole") of which we call the plane of immanence.[2]

Immanent means without mediation, indifferentiated but all the more open to differences. Imagine what the universe was like at its birth, a chaos of atoms and molecules: on this primordial plane there is no distinction between image, matter, movement, and perception but, rather, a world of "universal variation, universal undulation, universal rippling"—

or, as Deleuze says, a "metacinema."[3] Soon enough, of course, this chaos will coagulate into the individuated bodies ("molarities") that we take for granted, but even here and now, when we are tempted to set ourselves apart from the objects, when we are tempted to assert an essential or substantial difference between the brain and the image, we must regain our sense of a universal hospitality of images. The brain is no less plunged (*plongé*) into the plane of images as those images colonize our brains, the result of which is that, for Deleuze, "[t]here cannot be a difference in kind, but only a difference in degree"[4] between image and perception. In effect, the human brain emerges into a kind of hiatus in the field of images, a synaptic caesura that perceives ("prehends") the world from a particular point of view, in the same manner as Leibniz's monad.

But if the human brain thus evolves by introducing ever greater intervals in the image-flow, we might say that this evolution has carried us beyond any point at which we can share in the elaborate baroque harmony of perspectives that Deleuze calls our "chaosmos." If an atom or a butterfly consists in an infinitely richer perspective on the universe than our human brains, as Deleuze suggests, this is because the human brain tends to privilege itself, taking its own affective interval as the means for stabilizing perception (the perception of what we recognize) and preparing the ground for response (the action upon what we recognize). The world becomes a cinema inasmuch as we have evolved, long prior to the invention of cinema, into beings who distribute space and organize time according to the cinematic principles of our own "internal theatre," of perception-images, affection-images, and action-image. Indeed, Deleuze defines this habitualized brain as the locus of a sensory-motor schema that indulges in the narcissistic delusion of its own centrality, thereby transcending the vicissitudes of images to imagine itself a solitary subject always capable of recognizing things as they are and acting upon them. With the rise of the subject, Deleuze admits, "the world has become a bad film."

Second Proposition: The Brain Is Not a "Subject"

What do Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say we must conceive of the brain no longer from the position of a "Subject"? "We will speak of the brain as Cezanne spoke of landscape: the human is absent, but

everything takes place in the brain."[5] How do we achieve this pure perspective, the perspective of the brain, apart from its secondary connections and integrations? The question is potentially misleading because, if the true perspective of the brain belongs to what Deleuze and Guattari, employing the language of Whitehead, call the "superject," then we cannot in fact recourse to any meta-narrative or metaphysical sense of the brain. There is no "brain behind the brain," since this would only reinforce a conception of the brain as the internalized projection of a Subject who "acts, thinks, feels, wills, and desires"— yet another anthropomorphism of the brain!

On the contrary, as Deleuze and Guattari write, the brain "is neither an image (*Gestalt*) nor a perceived form, but a *form in itself* that corresponds to no external view."[6] For this reason, the brain cannot be defined as a relation between perception and consciousness, since it is the totality of all relations, including those relations that have not yet actualized. This is why the totality specific to the brain is always partial in the sense that a plane of immanence is only partially composed in relation to other planes. It makes sense, therefore, according to Deleuze, to consider the brain in terms of relative speeds and intensive states. For example, what is the intensity accorded to perception, as distinguished from memory or recollection processes? What is the speed specific to consciousness, as distinguished from unconscious processes that exist below the threshold (or qualitative limit) of perceptions or recollections bound by a certain sensory-motor apparatus? It no longer makes sense to define the brain topologically (that is, in terms of specific spatio-temporal coordinates), since the brain is everything and everywhere, regardless of time and space. The brain is virtual, not a space but a plane *(plan)* that provides the conditions of time and space (actualization of the virtual). This in turn reshapes the organically determined brain, giving form to the "grey matter" of possibilities.

Third Proposition: Philosophy and Science Share a Brain

The brain opens up an encounter between philosophy and science that constitutes an event of a special kind, since the event as such envelops both in a mutual form of thinking, that is, of thinking through the other. We know all too well the vulgar forms that this event seems to conjure—

the political reckoning with the possible ends of, say, genetic research or the production of chemical weapons. But in fact the event dwells in the "sense" that philosophy makes of science because philosophy does not settle for dogmatic statements or stupid clichés; rather, it undertakes the conceptualization of what often remains, in science, a chaos that is captured or tamed. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "Mathematical equations do not enjoy a tranquil certainty that would be like the sanction of dominant scientific opinion, but emerge from an abyss that makes the mathematician 'skip over calculations,' anticipating being unable to effect or arrive at the truth without 'colliding from one side to the other.'"[7] Science, they explain, creates functions, but the task of philosophy is to conceptualize these functions, just as it is the task of philosophy to conceptualize the percepts and affects of art, to open thought to the chaos of these domains. Even (or perhaps, especially) in the context of science, philosophy encounters a kind of chaos into which its own thinking is plunged. This is the risk or danger of philosophy, but it is also, in the context of new scientific developments, especially in neuroscience, the confrontation with thinking itself, the confrontation with "what is called thinking" (Heidegger).

While neuroscience and philosophy come together around the event called the brain, which is immanent with all events, every effort to think, a philosophy of the brain should not be mistaken with what is sometimes called "philosophy of mind." The latter tends, under the directives of analytic philosophy, to have already been mapped and circumscribed by certain deep structures that are determined in advance: when we suspect, for instance, that the mind must be the seat of language and reason (*Logos*), the brain is automatically modified in accordance with this image, the result of which is that we find what we seek but little else. It is in this context that Deleuze argues that the brain actually constitutes a special type of matter which is both more supple and less "closed," even though "nothing here goes beyond the physico-chemical properties of a particularly complicated type of matter."[8] Contrary to the image of matter that is "determined," the matter of the brain is capable of becoming a "determining determination" (*naturing nature*). This is why, in *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze-Guattari identify the brain (*le cerveau*) as nothing less than spirit itself (*l'esprit*)[9]; moreover, in Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, the concept of *élan vital* represents the positive discovery of the privilege of the brain in modern philosophy, by which Life "makes use" of the matter

of the brain in order to "get outside," to leap from the closed circle of an already determined and "closed" nature.

Fourth Proposition: The Brain Is Not a Metaphor

Deleuze always insists that we must think without an image, which is to say, that the brain must not be submitted to a totalizing, organizing, and organic principle of what it means to think, since this all but ensures that we will produce a feeble brain capable of only dogmatism. If our brains have been trained in accordance with such forms of common sense, this is only the effect of an image of thought that is propagated both as habitus and control, as convention and discipline. "Thought is thereby filled with no more than an image of itself, one in which it recognizes itself more than it recognizes things: this is a finger, this is a table, good morning Theaetetus."[10]

An image of thought is always a means of delimiting of the brain, of subsuming its potentialities and powers to a metaphor of what it means to think, when in fact we have no idea what a brain can really do. Inspired by developments in neuroscience, Deleuze insists that the brain as "a relatively undifferentiated mass" in which circuits "aren't there to begin with": in other words, "[c]reating new circuits in art means creating them in the brain too."[11] Spinoza's great affirmation—who knows what a body can do?—should be equally applied to the brain, since we seem capable of fashioning an infinite number of different brains, each according to our particular experiences and affections, to singularities that condition our most decisive neural pathways and make possible new synaptic lines of flight. To "think differently" always implies making a new brain for ourselves. Applying the above statements to the brain constructed by modern cinema, we might recognize here the desire to build a better brain, "to leap from the circle of closed societies." Ideally, that is, cinema also "makes use" of the matter of the brain in order to "get through," "to make a machine to triumph over mechanism," "to use the determination of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very determination has spread."[12]

Fifth Proposition: The Modern Cinema Is Composed of Two Different Brains

The relation of the two domains of science and art to cinema is especially important, since as Eisenstein perceived early on the cinema is a techno-scientific art. That is to say, it creates functions that are applied to solve problems specific to its technical apparatus and is made up by the relative speeds it uses to slow down chaos in order to "capture" movement. At the same time, it composes perception-images and sound-images and introduces new varieties into the clichés that determine normal states of consciousness. This might help to clarify the relations specific to thought that emerge in the cinema, as well as Deleuze's elaboration of the "cinematographic subject" (I THINK) that precedes a people and causes its creation, even fabulously. Why? The subject of such a cinema, we now see, must be created outside language, national culture (or story); that is, it would have to be a "people" that was created by cinema itself, and could not depend upon politics for its creation, since politics actually "creates" nothing but only makes use of the creations of philosophy, art, and science.

Among others, it was Eisenstein who intuited in the "machine" of cinema a means of transcending the mechanisms of perception, opinion (common ideas, or views), and cliché in order to invent newer and finer articulations of the linkages between the human and the world; what Deleuze would later call the creation of "percepts and affects." The cinema does this precisely by making use of the conventions and determinations "to pass though the net of determinations that have spread out" into a world (determinations of perception, opinion, character, etc.) and, as a result, it fashions its own conventions which become *doxa* as well. Of course, there is always a danger that these forms will become too rigid and dominant, the historical danger of a cinema that is placed in the service of an already existing national character, a kind of monumental cinema which represents both the propagandistic function of Soviet cinema, but also of the American popular cinema. As Deleuze points out, despite the possibilities offered by the cinema and understood by the likes of Eisenstein, the industrial, stylistic, and even cerebral elaboration of film tended in its "classical" years to re-trace the very evolutionary formation of the human brain into a stable and certain habitus.[13]

Sixth Proposition: The Cinema Is a Cerebral Machine or Image of the Brain

If the brain is a plane of immanence or consistency, then we might understand its function through networks of images themselves. Thus, in "*Doutes sur l'imaginaire*" and elsewhere, Deleuze describes the plane of consistency created by cinema as a "Whole" which internalizes the image of movement while, at the same time, movement is externalized in a series of images. "In effect," Deleuze writes, "when the image is in movement, images are never enchained together without becoming interiorized in a Whole, which externalizes itself in the enchained images."[14] The brain is a screen, Deleuze says, but the screen, the cinema, is also a brain, an organization of images and memories whose connections (regular or irrational) comprise an "image of thought."

In this respect, Deleuze's two books on cinema form a single meditation on the brain itself and its various images. Each director that Deleuze discusses formulates the brain differently (yes, there is a cerebral style), but Deleuze singles out Stanley Kubrick as the director whose work takes a turn toward the full cerebralization of cinema. The brain and the world are virtually identical in Kubrick's films because the world itself has become brain, a vast neural arrangement. For example, we find an image of the brain in the perversely centralized "war room" of *Dr. Strangelove* (1964), the hermetic maze of trenches in *Paths of Glory* (1957), the literal maze located in the property of the Overlook Hotel in *The Shining* (1980), or the regimented symmetry of the marine barracks in *Full Metal Jacket* (1987). Hence, while the world and brain are immanent, Kubrick contrives a world in which brains are environs that multiply and encounter other brains. Let us take what is perhaps the most vivid characterization of this topological problem, *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), where the brain is also objectively present in the form of the black monolith. Here, the brain is divided between a representation of the whole (the brain is the world); the presence of a distinct but impermeable thing represented by the monolith (a presence-in-itself, or *Ding an sich*, having neither an inside nor a definite external form); and finally, the generalized power that seems to be responsible for the plan of evolution on a planetary and cosmological level.

Within this cosmological unfolding, naturally, there are special moments—divergences, bifurcations, forking paths, which stand out as "events." The first of these is the "eventuation" of technology, which the monolith's arrival already anticipates as remarkable leap. A simple bone is transformed into a tool (a weapon), then later, with one of the greatest graphic-matches in the history of cinema, into a spaceship capable of interplanetary travel. As Deleuze writes, Kubrick transforms the story of evolution itself, that is, the story of the brain, into a journey that leads both to the furthest reaches of space and, at the same time, to the differentiation of brain cells in the human embryo. "At the end of the '*space odyssey*', it is following a fourth dimension that the sphere of the foetus and the sphere of the earth have a chance of entering into an incommensurable relation, unknown, one which would convert death into a new life."[15] The brain, we could say, retains all possibilities (even birth or re-birth), but they have to be selected, chosen, and actualized.

Seventh Proposition: There Are Many Brains But Also a Dominant Image of the Brain

As Deleuze argues, there are different brains—molecular, chemical, and even cinematic. One cannot reduce these other brains to avatars "created" by human intelligence, as a kind of externalized or "artificial" manifestation of a purely virtual brain. Rather, the computer is an actualization of a new brain and not an extension of the human faculty in the form of a cybernetic mechanism. The creation of the computer introduces the distinction between "artificial" and "natural" intelligence, and it is only from this point that we begin speaking of two brains, or of one brain that becomes highly differentiated from itself. Again, Kubrick's portrayal of HAL 9000 in *2001* gives us a vivid illustration. HAL is not just the computer that runs the Discovery, HAL is the spaceship itself in its entirety. The astronauts "occupy" HAL, and he feels within him their presence and location, including the astronauts still in hibernation who are linked to his systems. At the same time, there is a location that does occupy HAL in the same manner, originally ascribed to the thoughts of astronaut Dave Bowman, which introduces a schism or paranoid formation. HAL's calculated solution to this schism is simply to remove

astronauts Dave Bowman and Frank Poole from its own body, thus resolving the logical impasse.

An example of the chemical brain can be illustrated in the phenomenon of drugs. Is it, in fact, that the human brain is altered or modified by the chemical properties of the drug, or rather that we experience the introduction of another brain, a chemical brain that subordinates and makes use of the organic brain as one of its own exterior lobes or partial surfaces? In both these definitions we see that although the human is located as the intersection with these other brains, they are in no way subordinated to its image. The human brain is only one of several brains, only one path in which the brain is actualized along divergent lines, "the human being only one cerebral crystallization."[6] At the same time, one could say that the actualization of the cybernetic brain has increased the number of circuits and pathways—perhaps even all the way to infinity—than were thought to be possible for the human brain beforehand. This event in the history of consciousness only appears to happen instantaneously, but it has in fact been prepared gradually by a series of evolutionary leaps. Recalling again the scene from *2001* where the bone spirals in the air and is suddenly transformed into a spaceship orbiting the earth, this event only *appears* to happen "in the blink of an eye," since Kubrick wants to show the full crystallization of the idea that first sparks in the primitive intelligence. From the perspective of the idea itself, there is little difference between a bone and a spaceship (a difference, strictly speaking, of material composition), since both are objects that represent a certain cerebral objectification whereby the brain invests itself in matter and transforms the world into brain-matter.

Eighth Proposition: The Future (of the) Brain Is Open to Chance Becomings

The future (of the) brain seems, at this point, to be determined by the opposition between the organic and the cybernetic. We might employ Deleuze and Guattari's terminology to say that while the human brain is deterritorialized onto the circuitry of the cybernetic brain, the cybernetic brain is simultaneously reterritorialized onto the human brain. Consequently, the human brain has begun to wander through the wider circuits and pathways of the computer—even to the point where the

distinction between human and cybernetic is blurred, if not dissolved altogether. Nevertheless, the human still tries to conceive of this relationship between the two brains according to an earlier form-matter distinction, by which it would appear that the human brain was simply employing the cybernetic brain as a path to its own actualization. Thus, there is more than a vestige of Hegelianism remaining in contemporary scientific narratives of the brain, in which Spirit (or Mind) takes a circuitous path of externalization in order to achieve a final identification between the actualized brain and the ideal that is potential in matter.

We maintain, rather, that the mind is only the "ghost in the brain," the sensory-motor double that has taken control of thinking but that thought is always catching the image of, like a strange spirit whose haunting we only dimly perceive. In neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, one usually finds the question of the cybernetic brain treated in terms of the possibility of artificial intelligence. For instance, the question arises as to whether it would be possible to create an intelligent machine (i.e., a "conscious" machine). But isn't this the most feeble means of imagining the brain, determining its capacities and powers according to an organic ("human") configuration? Again, we are no closer to knowing what a brain can do when we reduce even its cerebral productions to reproductions, to making a brain "like our own."

Ninth Proposition: The Human Brain is No Model for the Future Brain.

Two dangers belong to the productions of new brains—dangers that, despite their differences, share the aspect of an "all too human" creation. The first danger, the creation of a disciplinary brain, recalls Kubrick's *A Clockwork Orange* (1971), where the director explores the moral question that is attached to the sensory motor schema of the cinematic brain as a manner of correcting or rectifying the deficiency of the organic brain. Kubrick reverses the usual moral cliché concerning the question of causality in representations of sex and violence by already recognizing, in the very question itself, the splitting of the human subject into two brains that have already at a certain moment entered into combat, or of the idea of a higher brain that is able to control and subdue the lower, organic brain. In the middle of the film, the main character is connected to an

apparatus not unlike that of film itself, where a soundtrack is repeated in conjunction with a series of images in order to produce a specific motor-response on the part of the subject. The result is uncontrollable nausea and vomiting. Thus, the "action-image" that belonged to the organic brain of the violent criminal is altered by the introduction of another sensory motor-schema, creating "new circuits" that effectively introduce a moralizing force.

The second danger—the reproduction of an unconscious brain—can be found in the project Kubrick was planning before he died, which Steven Spielberg used as the basis for *A.I.* (2001). The film revolves around the mission to make a life-like robot, a boy "who can love." Here we might note that the seemingly preliminary question of mechanical feeling or affection has already been converted into a human emotion and, more to the point, a question of object-relations. The attempt to produce a life-like child induces in the robot a program that is transported from the organic brain, which is dominated by the logic of the lost object and of a never-ending mourning that we call consciousness. However, instead of the consciousness of death ("I will someday die"), we encounter the traumatic consciousness of artificiality ("I am not real"), which in turn produces a new form of unconsciousness—an unconscious that is specific to the cybernetic brain. Thus, a final irony associated with the desire to "make a brain like our own" is the creation of an unconscious desire in the cybernetic brain, even the possibility of a primary narcissism that would absorb all its functioning. From this point onward, the cybernetic brain would be subject to crashes that have nothing to do with gaps in its programming (as was the case with HAL 9000), but rather with the entire field of the virtual when it is mediated by the question of desire.

Tenth Proposition: The Future of the Cinematic Brain Lies in the Development of the Crystalline image.

Finally, we return to the proposition "the brain is the screen," but with the understanding that the screen only actualizes a portion of the membrane that runs between exterior perception and interior projections. The other portions of this membrane are actualized by the celluloid in the apparatus, by the thin film that covers the surface of the retina, by the skin that becomes sensitive to light and registers the movement of the bodies' own

intensities across a variable zone of distribution; all the way to the network of synapses that form an intricate lattice-work within the brain itself. At the same time, the complete realization of the identity of the brain and the world introduces a profound disorientation (even a schism) into the classical mechanism of perception, causing perception to become almost hallucinatory, and the modern question to emerge—perhaps hysterically, perhaps even violently—concerning how we can decide between what comes from the inside and what comes from the outside, the extra-sensory perceptions or the hallucinatory projections.[17]

Inasmuch as there is an identity between inside and outside, however, the brain and the world do not form a whole as much as an inseparable limit that is refracted in the form of the crystalline-image of perception-hallucination. The designation of real and imaginary ceases to hold sway over our perception, and is displaced by a virtual world or zone of indiscernibility whose qualities and powers are actualized (though with no greater certainty or "reality"). Again, the cinema of the brain developed by Kubrick becomes a privileged example of this moment, even though the instances he chooses to explore, the exemplars of this new brain caught in a disorientation between perception and hallucination, could be called pathological. In *The Shining*, for example, the indiscernibility of perception and internal projection is brought to an acute crisis of horrific images (slaughtered children, blood-filled elevators, etc.), thereby revealing that the characters who occupy the Overlook Hotel are themselves only the projections of past characters and previous lives who inhabit this topological space of this brain. Indeed, the distinction between perception and hallucination (as well as the distinction between past and present) is dissolved in favour of a more complete determination of the reality of the events that transpire. Does it make any difference, any longer, to ask what is real and what is merely hallucination? In the end, the distinction between memory and present, perception and hallucination, is no longer centred upon the perspective occupied by the demented mind of the caretaker (the character portrayed by Jack Nicholson), but has become strangely identified with the perspective of the Overlook itself, in which all events that have transpired and continue to unfold express what Deleuze calls a "co-existence of its own relations."

In *The Fold* Deleuze suggests that "every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object," but it is only in the cinema books that Deleuze is capable of demonstrating this thesis by revealing the artificial

conditions of a perception "that has no object and does not even refer to the physical mechanism of excitation that could explain it from without."[18] Rather, what is revealed is that the object is only a portion of the membrane that has hardened and rigidified through force of habit and has become identical with the stale repetition of a congealed matter. By means of the cinematic exploration, then, we discover an object-matter that can be folded with memory, re-folded with hallucinatory desire; we discover a more supple materiality, different movements of the body, new colours and vibrations of sound that were barely possible, audibly or visibly, under the coordination of the earlier sensory-motor scheme. And yet, we might ask, is this enough? Why does the discovery of the crystalline image present itself, on the one hand, as a crisis that engages us in a fundamental disorientation and separation from the world, and on the other hand, as an adventure of the brain that attempts to surpass its earlier organic determination, to "leap outside" the circle of closed connections?

In response, Deleuze proposes a principle of parallelism that future cinema must take up: the exhausted and worn-out body is the exact equivalent of the neurotic or demented brain. Thus, the renewal of cinema must be able to move in both directions at once: toward an outside composed of new possibilities for the body and what it can do, and at the same time, toward the direction of an inside that is created by new actualizations of the brain, or by the multiplication of new artificial brains (chemical, electronic, silicon-based, etc.). This is what Deleuze refers to as the fundamental dualism that corresponds to two aspects of the arrival of the time-image (crystalline perception) as the fulcrum of technological innovations: "a cinema of the body, which puts all the weight of the past into the body, all the tiredness of the world and modern neurosis; but also a cinema of the brain, which reveals the creativity of the world, its colours aroused by a new space-time, its powers multiplied by artificial brains" (TI 205). When we say, "give us a new brain!" we must also say, "But then, give us a new body as well!" This would be the two-fold task of any future cinema, and an area for the further investigation of the future relationship between the cinema and the brain.

Notes

[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997), p. 59.

[2] Ibid, p. 58 (italics in the original).

[3] Ibid, p. 58, 59.

[4] Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 23.

[5] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991), p. 198. All translations from the French texts cited in this essay are made by the authors.

[6] Ibid, p. 198.

[7] Ibid, p. 191.

[8] *Bergsonism*, p. 107

[9] Cf. the conclusion to *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*

[10] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 138.

[11] Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparles, 1972-1990* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), p. 86.

[12] Cf. Deleuze's chapter on "élan vital" in *Bergsonism.*

[13] Cf. the "The Crisis of the Action-Image," the concluding chapter to Deleuze's *The Movement-Image.*

[14] *Pourparlers*, p. 89.

[15] Gilles Deleuze, *L'Image-Temps* (Paris: Minuit, 1985), p. 268.

[16] *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, 202.

[17] This is vividly dramatized in John Boorman's *Zardoz* when Zed penetrates a crystalline brain that controls the entire evolution of the world into two unequal halves, resembling the primitive division of the organic brain itself into the brute physicality of the body and the purely cerebral (or intellectual) energy of the mind. It is Zed's discernment of the crystal's secret that allows him to bring both regions of the world-brain in contact with one another again, if only to bring the gift of death to those who suffer too much mental existence (to the point of madness and entropy) and, finally, peace to those who suffer the violence of too bodily of an existence.

[18] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 93.

Pli 16 (2005), 129-148

Deleuze and Essence

KEITH FAULKNER

Introduction

How do two different moments resonate in time? Is it just a matter of an active faculty of recognition or of judgment *or* is it something more profound? The use of the concept of "essences" in the work of Gilles Deleuze is an attempt to address these questions. The argument of this essay is as follows: two different images in time resonate, not because of an activity of judgment, but because of an "internal difference" of a virtual image. Deleuze uses the term "essence" both in *Proust and Signs* and in *Difference and Repetition.* In the latter work he also refers to essence as "internal difference." As we shall see, this quality of being an internal difference distinguishes Deleuze's use of essence from the Platonic concept of essences. Deleuze's essences are a multiplicity of implicated images that do not possess a logical identity, while the Platonic vision of essence is of a strict logical identity. This essay will draw upon an anti-Platonic tradition of thought that postulates the priority of the unclear image of thought. First, there is the concept of the imagination in Sartre's work: images in the mind do not have a simple nature. Second, there is the concept of primary process in Freud: dreams implicate multiple images. Third, there is the Proustian conception of the motif or the refrain that differs as it repeats. Fourth, there is the concept of "eternal objects" in the work of Whitehead: these indefinite images that maintain all forms of definiteness at once. Each of these thoughts has something in common: they maintain an image of thought that is not simply the relation of one image to another by a simple judgment of recognition; instead, one image is related to another because of an original *complicated* state in which images are infolded into each other. This complicated state mediates between all diverse and explicated images by relating them to this zone of

obscurity, in which, one image is indistinguishable from another. Therefore, resonance between two images in time operates by the mediation of a "differential" image rather than by the mediation of judgment. This is the basis of a *passive synthesis* of time for Deleuze.

The Problem: Explication and Complication

Explication is the representation of things in time and space. It makes relations between things in consciousness external to one another, but it only does this because of the prior condition of complication. Images actualize themselves in consciousness by a process of differentiation and negation of intensity.[1] It is the intensities of the pre-individual singularities that make them implicated. Therefore, the process by which images become explicated and the process by which images lose their intensity is the same. Just because this process takes place in the structures of the psyche does not mean that they are subjective processes. In fact, the process defines the very split between subjective and objective. The images *in* consciousness appear as subjective because they are subordinated to a point of view that corresponds to the perspective of one person. It is the structure-Other[2] that produces these images as *subjective* by postulating them as *one among many perspectives*. However, there is another type of image: the screen-memory.[3] This type of "memory" does not have the conditions of the structure-Other (or the structures of language); therefore they do not appear as one perspective among others. The elements of this involuntary memory do not appear as fully explicated the way subjective and voluntary memories do. They retain an element of complication that expels any ability of consciousness to "situate" this memory in a schema of self-other or subject-object. Therefore it will appear as a fully formed "objective" element of memory. It will not appear as a re-production of a past event. Instead, it will appear as an "essence" of things, a sense that the event is somehow outside of time. This image will remain between the unconscious and the conscious mind. It will not have the conditions necessary to enter consciousness, but it will also not remain repressed in the unconscious. It will intrude into consciousness *without the effort of a will*. It will constitute a *passive synthesis* of time because it will travel between instances. A moment of the past and the moment of the present are viewed under the same objective viewpoint of

this complicated essence. However, no amount of description of the way in which essences function will give us an idea of its nature. We must now turn our attention to discovering the exact nature of a not-fully-explicated image.

Sartre and Freud: The Complex Image

Jean-Paul Sartre in his book *The Psychology of the Imagination* gives an excellent analysis of mental images that are different from the images that we see in the world. The images that we see in the world are stable, extensive, and fixed in place. However the images in our mind do not always fixate themselves as well as we think they do. The images in the imagination seem to be pale images or copies of images that we have seen in real life. But when we recall the image, it does not present itself in the same way that a perception would. Perceptions are fully explicated images, whereas images in the imagination always retain a portion of the complicated nature from which they spring. This fact cannot be better illustrated than Sartre did in this great book. In it, he gives an example of the mental image of the Pantheon in which the person who imagines it is asked to count the columns:

> "Many persons," writes Alain, "Report having an image in their memory of the Pantheon and being able to evoke it quite readily. I ask them to please count the columns that support the façade; and they not only fail to do so but even to try it. However, this is the easiest thing to do the moment they have the real Pantheon before their eyes. What then do they see when they imagine the Pantheon? Do they see anything?" [...] The Pantheon could not appear to the imaginative consciousness in the same manner as it does to a perceptual consciousness. It is not true that the image is a "representation whose parts are juxtaposed," as Bergson would have it. Of course, as knowledge, an imaginative consciousness does envision the external object in its externality, that is, as composed of juxtaposed parts; but as affectivity, the imaginative consciousness presents the object to itself as entirely undifferentiated.[4]

As Sartre points out, a fully explicated image would have parts that are juxtaposed, or parts that are external to one another; however, this does not seem to be the case with the mental image. The image does not, therefore, appear in space, but rather in a *spatium.*[5] It does not have the dimensions of geometry, the measurability of a physical object, or the density of a solid object. If we imagine this Pantheon and ask ourselves how high the image appears in our mind, we will not be able to give it a measurement. If we ask ourselves what is next to the Pantheon in this image, we will not be able to imagine a "next to" without changing the entire image. This means that the image subsists in a universe by itself in the imagination. As such, there is no point of comparison with anything else that would be able to measure it. If we were to ask the person who has this image in his mind, "where are you standing in relation to the Pantheon?" he would not be able to answer. To imagine oneself looking at the Pantheon, one would have to change the image to include a representation of oneself looking at the object. However, in all of our real-life experiences of looking at things, we do not include an image of ourselves looking at the object. When one looks at the Pantheon in real life, one *has a real perspective.* However, in the imagination there is no perspective on this object: it seems to be approached from a non-perspective. When asked "how high are you in relation to the image in the imagination?", one likewise receives no cogent answer. This is because the image has no extensive features; instead it is an *intensive* and *complicated* image. Why does it lack the structure of perceptions? It lacks the structure of perceptions because, in our imagination, there is no possibility of an Other who can look at the *same object* from another perspective. This means that the image lacks depth. We can make the image spin in our imagination, but we cannot represent it spatially as having dimensions. Having dimensions is a condition placed upon objects by the structure-Other. The structure-Other is the condition for extensive representation in consciousness and perception.[6] In the imagination the image is still half-repressed. It is not a "re-presentation" but a pure presentation that does not correspond to any extensive image. In Freud's terminology, this image would have "perceptual-identity" but no "thought-identity." A perceptual-identity is not an identity of a perception; rather, it is a precondition for recognizing an object in perception because an image has been established in the mind. The thought-identity is the process by which the perceptual-identity is related to an object. For example, because we have this image of a non-extensive Pantheon in our mind, if we saw

the real Pantheon right now we would immediately recognize the image in our mind corresponding to the image of the Pantheon. However, they are not related by a system of identity. The imagined Pantheon has no given perspective, extensity or parts. This is necessary because, if the image in the mind had a definitive perspective, then we would never be able to identify the real Pantheon as being similar to the one in our imagination. The real Pantheon is approached by different perspectives, in different lighting, under different weather conditions; the Pantheon in our imagination is without any perspective, without any weather or shades of light. In a strange paradox, the image in our mind has more identity for being vague than the real object. The real Pantheon is different from itself in time and space depending on the perspective of a viewer. If our imagination had a definite image of the Pantheon from a given perspective, and if we saw the real Pantheon from even a slightly different perspective, we would not recognize it as being the same as our mental image. If our mental image is merely a distorted copy of the real image that *we once saw,* then it would merely be a "trace" of that perspectival image in our mind. But the image in our mind is not perspectival; therefore it is not a trace of a past real-image. It is an image of something seen from *no perspective and no relative conditions,* and we can never have had such a perception. When Proust tells us that the image of Combray rises up as it never was, we must take this seriously. The image of Combray is different from any trace in memory of the real-experiences of that city in the past. The image of Combray that rises up is a fully objective and non-perspectival image of a complicated essence. Freud defines this perceptual-identity (the imagined image) as an accumulation of excitations, and the thought-identity as the process that finds this image in an external world:

> The primary process endeavours to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus accumulated, it may establish a 'perceptual identity'. The secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its place – the establishment of a '*thought* identity' [with that experience]. All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an identical cathexis of the same memory which it hoped to attain

> once more through an indeterminate stage of motor experiences.'[7]

The primary processes accumulate around the perceptual-identity that establishes a satisfying virtual image and the secondary process seeks to relate this perceptual-identity to a thought-identity. Thought-identity is Freud's term for the process of recognition. The mind starts with ideal objects and seeks to find them in real experience. The use of "motor experiences" attempts to make the images in the imagination into images in perception. In fact, the only way the mind can tell the difference between these two types of images is the difference in intensity between them. The mental images are intense and complicated, and the images in perception are extensive and explicated. The process of recognition is just the process of elimination, whereby mental images are surpassed by more concrete images. In short, general images without spatial characteristics are subordinated to extensive images. It is because the images of perceptual-identity differ in kind from the images in perception that we can say that the former images *do not belong to a past present, but rather to a pure past.* If the images of memory were just the images of images "seen" in the past, like a photograph, they would not have this ideal dimension of non-perspective that both Freud and Proust give to them. In this way they are "Real without being present, ideal without being abstract." (PS 61)[8] If two moments in time can be brought together in time, it cannot be because the "photographic-like" images that they trace in memory resemble each other. Rather there must be a general essence that internalizes the difference between these two images in time. If there were no "perceptual-identity" of Combray in the imagination of the hero, there would be no resemblance between these two points in time. The *ideal but not abstract* image of Combray is not some empirical element that was experienced in some real past. It is the transcendental element that makes two instances in time resonate. This image is particular without being perspectival. It is not an "individual" image but a local image. As Deleuze says, it is a principle of localization that reveals the differential truth about place and time: "Doubtless it is particular, but it is a principle of localization rather than of individuation. It appears as a local essence: Combray, Balbec, Venice. It is also particular because it reveals the differential truth of place, of a moment." (PS 61) It reveals the truth of place and time because it internalizes the differences between all places and all times. The image is not a generality abstracted from particular

images. Particular images *do not come first*; instead the complication of images comes first. We have associated the "perceptual-identity" of Freud with the internal difference of Deleuze. This may or may not be completely justifiable; however, they share the same function: they internalize the different place in time and space into images that are partially unconscious and, therefore, are outside of time. In every involuntary memory, in every resonance, there are always three terms: the two real terms differing in time and the third element that internalizes the differences between the first two. Deleuze makes it clear that the image of Combray *as an internalized difference* makes the two real elements coexist in time: "And if the two series succeed one another, they nevertheless coexist in relation to Combray in itself as the object = x which causes them to resonate." (DR 122)[9] This means that, although there are two perceptual elements, one in the present and one in the past, they would not be able to be brought together in memory if there were not this complicated essence that is not reducible to any real element. However close this might seem to be to Plato's Ideal forms, we must remember that Plato's forms had a strict logical "identity" as a predicate. The essences that Proust and Freud are using are strictly differences that are implicated into each other. The image of the Pantheon is not a Platonic "identity" because it is not extensive; it cannot have its columns counted, it cannot be given a size, it cannot be said to have a distinct space or time. In short, it is not a clear and distinct idea that can be perceived by the intellect. It belongs to an "erotic"[10] memory, according to Deleuze, and not an intellectual or voluntary memory. As such it shares almost no characteristics with Platonic essences.

Deleuze and Proust: Resonance and Memory

Deleuze begins his book *Proust and Signs* by condemning any reading of Proust's *Recherche* as a work on memory: "It is not recollection, memory, even involuntary memory." (PS 3) This flies in the face of most of the assumptions of readers of Proust. The *Recherche* is not a sentimental, reminiscent and subjective monologue about the author's memories. Deleuze tells us that the *Recherche* is essentially a search for truth: "Search, *recherche*, is to be taken in the strong sense of the term, as we say 'the search for truth'." (PS 3) But, if this work is not about memory,

then we must seek for its subject matter elsewhere. Deleuze does this. While most commentators would speak about the involuntary association of ideas, or about recognition, or the vicissitudes of memory and forgetting, Deleuze puts all this aside and looks for an ontological explanation. The connection between two moments in time cannot be just a subjective operation of the mind; it must say something essential about time itself. Proust himself points the way to this form of interpretation: "A moment of the past, did I say? Was it not perhaps very much more: something that, common both to the past and to the present, is more essential than either of them?" (RTP 2266 / SLT, vol. 3, p. 905)[11] It is in this quote, and in this spirit, that Deleuze transforms the reading of Proust into a search for "essences", rather than the search for memories. Memories are just the subjective "representations" of past events; essences are so much more than this. While the form of voluntary memory requires a cogito to "represent" the past moment; the involuntary eruption of essences into reality do not require any subjective act. This is why we must say that "essence" constitutes an ontological act of time, and not a subjective act of association of memories. There is no attempt by a mind to find similarities between the present moment and the past moment. This can only partly explain that of which Proust speaks. Proust also speaks of the extra-temporal being of the essence of things:

> ...because in some way they were extra-temporal, and this being made its appearance only when, through one of these identifications of the present with the past, it was likely to find itself in the one and only medium in which it could exist and enjoy the essence of things, that is to say: outside time.' (RTP 2266 / SLT, vol. 3, p. 904)

This "medium" is not the subject, but rather, an extra-temporal state of being. This is not to say that the "subject" becomes extra-temporal. The "subject" is displaced by the wholly involuntary nature of the memory. Rather, according to Deleuze's interpretation, it is a region of being that reveals itself as an objective point of view: "Essence does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressed as the essence not of the subject but of Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject." (PS 43) Still, we would be misrepresenting Deleuze's position if we were to say that essence is only that which is revealed *to* a subject. It is an unfortunate obsession of phenomenology to make all revelation a

revelation that takes place *within* consciousness. As we will see, this revelation of essence is not just a revelation to consciousness because, for Deleuze, there are so many other levels upon which being can be revealed. In the example of the image of the Pantheon above, we would be distorting the image if we were to merely reduce it to a subjective presentation in the imagination. Proust's presentation of the image of Combray in-itself is not just another act of imagination. We imagine things all the time without being transported in time and space. To simply reduce the Proustian experience to a flight of fancy would be a grave mistake. Therefore we must re-examine this image of essence to see how it differs from simple "subjective" imagination.

In order to understand Deleuze's position on the concept of the essence of things, it is necessary that we consider a very profound chapter in his book *Difference and Repetition.* In the chapter "Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference", Deleuze makes a clear distinction between representation and Ideas:

> The true opposition lies elsewhere: between Ideas (structure-event-sense) and representation. With representation, concepts are like possibilities, but the subject of representation still determines the object as really conforming to the concept, as an essence. That is why representation as a whole is the element of knowledge which is realized by the recollection of the thought object and its recognition by a thinking subject.' (DR 191)

The movement of recollection merely re-presents a moment of the past in the same way that Platonic reminiscences merely make it possible for past ideas to be recalled in the present. Representations require the intervention of a subject because representations are forms of knowledge. As such they only have a possible value in relation to reality: they must be tested in relation to perception. There is only a possible connection between the presentation of perception and the representation of a memory. Representation lacks the structure of necessity that implicates real beings. The system of "representation" can never explain how the image in the mind corresponds to a perception: we will never know if what we are seeing today is the "same" thing that we saw in the past except as a mere possibility. On the other hand, Deleuze tells us that the Idea has the structure of an essence that is not the mere opposite of a Platonic

"essence," but rather, is a pure multiplicity that is neither a mere appearance nor the ideal form of a thing:

> The Idea makes a virtue of quite different characteristics. The virtuality of the Idea has nothing to do with possibility. Multiplicity tolerates no dependence on the identical in the subject or in the object. The events and singularities of the Idea do not allow any posting of an essence as 'what the thing is'. No doubt, if one insists, the word 'essence' might be preserved, but only on the condition of saying essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense; not simply the contrary of what is ordinarily called the essence but the contrary of the contrary: multiplicity is no more appearance than essence, no more multiple than one.' (DR 191)

This is the form of "essence" that Deleuze finds in the work of Proust. Because consciousness only recognizes identities, the differential essence of things cannot be an Idea of consciousness. In fact, Deleuze asks: "How should the necessarily unconscious nature of Ideas be understood?" (DR 192) Whereas Plato placed the Ideas on the side of the intelligible forms, Deleuze places them in the incomprehensible: however, "It is incomprehensible only from the point of view of a common sense..." (*ibid.*) In short, the qualitative essence of things that Proust speaks about cannot be perceived by the intelligence, but only by a moment of discord in the faculties. This is the purely involuntary moment of forced memory and forced thought, that is forced to think what cannot be thought: "thought should find within itself something which it *cannot* think, something which is both unthinkable and that which must be thought." (*Ibid.*) In short, thought encounters the *real*, as long as we do not consider this "real" to be mere appearance. The *real* is multiplicity that never appears in perceptions (which are extensive and explicated) but only in a state that is neither sensible nor intelligible. If we consider our example of the Pantheon again: On the surface it appears to be a simple representation. However, if we examine its parts we cannot say that they have an extensive relationship to one another. Rather, the parts of the image are internal to each other. We can take a more complex example from Proust of Combray: The image of Combray is not an external relationship of the streets that are placed in a conjoined space. Nor is it merely a representation of the city in the mind. A "whole" city cannot be

represented because the image would be too complex to present in the imagination. Instead it presents a complex problem for the imagination. The "Idea" is precisely the unrepresentable aspect of the image. To make this clearer let us take up the example given by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* of the two ways of determining a straight line:

> ...the straight line is the shortest path. 'Shortest' may be understood in two ways: from the point of view of conditioning, as a schema of the imagination which determines space in accordance with the concept (the straight line defined as that which in all parts may be superimposed upon itself) – in this case the difference remains external, incarnated in a rule of construction which is established 'between' the concept and the intuition. Alternatively, from the genetic point of view, the shortest may be understood as an Idea which overcomes the duality of concept and intuition, interiorises the difference straight and curved, and expresses this internal difference in the form of a reciprocal determination and in the minimal conditions of an integral.' (DR 174)

The first example establishes a "representation" of a straight line by imposing a concept that will determine the image of the line in the imagination (schema) as immediately straight. The second example does not start off with a concept of "straight" and only arrives at a line that is the "shortest" by progressively drawing a line between two points until a shortest one is determined. This means that there is a determination of the concept *only* once all the possibilities are exhausted.[12] This means that *the Idea of a straight line includes all of the curved lines used to determine it.* In the same way, Combray contains the vestiges of many other cities, real or imagined, and thereby sets up a zone of indeterminacy in the image. Therefore: the image contains a multiplicity of other images. In the same way the image of the Pantheon contains all the possible perspectives upon it, an indeterminate number of columns and an indeterminate size. This is not just because we are never exactly sure about the images we have. It is because the image *must* remain indeterminate and multiple in order to internalize two different images in time. Let us take another example from the work of Proust: Charlus. When the hero first encounters Charlus, he has the aspect of a criminal, then he gains the image of a noble man, and finally he encounters him as an old and broken man. These diverse images

can only be internalized into each other if there is a zone of indeterminacy called "Charlus" or an *essence* of Charlus. The problem with Platonic forms is that they do not allow for change: there would have to be different ideal images, in Plato's sense, for the old Charlus and the young Charlus. How then could they be conceived *across time* except as a *differential* essence that remains multiple? Here is another important question: Would this essence be "eternal" or temporal? It cannot be eternal in Plato's sense of the ideal forms being "eternal" because the differential Ideas of Deleuze are not fixed. They cannot be considered temporal because they do not appear in time. Rather, they are temporal in so far as they allow different moments in time to come together, *and* they are "eternal" because they are not reducible to any actualized appearance. Freud in his *Project* realizes that "recognition" is not a simple matter of relating an old image in memory to a new image in perception. It also requires *thought* that internalizes the difference between the images:

> If the perceptual image is not absolutely new, it will now *recall* and *revive* a mnemic perceptual image with which it coincides at least partly. [...] In so far as the cathexes coincide, they give no occasion for activity of thought. On the other hand, the non-coinciding portions 'arouse interest' and can give occasion for activity of thought in two ways. The current is either directed onto the *aroused* memories and sets an aimless activity of memory at work, which is thus moved by differences and not by similarities, or it... remains in the components of the perception which have newly emerged and in that case exhibits an equally aimless *activity of judging*.'[13]

Freud has given us a conventional answer to a complex problem. He has chosen the route of active synthesis of *judgment* rather than the ontological route of internal difference. In the case that Freud presents, a difference between two perceptions in time is internalized by that faculty of *judgment,* which reduces the present perception to a state of identity with a past perception. Or the mind continues to search for an identical image in memory in an "aimless" fashion. The "two"-term form of memory cannot help but reduce one image to another despite their difference. We never encounter exactly identical images in perceptions across time. The active faculty of judgment reduces these changes to an identity in the "past" image. Only when the third term of "internal"

difference is introduced do the differences between the two real series maintain their differences. The "third" term of *essence* no longer requires thought or judgment to make two moments in time resonate. This is why "essence" belongs to an involuntary memory. The essence of Combray (that contains all variations of Combray in one image) allows the memory that the hero remembers and the current sensation to resonate without making them identical in thought.

Whitehead and Proust: Internal Variations

The concept of the "virtual" is actually quite simple. An essence is virtual because its structure is an inclusive multiplicity. Whitehead also had a notion that was similar to this. In an essay on Whitehead, Richard Rorty tells us that he conceived of indefiniteness as being an essential element of forms:

> Whitehead, abandoning the identification of actuality with definiteness, solves the problem by letting in *all* forms of definiteness at once, and by making the criterion of degree of actuality consist in the extent and complexity of the choice among those forms. [...] Whitehead's insight is that "pure potentiality" is to be found not in the *absence* of definiteness, but in piling definiteness on definiteness until no guidelines for decision between these alternative definitenesses remain.'[14]

These definite forms are what Whitehead calls "eternal objects." However these eternal objects are not chosen by the intellect the way Plato's' ideal forms are chosen. They are chosen by the event itself, according to Deleuze: "eternal objects are pure Possibilities that are realized in fluvia, but also pure Virtualities that are actualized in prehensions. That is why a prehension does not grasp other prehensions without apprehending eternal objects..."[15] Each one of these definite "eternal objects" is almost indistinguishable from its neighbouring eternal object, in the same way that Leibniz established continuity between the species by establishing an infinite number of intermediate species.[16] Whitehead defines the "event" of the eternal object much in the same way as Deleuze defined the differential essence: "Two events have junction when there is a third event such that (i) it overlaps both events and (ii) it has no part which is

separated from both the given events."[17] Whitehead gives the example of the Great Pyramid: "For example, the event which is the life of nature within the Great Pyramid yesterday and to-day is divisible into two parts, namely the Great Pyramid yesterday and the Great Pyramid to-day. But the recognizable object which is also called the Great Pyramid is the same object to-day as it was yesterday."[18] It is not the actual pyramid that is the same in the two days; it is the eternal object "Pyramid" that is the same by *including all differences in itself.* The eternal object is *never* actualized; however, it presents itself *between* the series of actual pyramids. In short, it is *in* none of the actual series but it acts between all the actual elements. This is why Deleuze insists that eternal objects are virtual.

Each moment is like the birth of a new world. The essence of things acts like a complex point from which all things unfold. Time is not an infinite straight line, but rather, it is more like a rope that coils up and uncoils.[19] Each moment of its unfolding, the world is created anew around a new set of singularities. A concert is being performed tonight, Deleuze says, "And the notes of the scale are eternal objects, pure Virtualities that are actualized in the origins, but also pure Possibilities that are attained in vibrations or flux."[20] The notes of the little phrase of music are not reducible to the actual notes played on a material keyboard, according to Proust: "Swann had regarded musical *motifs* as actual ideas, of another world, of another order, ideas veiled in shadow, unknown, impenetrable to the human mind..." (RTP 280 / SLT, vol. 1, pp. 379-380) This is the differential Idea of the musical *motif* that is not reducible to the material elements of sound or the symbolic elements of notes. If one tries to discover the mystery of the little phrase in the notes themselves, one fails to grasp the essence of the motif. Proust says of Vinteuil and his music that they are an expression of an involuntary resemblance in which the variations are almost imperceptible: "Vinteuil took up the same phrase again and again, diversified it, amused himself by altering its rhythm, by making it reappear in its original form, those deliberate resemblances, the work of his intellect, necessarily superficial, never succeeded in being as striking as the disguised, involuntary resemblances, which broke out in different colours, between the two separate masterpieces..." (RTP 1795 / SLT, vol. 3, pp. 257-258) It is here that Proust distinguishes between the variations that the intellect can detect and the variations that only the heart can detect, those involuntary resemblances that seem to internalize one another. When Swann remembers *the* phrase of music, he is remembering a whole series of imperceptible variations. It is this imperceptible variation

that makes the little phrase so powerful. Each time it plays, it is different from itself and yet strangely the same. Each time the world is new: the variations do not collapse into an identity; instead they present themselves as eternal elements that are never reduced to the actual phrase that he hears. This is because all the eternal elements subsist in a *complicated* state that is not apprehensible by the intellect; for the intellect only grasps that which is explicated. It is not in time. It is at the beginning of Time in-itself. It is as if the elements of the phrase existed in a world by themselves, in which they only varied from themselves and not in relation to anything else. Each encounter with the phrase is fresh because it becomes a new perspective on the world. Each time Swann or the hero hears the little phrase, they are filled with joy and begin to see things differently: each encounter divides the world into a before and an after. The phrase envelops places and people and redeploys them in different relations. If Proust's "essence" were the same as Plato's essences, it would not have this power. Only what is different in itself has the power to make the world different. Being an unthinkable element at the heart of thought, it forces the faculties into a discordant relationship in which they are forced to envelop different and normally divergent elements. This is why Deleuze tells us that the enveloping work of art acts as an immaterial site that is different from the *place* that we encounter it: "It is in this sense that the work of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the beginning of the world, but also forms a specific world absolutely different from the others and envelops a landscape or immaterial site quite distinct from the site where we have grasped it." (PS 110) It is as if the implicating viewpoint of art itself was infectious and caused the imagination to implicate other, normally diverse, elements, by eliminating distances in time and space. The essential quality of art is that it introduces the quality of dreams into reality. Just as there are no distinct places or times in dreams, there are no distinct places and times for the mind enraptured in the work of art or the little phrase of music. Proust describes this as the moment when isolated elements seem to create their own world, and to begin Time:

> At first the solitary piano complained, like an abandoned bird in its countryside; the violin heard, it replied as if from a neighbouring tree. It was like the beginning of the world, as if there had been, as yet, only the two of them on the earth, or rather in this world closed off from everything else, constructed by the logic of a creator and in such a way that there was never

> any more than the two of them: this sonata.' (RTP 282 / SLT, vol. 1, p.382)

Each of the two elements includes the other in an implicated world that Deleuze describes using Whitehead's terminology "prehensions that are prehending one another..."[21] Swann grasps the elements in their virtuality *while at the same time* he grasps them in their actuality. But the actual notes would never have the ability to evoke such emotion. The little phrase starts by filling the world with Swann's mood. But this is surpassed by a state of the soul that is more than just a mood: "Was it a bird, was it the soul, as yet not formed... whose plaint the piano heard and tenderly repeated?" (RTP 282 / SLT, vol. 1, p. 382) This state of the soul gives rise to many associations: "it existed latent in his mind on the same footing as certain other notions without material equivalent, such as our notions of light, of sound, of perspective, of physical pleasure, the rich possessions wherewith our inner temple is diversified and adorned." (RTP 282 / SLT, vol. 1, p. 381) But then all of this is overcome in a moment in which the superior viewpoint of the work of art makes us doubt our own existence: "Perhaps it is non-being that is the true state, and all our dream of life is inexistent..." (*Ibid.*) This is a progressive movement from the material of the sounds up to the self, the soul and the mind, but even beyond all these things, the essence. We start with the explicated state of note and end with the pure viewpoint of the music itself. This is the opposite movement from Plato's move from appearances to objective forms, according to Deleuze:

> This is precisely the originality of Proustian reminiscence: it proceeds from a mood, from a state of soul, and from its associative chains, to a creative or transcendent viewpoint—and no longer, in Plato's fashion, from a state of the world to seen objectivities.' (PS 110)

The "transcendent" viewpoint is immanence itself (in the sense that the immanent is immanent only to itself and seems transcendent in relation to the subject). It is Plato's Ideal Forms that are transcendent in the bad sense of transcendent. The Ideal Forms interrupt becoming while the transcendent viewpoint of immanence itself provokes becoming. It provokes the beginning of the world; it makes everything begin again at every moment.

Conclusion

When addressing Deleuze's use of conceptual terms, such as "essence", we must always keep in mind the philosophical work that it is doing. What does essence do? We have seen that Deleuze uses the concept of essence or internal difference to explain how two instances in time can converge outside of the mechanism of judgment. If time can be synthesized "passively", it must be through internalized difference and not by the active faculty of the cogito. To better understand Deleuze's terminology, we have approached it in terms of the problem it addresses. This essay is only a beginning to the study of essence, difference, the virtual, and the Idea. It merely points towards how these terms *might* be used productively. Unfortunately, much of Deleuze's terminology has been misused and misunderstood. This essay has attempted to bring the level of discussion of these problems to a level where terminology has a precise meaning. But this precision can always be carried further. So far, in this essay, we have defined a number of precise distinctions. First, Deleuze's essence is distinguished from Platonic essence by the difference in direction (a movement from the actual to the virtual rather than the move from the particular to the general) and a difference in use (a difference of logical identity from progressive determination). Second, Deleuze's essence excludes the subject (because the internal difference determines a passive synthesis of time) while the Platonic essences require an active thinking subject to determine a resemblance. Third, Deleuze's essence is progressively determined in time while remaining beyond time, while the Platonic essences are completely determined outside of time. Finally, Deleuze's essence is not something reducible to the distinct image (because the complex image contains more than is manifested in the imagination) while the Platonic essences are only those ideas that can be grasped in their clarity. There are always more distinctions that can be made and this essay has by no means exhausted all of them. This essay is only a starting point for a project that can be progressively determined to infinity.

Notes

[1] See G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* Trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 244-245: "Just as intensive quantities seem to be cancelled, so problematic Ideas seem to disappear." Freud also postulated a need in psychical systems to limit intensities of ideas for there to be a transition from perceptual-identity to thought identity: "Thinking must concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the *intensities* of those ideas." S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p.762.

[2] For more on the structure-Other see: G. Deleuze "Michel Tournier and the World Without Others" in *The Logic of Sense* Trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 301-321.

[3] See: S. Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp.83-93.

[4] J.-P. Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination* (New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1985), pp. 127-128.

[5] For more on the *spatium* see: G. Deleuze *Difference and Repetition*, p. 231.

[6] G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 281: "Notions necessary for the description of this world – such as those of form-ground, profile-unity of the object, depth-length, horizon-focus – would remain empty and inapplicable if the Other were not there to give expression to those possible worlds in which that which is (for us) in the background is pre-perceived or sub-perceived as a possible form; that which is in depth as a possible length, etc."

[7] S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 761-762.

[8] G. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text* Trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), hereafter *PS*.

[9] G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* Trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), hereafter *DR*.

[10] "...every reminiscence, whether of a town or a woman, is erotic" (DR 85).

[11] M. Proust *A la recherche du temps perdu* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1999), hereafter *RTP*. (English translation: *Remembrance of Things Past* Trans. C. K. Scott Moncrief and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Vintage Books), hereafter *SLT*. (All translations are my own.)

[12] Maimon influenced Deleuze on this point. Salomon Maimon uses the principle of "exhaustion" as a principle to determine what he calls "Ideas of the understanding." The idea of the understanding determines the rules for the production of objects of perception by a *progressive determination* of the object that extends to infinity. In the following quote Maimon describes how the concept of a circle is produced by the principle of exhaustion: "For example, the understanding prescribes to itself a rule with the following condition: from a given point, draw an infinite number of equal lines, because of which (by the linking of their ends) the concept of a circle must be produced. The possibility of this rule, and also by following this concept, can be raised in the intuition (by the movement of a line around a given point) and therefore equally in its formal completion (of the unity in the diverse). But its material completeness (of the diverse) cannot be given in the intuition, because one can never draw more than a finite number of equal lines between them. Therefore, this is not a concept of the understanding that corresponds with the object, but only an Idea of the understanding, of which one can always be approached to infinity in intuition by successive addition of lines, and consequently a limit-concept." S. Maimon, *Essai sur la philosophie transcendantale* Trans. J.-B. Scherrer (Paris: J. Vrin, 1989), p. 72 (my translation).

[13] S. Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* Trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 330-331.

[14] R. Rorty, "Matter and Event", in L. Ford and G. Kline, ed., *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), pp. 91-92.

[15] G. Deleuze, *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque* Trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 79.

[16] "The *Law of Continuity* states that nature leaves no gaps in the orderings which she follows, but not every form or species belongs to each ordering." Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 307.

[17] A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 76.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.77.

[19] "Cicero put it very well when he said that the passage of time is similar to the unravelling of a thread (*explicatio*)." G. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 144. The vision of time as a coil in which time unfolds from a complicated point is derived from a Stoic conception of divination: the causes of all things subsist in a unity or connection of all causes that are extra-temporal. Cicero, in his book *On divination* states that, "The passage of time is like the unwinding of a rope, bringing about nothing new and unrolling each stage in its turn." A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 338.

[20] Deleuze, *The Fold, Leibniz and the Baroque*, p. 80.

[21] *Ibid.*

Pli 16 (2005), 149-170

How Radical is the New? Deleuze and Bachelard on the Problems of Completeness and Continuity in Dialectics

JAMES WILLIAMS

'An Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity.' (Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 182)

'We shall then become aware that continuity is essentially dialectical, that it is the result of a conciliation of contraries and that, temporally, it is made out of rejection, carrying forward into the future, or flowing back to the past.' (Gaston Bachelard, *Dialectique de la durée*, 125)

1. Introduction: Dialectics and continuity

Given Deleuze's work against Hegelian and post-Hegelian dialectics in *Nietzsche and philosophy*, it could seem contrary to describe Deleuze's method as dialectics. It could also seem odd to describe his philosophy as a method, given his work on the immediacy of affirmation in the Nietzsche book[1]. However, the term dialectics or new calculus is taken from Deleuze's later work in *Différence et répétition*, where dialectics take on a positive role and where affirmation and transcendental become moments in a broader philosophy[2]. Deleuze transforms dialectics by

1 G. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Trans. H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia, 1983) esp. chap 5, sec. 4.

2 G. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris PUF, 1968). Trans. P. Patton *Difference and Repetition* (London: Athlone, 1994) p. 162, hereafter DR. See also J. Williams *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: a Critical Introduction and Guide*, pp 17-21, hereafter GDDR.

insisting that synthesis is not about reconciling or subsuming oppositions, negations or contradictions. It is about completing a differential reality through syntheses that are at once critical, transcendental and destructively creative.

These qualms notwithstanding, from the point of view of their methods, Deleuze and Bachelard seem to have much in common. Both choose to name their methods 'dialectics' (in opposition to Cartesianism). Both stress the importance of the concepts of synthesis and completeness in dialectics. They share common intuitions as to why we should move away from the Cartesian rationalism of analysis and deduction. They share the view that reality is unavoidably and valuably complex.

Their intuitions also involve a suspicion of brute objectivity, of crude empiricism and of basic metaphysical or scientific notions resistant to further differentiation. In characterising their dialectics, both resort to mathematics. They experiment with the idea of dialectics as a new, anti-Cartesian and irregular *mathesis universalis*. This is based on the evolution of mathematics through the adjunction of new theories, in the case of Bachelard. It is based on the role of the adjunction of differentials and integrations in calculus, in the case of Deleuze.

However, from these propitious beginnings, Deleuze and Bachelard diverge profoundly and with great critical oppositions. This divergence takes place around the characterisation of their dialectics through the relations holding between the concepts of completeness and continuity. Again, both thinkers lay great weight on the latter concept but with utterly different definitions and valuations.

Different views of completeness and continuity will lead to opposed definitions of synthesis in relation to the new in dialectics. The question 'How radical is the new?' is answered in different ways by Deleuze and Bachelard due to their disagreements about continuity and about how this impacts on the concept of completeness. Neither believes that the new cannot be assimilated in any way, nor do they think that it can be completely assimilated. Instead, the difference lies in questions concerning how thought comes to work with the new in the context of a dialectics.

Bachelard constructs a dialectics around the problem of how to think methodologically given a demand for completeness and a lack of continuity. He is responding to the challenge of adding the new to that which is already relatively known, whilst accepting that there can be no

final perfect fit between them. Reality is essentially discontinuous, but thought can bridge this discontinuity through the synthetic transformations and implicit relativity of dialectics. The status of propositions changes through successive adjunctions. There are no ultimate truths that are not open to revision after experimentation.

Deleuze constructs his dialectics around the problem of how to affirm a productive continuity through a search for completeness, whilst also responding to the proposition that continuity is never a matter of identities or representations. In other words, we can never represent or identify continuity, even relatively and in an open-ended transforming way. Yet reality is continuous and it is possible to speak of better or worse affirmations of that continuity in accordance with individual problems. This is the paradoxical challenge of his dialectics.

There are two aspects that are helpful in reaching an understanding of this divergence. First, Bachelard and Deleuze arrive at their dialectics through very different subject matter. Deleuze shares some of Bachelard's interest in science and mathematics. Bachelard is interested in the historical and metaphysical roots of the need for dialectics. Yet the former is responding, first and foremost, to the problem of the negative power of metaphysics that are based on representations and transcendence. Whilst the latter is responding, first and foremost, to the problem of scientific completeness in the light of scientific developments.

It could be said that Bachelard is closer to the early Whitehead of *Science and the Modern World* [3] - where philosophy comes in after a survey of history and science. Whereas Deleuze is closer to the later *Process and Reality*[4]. Where speculative philosophy and metaphysical creativity retain an independence from the observation of science and the history of science.

This relation to science as point of evidence for philosophy is all-important in understanding the Deleuze-Bachelard opposition. Yet, it is also one of the most delicate problems in interpreting their philosophies. For example, in his *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*[5], Manuel DeLanda has recently proposed strongly science-based readings of

3 A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge University Press, 1928)
4 A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978)
5 M. DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002)

Deleuze. These are greatly at odds with the premises that underlie this essay[6].

Bachelard shows great interest in philosophical intersections with the history of science and the emergence of scientific theories, for example, in his attacks on Cartesian epistemologies. My claim, though, is that scientific developments are the main drivers behind the emergence of his dialectics and the problems he is responding to. Whereas, for Deleuze, these problems have strongly philosophical roots. This difference can be seen, for example, in their treatment of Descartes, where the former is particularly interested in Cartesian epistemology in the light of modern science[7], whereas the latter is more interested in the contrast between Cartesian analysis and a concept of synthesis coming out of Spinoza or the idea of the transcendental coming out of Kant and Bergson.[8]

The second source for an understanding of the differences between Deleuze and Bachelard lies in the philosophical methods adopted as ways into the given, prior to further work in terms of dialectics. These methods are an important part of the dialectics, they provide the starting point where the structure and basic content of the dialectics is mapped out – though in a way that is necessarily open to revision. Thus, these prior methods are not independent of the dialectics. They are fully part of them, but an important part, since they provide the actual material for the broader method to work on.

In his works on philosophy, science and art, Bachelard gives great weight to phenomenology taken from a wide range of sources. In contrast, Deleuze emphasizes a new way of developing transcendental philosophy. Furthermore, where Bachelard takes the mind and psychology as key starting points, Deleuze takes sensibility and the affects, as expressed through the arts and defined, among others, by Nietzsche and Spinoza. Deleuze is explicitly critical of phenomenology, particularly in its Sartrean guise. Bachelard is particularly critical of transcendental moves, particularly in their Bergsonian guise[9].

6 See GDDR, pp 165-71.

7 G. Bachelard, *Le nouvel esprit scientifique* (Paris: PUF, 1934) p. 142, henceforth NES [all translations mine].

8 DR pp. 131-33.

9 G. Bachelard, *Dialectique de la durée* (Paris: PUF, 1950) henceforth DD.

Anti-Cartesian dialectics in *Le nouvel esprit scientifique*

In his introduction to *Le nouvel esprit scientifique*, Bachelard sets out a philosophical programme responding to the scientific discoveries of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. His main argument is that a new scientific spirit demands changes in philosophical views of reality and method: 'Sooner or later, scientific thought will become the fundamental theme of philosophical polemics; this thought will lead intuitive and immediate metaphysics to be substituted by objectively rectified discursive metaphysics.' (NES, p. 6) Philosophy will become a dialectical method that privileges objective scientific discoveries.

However, it is very important to realise that, by objective rectification, Bachelard does not mean a direct response or reflection on pure facts or data. On the contrary, objective rectification is already a scientific dialectics, where theories are always part of an ongoing debate around new discoveries, to the point where there are no pure objective facts: 'If immediate reality is only a simple pretext of scientific thought and no longer an object of knowledge, we shall have to pass from the *how* of description to theoretical *commentary*.' (NES, p. 10) Thus truth becomes not a matter of objectivity, but of debate: 'Every new truth is born despite the evidence, every new experience is born despite immediate experience.' (NES, p. 11)

In making these points about truth, Bachelard shows a further point of connection with Deleuze and with the preparation for Deleuze's mature philosophy. The notion of a truth 'despite' fact and experience is taken from Nietzsche: 'As Nietzsche says: everything that is decisive is only born *despite*.' (NES, p. 11) Yet, this connection to Nietzsche on truth is a narrow one. In the philosophy-science relation, Bachelard still privileges science and the debate between rationalism and realism in science: 'In effect, science creates philosophy. The philosopher must inflect his language in order to translate contemporary thought in its suppleness and mobility.' (NES, p. 7)

Modern science demands a dialectical position between theory and fact, indeed, between theories, facts and further theories. This demand is born of necessity. There is no pure theory (*pace* Descartes and Kant). The are no pure facts (*pace* Russell) or even, in a more up-to-date form,

irreducible properties such as qualia[10]. So any scientific theory is necessarily dialectical, not only between fact and theory, but between different theoretical assumptions about different facts.

Bachelard is then quick to insist that this dialectics is not one of opposition. It is not that facts contradict theories, neither is it that theories straightforwardly contradict one another. Rather, the nature of the debate is a two-directional one. Facts only appear thanks to theories, notably, on how to simplify reality so that it may reveal facts. Theories make claims about reality that are undermined by the complexity revealed by scientific discovery. There is a dialectics between the need to simplify and the discovery of complexity.

This is not a nihilistic relativism. Bachelard gives precise descriptions of this dialectics and of a relativism associated with progress and projects, rather than with the danger of some generalised doubt: 'In fact, as soon as the object is presented as a complex of relations, it must be apprehended through multiple methods. Objectivity cannot be separated from the social character of the task. We can only arrive at objectivity by exposing a method of objectification in a discursive and detailed way.' (NES, p. 16)

He thinks that this detailed and precise form of dialectics can only come from science (NES, p. 18). Moreover, it is as a model of a psychological process that science stands out. This psychology is not one of negation or opposition, but one of synthesis in terms of rectification and precision: '... an empirical rectification is joined to a theoretical precision.' (NES, p. 19) Modern science teaches us that theories are rectified and added to through new empirical discoveries. The techniques surrounding experiments and the things tested-for are made more precise in the light of theory.

Psychologically, modern science does not evolve through the discarding of theories through counterfactuals or simple falsification, rather, theories have to be included in greater and sometimes looser collections of theories. These have the aim of seeking greater cohesion, but not through simplifications:

10 There is an interesting parallel between Bachelard's argument against objective facts prior to theory and Dennett's arguments in, for example, "Quining qualia" in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds. *Consciousness in Modern Science* (Oxford University Press, 1988)

> Thus it seems to us that truly new epistemological principles must be introduced into contemporary scientific philosophy. Once such principle, for example, would be the idea that complementary characters must be inscribed in the essence of being, thus breaking with that tacit belief that being is always the sign of unity. Indeed, if being in itself is a principle that is communicated to the mind – in the same way as a material point enters in relation with a field of action – it could not be a symbol of unity. We should therefore found an ontology of the complementary less harshly dialectical than the metaphysics of the contradictory. (NES, p. 20)

Setting aside, for a while, the strong connection to Deleuze on being as becoming and multiplicity and the strong difference with his work insofar as Bachelard's points are expressed in terms of a psychology, this important passage highlights three important aspects of Bachelard's dialectics. We should seek completeness through the addition of complementary theories. Complementary does not mean fully unified. Neither does it mean contradictory.

These aspects become more clear in the final chapter of *Le nouvel esprit scientifique* on non-Cartesian epistemology. First, like Deleuze's work on biology and thermodynamics in *Difference and Repetition*, Bachelard is concerned with the way modern science complicates our experience of the world, rather than explaining it[11]. Where Descartes seeks simplifications with great explanatory power, Bachelard sees the emergence of the idea of an 'essential complexity of elementary phenomena' (NES, p. 143). These cannot be reduced legitimately and methodologies that do so must be mistaken.

But Deleuze tempers this positive side with the view that all sciences must necessarily also have an explanatory side. So, in contrast to Bachelard, Deleuze refuses the radical view of modern sciences as going beyond explanation in the dialectical privileging of complication through theory. Instead, the desire for completeness is already a sign of an explanatory simplification of the richness of a prior intensity.

It is not that Bachelard ignores the pedagogical side of modern science – quite the contrary. It is that he situates pedagogy after discovery, as if the

11 See Deleuze's study of the works of Curie in *Difference and Repetition*, DR p. 286).

simplification demanded by it remains at arms length from discovery proper. Whereas Deleuze sees explanation as a necessary betrayal of complexity, even in the most pure moments of scientific advance. The problem of explanation is not pedagogical, but proper to scientific method. Yet, like Deleuze, Bachelard analyses the flaw in Cartesian methodology in terms of identity: '[contemporary scientific] thought tries to find pluralism beneath identity, to imagine occasions for breaking with identity, beyond immediate experience summed up too quickly as the aspect of a group.' (NES, p. 143) But, despite the connections to Cartesian theory on modern science, philosophy of mind and epistemology, he does not see this temptation as implied by modern science[12].

Partly, this is because he defines synthesis in modern science in terms of a priori mathematical syntheses: not as a move to find objective unity, but as a way of bringing together an objective plurality through the way mathematics bring complementary fields together without reducing them to one-another (his main examples for this are the relation between Euclidean and Non-Euclidean mathematics and their relation to Newtonian physics and the physics of relativity). According to Bachelard, mathematical synthesis resolves problems, but also raises new questions and introduces new fields. Its synthetic value is productive rather than reductive. It is worth noting that Deleuze makes much of a similar non-reductive nature of intensity in relations between different number theories (DR, p. 234).

Mathematical synthesis sheds results by adding fields, but does not depend on presumptions of a prior identity: 'That mathematical description is not clear through its elements. It is only clear in its achievement through a sort of consciousness of its synthetic value... all basic notions can in some way be doubled; they can be bordered by complementary notions.' (NES, p. 146) It is matter of progressing through new perspectives, rather than being pushed forward by a single dominant one.

Dialectics then becomes the questioning search for 'variations under identity' that 'shed light on the first thought by completing.' (NES, p. 150)

12 This Cartesian influence still prevails today. For a critical discussion of Cartesian influences in contemporary cognitive science see M. Wheeler *Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step* (MIT, forthcoming) esp. Chap. 3 'Descartes' Ghost: the Haunting of Cognitive Science'.

This is not, then, a structure of scientific revolutions. It is a structure of scientific additions and revisions, where each addition involves changes in the objective status of what it adds to. This is shown in a very beautiful passage on laws: 'We shall not speak of simple laws that are then disrupted, but of complex and organic laws touched sometimes by certain viscosities, certain obliterations. The old simple law becomes a simple example, a mutilated truth, the beginnings of an image, a sketch on a board.' (NES, p. 161)

Doubt at all levels, perfectibility and the rectifiable become the principles for this dialectics, as it moves towards a progressive objectification free of any final objectivity, simple law and metaphysical ground. Here we begin to glimpse the great rift with Deleuze. Against the notion of historical eternal return, Bachelard speaks of 'thoughts that do not begin again; these are thoughts that have been rectified, enlarged, completed.' (NES, p. 177) We shall see that Deleuze depends on a counter-notion of the possibility of eternal return that depends on a notion of continuity underlying actual discontinuity. Whereas Bachelard has to posit a prior discontinuity ensuring that differences can only be bridged partially - only completed, never complete:

> ... would it not be right, in order to understand intellectual evolution, to pay attention to anxious thought, to thought in search of an object, to thought looking for dialectical occasions for going beyond itself, to break with its frames, in short, a thought on the way to objectification. (NES, p. 181)

Continuity and discontinuity

Deleuze's dialectics differ from the above account of Bachelard's in at least two major ways. First, Deleuze denies the possibility of progress as defined by Bachelard in *The New Scientific Spirit*. For Deleuze, there can be actual progress, but this must be set against the eternal return of difference, that is, the significance of actual progress changes in terms of the eternal and necessary return of intensities, virtual ideas and sensations (DR, p. 297).

So it is perfectly possible to speak of scientific progress, but it is not possible to assign any independence to that progress with respect to value

and to sensibility. This is important from the point of view of Bachelard's modelling of philosophical dialectics on scientific dialectics and from the point of view of his dependence on science and phenomenology for philosophical material. Philosophy cannot be simply progressive in the same way as science.

Furthermore, it is possible to provide a Deleuzian argument against the specificity of scientific invention – situating it instead as a case of a wider form of creativity. From a definition of creativity as open selection through sensibility, intensity and the expression of Ideas, Bachelard gives an overly negative and programmatic account of creativity in the sciences. He may therefore have also given a mistaken account of dialectics based on a restrictive account of the 'psychology' of the scientist.

The second key point to be made by Deleuze against Bachelard concerns continuity. Where Bachelard claims that dialectics is a matter of the search for completeness through discontinuous but not opposed terms. Deleuze argues that beneath every actual difference, beneath every disparity, lies a continuous transcendental condition for actual difference, where actual difference is defined in terms of identity. In *Difference and Repetition*, this argument is developed in terms of pure differences underlying measured spaces (DR, p. 229).

These points are linked, since when Deleuze speaks of the eternal return of difference he means the return of the expression of continuous virtual ideas and intensities; under different configurations or perplications (envelopments), in the case of intensities, and different relations of distinctness and obscurity, in the case of transcendental ideas. There is no possibility of discontinuity between intensities and between ideas, such breaks only appear when they are actually expressed. Even then, a complete expression must always take account of the connection of all actual things through the virtual:

> [...] all the intensities are implicated in one another, each in turn enveloped and enveloping, such that each continues to express the changing totality of Ideas, the variable ensemble of differential relations. However, each intensity clearly expresses only certain relations or certain degrees of variation. Those that it expresses *clearly* are precisely those on which it is focused when it has the *enveloping* role. In its role as the enveloped, it still expresses all relations and all degrees, but *confusedly*. As

> the two roles are reciprocal, and as intensity is in the first instance enveloped by itself, it must be said that the clear and the confused, as logical characteristics in the intensity which expresses the idea – in other words, in the individual which thinks it – are no more separable than the distinct and the obscure are separable in the Idea itself. (DR, p. 252)

Underlying actual things and standing as transcendental conditions for their variation, we find intensities and Ideas that cannot be finally separated from one another, because such separation would introduce illegitimate limits in the conditioned realm of actual things. So Ideas and intensities can only be determined as separate according to degrees and according to relations of distinctness *and* obscurity, where distinctness only appears with a wider varying set of more or less obscure relations.

Bachelard's counter to such claims is developed in *La dialectique de la durée*. It is constructed around the thesis that psychology and phenomenology of time imply discontinuity. This discontinuity of time implies an ontological discontinuity. Every continuity is therefore illusory and, in fact, secondary with respect to a dialectics that comes out of the possibility of affirmation or negation in activity: 'To think is to abstract certain experiences, it is to plunge them into the shadow of nothingness. If one objected to us that that these effaced positive experience subsist nonetheless, we would answer that they subsist without playing a role in our actual knowledge.' (DD, p. 16) Because we make negative judgements we have to suppose that reality is discontinuous, in the sense of allowing gaps or empty space and time in existence.

For Deleuze, this is to miss the role of passive syntheses as transcendental conditions for activity. These conditions imply a continuity at the level of Ideas and a complicated continuity at the level of time. But a further rejoinder can be found in Bachelard's response to the question of the transcendental:

> We believe that we must give ourselves a little more than simple temporal possibility characterised as an *a priori* form. We must give ourselves the temporal alternative analysed through these two verifications: either in this instant nothing is happening, or in this instant something is happening. Time is therefore continuous as possibility, as nothingness. It is discontinuous as being. In other words, we start with a temporal duality and not a

> unity. We rest that duality on function, rather than on being. (DD, p. 25)

Time as condition must be discontinuous, given the nature of our consciousness of things as having the potential to exist or not. There is a discontinuity between these two states and Bachelard will go on to argue that this discontinuity is replicated in consciousness through our power to negate and to make decisions between different possible routes.

Syntheses of time and Deleuze's critique of discontinuity

The opposition around continuity described above can be summed up through two opposed arguments. Deleuze's line is that actual events presuppose a transcendental continuity, because such events cannot simply be accounted for in terms of identities. Identities are encountered in events that vary according to a 'drama' of multiple sensations and hence intensities. For example, there is no finally isolated moment of decision in psychology, only the awareness of deciding or of signs of a decision, abstracted from endless and variegated rises and falls in tension in feelings and processes. The abstraction can make us think that time is essentially discontinuous, in the sense of thinking 'Everything changed here, at this point.' But the break is always changing in significance according to the variations that surround it (in a declaration and its context, for example).

For Bachelard, on the other hand, the argument goes that science and phenomenology are the only proper sources of evidence for conclusions concerning time. What they show is that we have to assume that time is discontinuous, in order to account for the psychology of decisions and choices, and for the phenomenology of intentionality. Were time continuous, then our sense of points of decision, of breaks where events could go one way or another, would be mistaken. All the evidence points to the contrary. Our experiences are of discontinuous events, where things stop and start, where they can be made to stop and start, and where our directedness to events presupposes such breaks. The fact of negation, where we can stop things, or where things stop, or where our directedness implies the necessity of stops and starts, shows that time must be discontinuous.

In reply, we can look at a scientifically isolated point of decision (or at least sign of such) 'The rat moves to A' or 'The mapping of brain patterns changes dramatically at this point'. From a Deleuzian point of view, each isolation is open to re-examination according to wider patterns of significance, that is, according to different flows of sensations and of the problems that surround them. In other words, the scientific or phenomenological point will move. It may even be located at plural points, or according to neighbourhoods or stretches that deny the importance of a single point.

But this shift to relative plurality is not the issue for Deleuze. Rather, it is what the shift presupposes that bothers him – not what it leads to. Why did we change our view of what stands as the point of decision? Can that change be explained in purely scientific terms (new discoveries) or phenomenological terms (different and more complex views of intentionality)? Or, rather, do we have to look further in terms of why we continue to search for changes in a given direction? Shouldn't we look at why that direction changes and at why we view the results of that change in different and perhaps ultimately individual ways?

Deleuze's transcendental deductions around three syntheses of time point to conditions for discontinuity that are themselves continuous. An active decision presupposes all the repetitions and variations that have come together into forming a being capable of making the decision. Indeed, even the short-hand of 'being' or 'actor' is insufficient. What we should say is that a given situation, comprising a decision and its environment, has no limit in principle with respect to the extent of the environment and actor in terms of antecedents (DR, p. 77). It is possible to say that an ancestry 'decides' or that the decision lies in the relation between a climate and that ancestry. It is not possible to say that any point of that ancestry or environment is excluded in principle.

Furthermore, actual repetitions that lead to a decision have to be extended into a field of virtual memory (Bergson's pure past). It is not only the hard-wired aspects of the past that matter, but also soft and highly variable virtual ones (DR, pp. 81-2). This is something that Deleuze shows in his work on cinema. Our memory is a swirling and changeable record of the past. Yet it is played out in present acts. Again, no limitation in principle makes sense. More seriously, there cannot even be a linear limitation, as might have been thought in the actual repetitions ('This must have happened first'). Memory can be re-jigged in the present, to the point

where we have to say that we act on the virtual past and also, therefore, on the relation of that virtual present and its relation to actual past repetitions. Equally, though, the virtual past acts on us, thereby setting off relations of reciprocal determination of memory and actuality[13].

For instance, the realisation of a betrayal changes our memories and colours them in different ways ('He was stealing money all that time.') That new past changes the relation of our current acts to their preparation, in the sense that different repetitions, environments and skills come to the fore, whilst other recede ('I shall make him pay here and like this.') A skilful film-maker exploits this property of time and memory, changing our sense of the film as a whole as it unfolds through new disclosures and concealments. This does not have to be restricted to art-house films; arguably, any thriller exploits this property, for example, in the uncertainty around Keyser Soze in *The Usual Suspects*[14], where the whole film changes in the final shots.

But does any of this work on memory imply continuity? Should we still not speak of actual identifiable things in repetitions and environments? Should we not do the same with respect to memories? Everything may have to be thought of in limitless chains. This may force us to accept the necessity of contingent abstractions. But that does not mean that such abstractions do not take place in essentially discontinuous realms. From Bachelard's point view, what matters is that I have had to refer to the end of the film and it is this identifiable moment that changes a series of earlier discontinuous points. The film drives a desire to find out, that is, to reach a point that resolves tensions in earlier ones. Were all things continuous that drive could not be explained, since we would not have the final point and its capacity to organise time around it.

To answer these questions we have to go beyond Deleuze's first two syntheses of time ('Every present event presupposes syntheses of actual chains of repetitions.' and 'Every present act presupposes the synthesis of the whole of the virtual past.') However, prior to that, it is important to make a point concerning the relations that hold between all three of Deleuze's syntheses. Each one is incomplete without the others – they presuppose one another. We have already seen that the first synthesis and the second are connected and cannot be separated. This is because actual

13 See Deleuze's study of these processes in the films of Orson Welles in G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2* (Paris: Minuit, 1985) pp. 138-51, esp. p. 145.

14 *The Usual Suspects*, dir. B. Singer, MGM, 1995.

repetitions and acts take place and acquire significance with virtual memory. This is as true for a material or biological process as it is for a conscious being.

Deleuze's point is that the synthesis of the pure virtual past is a necessary condition for the synthesis of an active present: 'There is thus a substantial temporal element (the Past which was never present) playing the role of ground.' (DR, p. 82) That ground is what allows an act in the present to be determined in terms of how it rearranges the whole of the past and hence it also in terms of how it acquires significance, determinacy and value in relation to the present: '... if the new present is always endowed with a supplementary dimension, this is because it is reflected *in* the element of the pure past in general, whereas it is only *through* this element that we focus upon the former present as a particular.' (DR, p. 82) The present is incomplete unless is considered in relation to all the things it passes away into (the pure past).

When a chalk cliff suddenly loses a large section, thereby changing a landscape, the large-scale event presupposes repetitions of storms, tides, formation of rocks. Each of these synthesises its own cycles, where what matters is the variation in any repetition, that is, what changes each time, and not what remains the same. But why should any of this refer to virtual memory? The answer is in the selection of the event and of the pathways of repetitions. What happens when a particular event is isolated? How is it isolated? The material selection presupposes an ideal one, in the sense where the record of the past is re-written through the selection and in the sense where that re-writing is a condition for the material selection.

It is possible to think of this interdependence in terms of value. Seen as brute material processes, chains of repetitions are neutral with respect to value (Why celebrate the birth of an animal? Shrug at the erosion of a rock? Ignore a microscopic change?) When events are selected, value impinges to introduce hierarchies. But what is this value? For Deleuze, it is itself a selection through sensations and these depend on past associations of ideas and sensations. There is therefore a virtual, immaterial, trace of selections that runs through all of the virtual past and this trace introduces value and selection into actual processes. There is a virtual history of value that allows for determinations in the actual. Why did you care so about that rock face? What selections did that care imply?

This reference to selection as the appearance of the new in an unfolding series of events is at the core of both Deleuze's and Bachelard's

arguments. For Deleuze, selection implies a third synthesis of time as a relation to the future. This synthesis implies continuity in all syntheses and through all things. A continuous relation – that Deleuze will define in terms of intensities and virtual Ideas – is presupposed by all actual events. For Bachelard, as we shall see in detail in the next section, it is quite the opposite: selection and the new presuppose discontinuity.

Deleuze's argument is that selection, as the drive towards the new, presupposes a cut, assembly and transformation of all of time. The first point is not controversial, at least in this context, since it supports Bachelard's point. To select the new, we presuppose that it cuts away from the past in some way. The next point is that though there is a cut, it is one that takes place with the backdrop of the past. Therefore, the cut projects that past into the future. A decision or an unconscious selection does not only cut away from the past, it brings something new into the past and brings the past into the future. So though there is a break, there is also an assembly. A discontinuous and continuous time are implied by selection.

For example, the decision to move to a new kind of experiment or to a new way of living or form of behaviour shears off from the past and attempts something untried and original. But, in terms of the production of memory or of the past and in terms of earlier chains of repetitions, the experiment and the new form bring them into play in the future. So selection is a cut and an assembly of the past and the future. But isn't this a contradiction? How can time be both continuous and discontinuous? Is it not rather the case that time is discontinuous throughout and that Deleuze's assembly is an assembly of prior cuts and later ones?

His answer lies in the third property of selection. The assembly of the past and the future are transformations of them. So it is possible to speak of a cut and of an assembly, because the assembly is of different things. When thinking of the future (F) as different from the past (P), we may be tempted to think that the difference lies between P and F. But Deleuze's point is that in a selection we move from an assembly P/F to a new assembly P'/F'. We select a new past and a new future. So any difference is between P/F and P'/F'. However, isn't this even more nonsensical than the previous contradiction? How can we change the past and the future in the present?

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze's answer is usually couched in terms of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return, but I want to give a

different version that links more easily to his ideas about intensities and virtual Ideas. It is the case that any given actual identical thing cannot return, what returns are pure differences and what changes is the relation of these to actual things. When we spoke of the pure past and of virtual Ideas and intensities earlier, these could have been understood as identifiable memories – open to representation. For Deleuze, the virtual is the transcendental condition for transformations, that is, for the sensations that something is actually different though in an unidentifiable way (if it could be identified, then it would not be new in the sense of implying a cut.)

These conditions are always defined as continuous for Deleuze. Otherwise, forms of identity and representation would return in the virtual, thereby contradicting his argument that the new must be radical in the sense of departing from the present and from the past, whilst transforming them: 'The synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production, and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor.' (DR, p. 94)

For this unconditioned character to hold, and yet for there to be an assembly and transformation of the conditions of production, the new presupposes something that escapes both the actor and the production (past and present). This is the transcendental field of the virtual. The radical nature of the new as expressed through sensations implies therefore that this field must be continuous – and hence independent of actor and production, in the sense of in principle unidentifiable in terms of them. It must change only as continuous, that is, in terms of relations of distinctness and obscurity, rather than in terms of relation of opposition and identity.

The transcendental field is a continuous multiplicity of varying relations that stands as the condition for the new as cut and transformation, for example, as condition for the fractured I and dissolved self: 'As we have seen, what swarms around the edges of the fracture are Ideas in the form of problems – in other words, in the form of multiplicities made up of differential relations and variations of relations, distinctive points and transformations of points.' (DR, p. 259). For Deleuze, the new presupposes continuity, otherwise, we could not explain its novelty.

Bachelard's arguments in *La dialectique de la durée*

Bachelard puts forward many different arguments against the continuity of time in his critique of Bergson in *La dialectique de la durée*: 'We should like to develop an essay of discontinuous Bergsonism, in showing the necessity to arithmetise Bergsonian duration in order to give it greater fluidity, more numbers, greater exactitude too in the correspondence that holds between phenomena of thought and the quantic qualities of the real.' (DD, p. 8) Given Deleuze's dependence on Bergson for key arguments about time, in particular, in terms of his second synthesis of time, and given the strong Bergsonian influence on Deleuze, it is no surprise that many of Bachelard's arguments also apply to Deleuze.

In most of his works, Bachelard's method involves a close and up-to-date study of different scientific findings relevant to his topic. In other words, he takes his own dialectics very seriously in its situating of philosophy with, but also after, science. Philosophy is a discipline that learns from scientific advances and that contributes to the evolution of science as a rational pursuit guided by a dialectical approach to the relation of theory to objective scientific discoveries and vice-versa. That's why the passage above highlights the correspondence between a scientific approach to the real and a phenomenological approach to thought. There is an ongoing debate and accommodation between experience and discovery.

This approach to science as starting point for reflection is problematic. First, the two thinkers are not dealing with the same science, including mathematics. Second, Bachelard's studies far outreach Deleuze's work. The former works on primary and often cutting edge sources (the latest theorems in mathematical journals in his exemplary study of Adolphe Buhl's work in *La Philosophie du non*, for instance[15]). The latter tends to work on philosophical digests of such work, or on broader primary sources and in a much less detailed scientific manner, but perhaps with a greater sense of the intricacies of philosophical ontological arguments in their relation to science. Bachelard is a mathematician and a philosopher of science. He is attempting to bring philosophy up to the level of the scientific discoveries of his age[16]. Deleuze is a metaphysician whose

15 G. Bachelard, *La philosophie du non* (Paris: PUF, 1940) pp. 95-104.

16 Though not directly relevant to the main argument here, it is important to note that Bachelard's closeness to science dates his work more than Deleuze's and that Deleuze's philosophy is better positioned to explain this erosion.

system seeks to develop a coherent account of science within a wider metaphysics.

So, for Bachelard, science is the privileged basis and source. Whereas, for Deleuze, science provides inspiration, examples, checks and support. The stakes of this distinction can be seen in their different approaches to the relations of art and science. For the latter, art and science fit into an overall metaphysics, but with different roles. The relations of virtual to actual, and the principles and concepts that characterise them, hold for both – although with different emphases and parts to play with respect to them.

For the former, art is outside the dialectics of truth as developed and defined through science. Science is related to the past through a sense of progress, whereas art has to break with the past: 'The poetic image is not subjected to a thrust. It is not the echo of a past.'[17] This difference is a product of their opposition with respect to continuity and discontinuity. In a metaphysics privileging continuity, there is no scope for the radical distinctions of a dialectics based on discontinuity.

Given the variety of Bachelard's arguments against temporal continuity and hence against the primacy of ontological continuity, I list them separately:

1. Positive judgements about reality depend on negative judgements. So any affirmed plenitude depends on negations. Scientific method does not show us that the real must be approached as full and continuous, instead it emerges from a dialectics of assumptions about emptiness and fullness, truth and error (DD, p. 14);
2. Action presupposes the possibility of negation and hence supports the notion of discontinuity. When we make choices or assume that something functions, we do so with the possibility that we could also refuse to act or that the mechanism could fail to function (DD, p. 22) (DD, p. 74);
3. Our experience of time is necessarily a judgement of time, in the sense where we make decisions about which times to focus on and consider. Time is the subject of an inner observation that presupposes that time can be divided by judgement in order to be observed (p. 36);

17 G. Bachelard, *La poétique de l'espace* (Paris: PUF, 1957) p. 1 [my translation].

4. In terms of causality and sub-atomic observation, measurement and hence discontinuity is all-important. Physics shows reality as discontinuous passages. Time must reflect that discontinuity and duration, defined as continuous, is a false assumption (p. 63);
5. In terms of psychology, continuity is in fact the product of a dialectical process of discontinuous moves from present to past and present to future. Continuity is an effect of discontinuity where time is cut up through processes of rejection and projection (DD, p. 125).

When we consider these points in relation to Deleuze's arguments in *Difference and Repetition* each point is given an explicit rejoinder. We have already seen that the remarks on judgement, will and time (2, 3, 5) are responded to through transcendental deductions of passive syntheses of time as continuous.

However it is important to remember that already in *La philosophies du non*, Bachelard developed a critique of the Kantian transcendental. According to Bachelard's dialectics, the problem with Kant's model is that there is no general object or intuition from whence to deduce a priori categories: 'Since the world of the general object is divided, the *I think* corresponding to generalisation is itself divided. The *I think* must have a dialectical activity; it must mobilise itself and be alert within a philosophy of the no.'[18] The negations and adjunctions proper to dialectics take precedence over transcendental moves and disqualify them in their claims to universality. So the key issue becomes whether Deleuze's development of transcendental philosophy avoids this kind of criticism. Given the fluidity and reciprocal relations that hold between the virtual conditions and the actual in his metaphysics, he can agree to Bachelard's critique of Kant but also answer that his own model is neither dependent on a general object, nor incapable of mobilisation at the level of the virtual.

Furthermore, on the first point listed above – on error and negation – Deleuze can answer through a critique of the fundamental role of error in philosophy and, by extension, in the sciences (DR, p. 150). In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze argues that to think of problems in terms of errors and correct solutions is to misunderstand the deeper nature of problems as irresolvable tensions between Ideas. Problems are to be repeated and transformed productively, but never fully solved. So when Bachelard says

18 G. Bachelard, *La philosophie du non* (Paris: PUF, 1940) p. 106.

that error and negation are essential aspects of science, Deleuze need not even dispute the claim.

Deleuze's point is rather that there is a deeper condition for the scientific drive to experiment and theorise about reality. This applies to Bachelard's fourth point. Underlying the movement of error and correctness, affirmation and negation we find forms of significance and value that explain why we seek correctness and affirmation. These Ideal transcendental conditions are not tied to any given scientific theory, but they depend on continuity as one of their key premises (notably because discontinuity would be a first step towards solutions rather than productive repetitions).

Conclusion

Bachelard and Deleuze are concerned with the openness implied by novelty. They design forms of dialectics that subject what is known and identified to constant reformulations and transformations. However, the question 'How radical is the new?' separates the two thinkers around the form of reality implied by the new in terms of continuity and discontinuity.

For Bachelard, the new is radical to the point of implying real discontinuity that must be accommodated by a dialectics that relates things in an open and revisable manner through tensions between theories and between theories and objects of observation. Given discontinuity, thought must be of the form of a rational dialogue that holds oppositions and contradictions together through the aim of greater integration, but without a perfect resolution. He defends a difficult progress where new steps allow for a more complete and accurate relation of theory to object, but where earlier theories maintain a relative value and some resistance to incorporation into an overarching final theory.

In Deleuze's work, the new is radical in such a way as to imply a virtual continuity standing as condition for an actual identifiable discontinuity. The condition for a novelty that goes beyond all current identifications is a realm of virtual intensities and Ideas that returns in different configurations each time they are expressed in actual novelties or creations. For these creations to have the radical nature associated with the

powerful sensations and significance that accompany them, the expressed intensities and Ideas cannot allow for a priori limitations on expression: they have to be continuous multiplicities of varying relations.

Pli 16 (2005), 171-185

Bachelard and the History of the Mind*

CRISTINA CHIMISSO

Gaston Bachelard found in the philosophy of his time two antagonistic views of intellectual history, and, connected with these, two conceptions of the mind. I shall call one view of history the 'snapshot' approach, borrowing the term from Bergson, and the other the narrative approach. I shall show that in Bachelard's philosophy versions of both views are present, combined in his dualistic[1] conception of history and of the mind. His dualistic conceptions of the mind and of history are at the core of his concept of epistemological break. I shall argue that Bachelard's goal in formulating his theory of the epistemological break was not only that of describing the mind and knowledge, but more importantly that of advocating a particular way of thinking and organizing knowledge. Although I do not share his view of imagination as ahistorical and as standing in stark contrast with rationality, I think that his concept of epistemological break, in a profoundly revised form, can still have an epistemological, rather than historiographical, function.

In his books, Bachelard discusses science, poetry, philosophy, alchemy, myths and more. The breadth of his interests, as well as of his references, is remarkable. August Strindberg is cited next to eighteenth-century treatises on optics,[2] Roger Caillois' *Le Mythe et l'homme* a couple

* This is the revised version of the talk I gave at 'Bachelard and the history of science', a conference held at Goldsmiths College, University of London, on 27th November 2003.

1 I use here the term 'dualistic' to indicate that Bachelard thinks that the mind (of modern people) includes the 'scientific mind' and the poetic or 'primitive mind', and that 'history' has different meanings when applied to science or the works of imagination. 'Dualism' here does not refer to Cartesianism.

2 Gaston Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique: contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective* (Paris: Vrin, 1993 [1938]), pp. 41-42.

of pages away from a text on topochemical reactions,[3] Paul Valéry not far from Hermann Boerhaave[4]. However, Bachelard's focus is very clear throughout his vast web of references and topics, indeed I think throughout his production: he investigates the mind and its mechanisms. His choice to carry out his investigation *a posteriori*, that is through a study of historical texts and images, may surprise contemporary analytical philosophers, but it was far from surprising in France.

In inter-war France, the study of the mind was central to philosophers' interests, and it was often done through historical analysis. The historical focus is one of the most striking characteristics of French philosophy from the point of view of the analytical philosophy of mind. The reasons for the development of the historical approach to the study of the mind are of course too complex to be discussed here in full. However, it is worth noticing that history and philosophy were far closer disciplines in France than they are for instance in the United Kingdom today. In particular, history of philosophy was a very important branch of philosophy, and historians of philosophy had considerable influence in the running of academic affairs. In purely academic terms, the strength of historical studies of philosophy can be seen in the number of chairs at the Sorbonne – which was by far the most important university in the country – and the number of PhD dissertations in the same institution. A simple counting of them reveals this. Between its foundation (1808) and 1935, at the Faculty of Letters of the Sorbonne, the number of chairs created in history of philosophy amounted to 19 out of a total of 31 philosophy chairs.[5] Bearing in mind that the name of a chair was chosen by the professor who obtained it, the number of history of philosophy chairs gives us a rough indication of the weight of history of philosophy in the most senior philosophers' research and teaching interests. The doctoral theses in history of philosophy constituted the single largest group of philosophy dissertations in the 1930s: in 1937 they were 161, followed by psychology (71)[6].

3 Gaston Bachelard, *La philosophie du non. Essai d'une philosophie du nouvel esprit scientifique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1940), p. 59, 55.

4 Gaston Bachelard, *La psychanalyse du feu*, 1st ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1949 [1938]), p. 103, 109.

5 Albert Guigue, *La faculté des lettres de l'Université de Paris depuis sa fondation (17 mars 1808) jusqu'au 1er Janvier 1935* (Paris: Alcan, 1935), pp. 14-29.

6 Source: "Liste de Sujets de Thèses déposés à la Faculté des Lettres," *Annales de l'Université de Paris* 13 (1938).

Many historians of philosophy thought that the goal of their historical research was that of studying the mind. They regarded the texts they read as examples of the ways in which the mind worked in different conditions and environments. In the presentation of the *Revue d'Histoire de la philosophie*, a journal founded in 1927 and entirely dedicated to history of philosophy, its editor Émile Bréhier, Sorbonne professor of history of philosophy, wrote:

> In order to know the human mind, its sphere of competence and its capability, it is not sufficient to proceed a priori, [rather], it is necessary to observe it work under the most diverse conditions.... History [...] is like a substitute for the experimental method in philosophy: it shows thousands of variations of the human reason, in relation to the period, the social milieus, the religions, the states of the sciences [and] of civilisations.[7]

The simile of history as the experimental method or laboratory of philosophy recurs in France for decades. Léon Brunschvicg, Bachelard's supervisor on one of his doctoral dissertations, in a seminar in 1923 declared that 'the philosopher works on history, just as the scientist works in his laboratory'[8]. Georges Canguilhem, Bachelard's successor on the Sorbonne chair of history and philosophy of science and directorship of the Institut d'histoire des sciences et techniques, was still employing this metaphor in the 1960s and 1970s.[9]

If the mind could not be studied *a priori*, then the right documents should be isolated. Scholars such as Bréhier thought that history of

7 Anomymous [Bréhier], "Notre programme," *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* 1, no. 1 (1927), my translation.

8 Léon Brunschvicg et al., "Histoire et Philosophie," *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 23 (1923), p. 162.

9 Georges Canguilhem, *Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie* (Paris: Vrin, 1977)., pp. 12-13; Georges Canguilhem, *Études d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences* (Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 13. In the latter article, Canguilhem argues that the model of the judicial court is better than than of the laboratory. This change of metaphor symbolizes his idea of normative history; I have discussed the 'normative turn' in French epistemology – which took place with Bachelard and Canguilhem – in my article "The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 34, no. 2 (2003).

philosophy provided the best repository of examples of how the mind worked. But not all philosophers chose history of philosophy. A historian of philosophy, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, for instance, decided to turn his attention to the beliefs, customs and myths of traditional societies, at least as described in the reports of contemporary ethnologists. The psychologists were also trying new directions, and they were progressively abandoning *a priori* philosophical psychology to turn to experimental methods. Many of them had both philosophical and medical training, and their teaching and research were often divided between faculties.[10]

For many philosophers, history of science was the ideal subject for this type of research. One of these was Léon Brunschvicg, who succeeded Lévy-Bruhl on his Sorbonne chair. He thought that history of the sciences, and of mathematics in particular, provided the ideal experimental material. Bachelard's supervisor on his other doctoral thesis, Abel Rey, was also convinced that the study of history of science was the best means to investigate the mind. It was to promote a systematic study of the mind that he founded the Institut d'histoire des science et techniques, which Bachelard was going to direct after him. In the presentation of the courses offered by the Institut, Rey describes history of science as the history of world-views.[11] For him, the goal of the history of science was the understanding of the intellectual evolution of humankind. The historian of chemistry Hélène Metzger, who was also a lecturer at the Institut, very much agreed with Rey on the general objectives of the history of science. In one of her talks, she said that her own goal in studying the history of scientific thought was that of improving our knowledge of the mind. She believed that this knowledge in turn would improve the use that we make of our minds in various intellectual activities.[12]

The examples of this point of view could be endless; these few should suffice to show that the questions Bachelard aimed to answer were, unsurprisingly, those that were current in his philosophical milieu. These

10 I have discussed the link between conceptions of the mind and the political strategy within French academia in the inter-war period, of the social sciences and history of science, including Bachelard's own position in my article "The Mind and the Faculties: The controversy over 'primitive mentality' and the struggle for disciplinary space at the inter-war Sorbonne," *History of the Human Sciences* 13, no. 3 (2000).

11 Abel Rey, "Avant-propos," *Thalès* 1 (1934), p. xvii.

12 Hélène Metzger, "La méthode philosophique dans l'histoire des sciences," *Archeion* 19 (1937), p. 206.

questions concerned the investigation of the limits and capabilities of the human mind. It is no coincidence that one of the most important books of Bachelard is dedicated to the 'formation of the scientific mind', a previous one to the 'new scientific mind', and another very important one is an 'essay on the philosophy of the scientific mind'.[13] Moreover, Bachelard's historical approach was also well rooted in contemporary French philosophy. The apparently common historical approach, however, hid very profound differences which often were not made explicit and loaded philosophical discussion with profound ambiguities. Crucial differences concerned the meaning attributed to 'history' and the consequent approach to past texts. This difference is particularly important in the discussion of Bachelard's project, because he approached past texts in two opposite ways, depending on their nature, as we shall see.

In Bachelard's time, just like nowadays, 'history' can often mean rather different things, which correspond to very different uses of past texts. Broadly speaking, there are two understandings of 'history'. These can be explained by referring to a distinction that Bergson uses in *Creative Evolution*. Bergson thought that intellectual knowledge of movement was impossible. What intellect for him could achieve was the knowledge of separate moments, in his words, of 'snapshots'. The intellectual understanding of movement was for him an illusion, which he called 'cinematographic': rather than movement, what we apprehend is a succession of snapshots.[14] A consequence of this view is that history in the sense of construction of narratives and as understanding of historical change and evolution is completely undermined. A 'snapshot' approach to the past would regard 'history' as a repository of past texts as separate documents, outside time. Many, indeed most historians of philosophy in the inter-war period regarded their discipline as the study of a collection of texts which could be discussed without reference to the times or society in which they were produced. The 'history' of philosophy was for them a body of canonical texts, which were substantially timeless. This was the position of Émile Bréhier, Léon Robin, Jean Wahl and Dominique Parodi, just to mention just a few.

13 Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique: contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective*. Gaston Bachelard, *Le nouvel esprit scientifique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1934). Bachelard, *La philosophie du non. Essai d'une philosophie du nouvel esprit scientifique*.

14 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Mineola, New York: Dover, 1998 [1907]).

An opposed approach to past texts is that of regarding them as forming a narrative. In this sense, when we say that something has a history, it means that it has undergone change. In other words, the comprehension of movement, far from being an 'illusion' is in this case the very goal of historical research. This movement can be of any type, such as evolutionary, causal, dialectic or progressive. Many philosophers contemporary of Bachelard subscribed to this thesis, for instance Léon Brunschvicg and Abel Rey, but also in different ways Hélène Metzger, Alexandre Koyré and the historians of mentalities, including Lucien Febvre.

At the core of these two different approaches, there are two ways of conceiving the mind. If one believes that the mind does not change in its limits and capabilities, it is not important which texts one analyses in order to discover its workings: it could be an ancient text as well as the most recent scientific article, ultimately they are bound to show the same logic and categories, although employed at a very different level of sophistication. On the other hand, if one believed, as for instance Brunschvicg did, that the mind was plastic and it worked differently in different times, then the dates of documents were obviously crucial. Brunschvicg, who regarded himself as a Kantian, nevertheless claimed to be more faithful to 'the spirit of critical idealism' in rejecting rather than accepting Kant's fixed categories in order to follow 'the dynamism and plasticity' of intellectual functions.[15] Indeed, he argued that Kantian categories in fact reflected the structure of Newtonian physics,[16] that is, only a particular moment of the history of the mind.

Bachelard shared Brunschvicg's view of the historicity of the mind, at least as far as the scientific mind is concerned. This is why Bachelard examined texts from different periods as evidence of the changes the mind has undergone. Unlike Bréhier and Robin, Bachelard believed that the texts he studied belonged to different stages of the development of human knowledge. Einstein's theory of relativity and Boehraave's theory of elements for him are the product of different ways of thinking, of different world-views and above all of different goals. Indeed, Boehraave's theories, like any other theory elaborated before the end of the nineteenth century, for Bachelard are not the result of rational thinking, but rather of

15 Léon Brunschvicg, *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), p. 550.

16 Brunschvicg, "Histoire et Philosophie", p. 147.

an imaginative process, and as a consequence do not belong to the history of science. Bachelard did not save pre-nineteenth century history of philosophy from the mark of non-rationality. However, the norm of rationality, being for Bachelard provided by current science, changes, and what seems scientific now could well be expelled from the history of science in the future.

For Bachelard the human mind is plastic, and changes through various dialectic processes. One of the dialectic processes that affect the scientific mind is that which takes place between one stage of knowledge and a previous one. Bachelard claimed that knowledge advances by 'saying no' to its own past. It is not by chance that one of his books is entitled *La philosophie du non*. What happens after a dialectic negation of the past, is not only a reorganization of knowledge, but also a contextual change of mind and object, and of the way in which the mind and the object interact. Bachelard called this event an epistemological break. The most dramatic epistemological break was for Bachelard that which brought human investigation of nature from an imaginative response to a rational construction, that is, the emergence of science. In his view, this event took place at the end of the nineteenth century, well after most of his contemporaries situated it. Since then, he argued, science has exhibited a history (in the sense of narrative), which is dialectic and open-ended. In its history, science has changed the mind, as well as producing new objects. This change goes on, so new knowledge, new objects, new ways of organizing knowledge will be produced, and these new ways for Bachelard will oppose the old ones. Indeed, Bachelard claimed that the scientific mind has already been opposed and overcome by the 'new scientific mind', emerging with the theory of relativity and non-Euclidean geometries.[17]

Another dialectic process involves the interaction of the mind and the object in scientific activity. The two elements, mind and object, both change as a consequence of their interaction. The change brought about by scientific activity is one of rationalisation, which affects both the mind and the object. The mind 'rectifies' its objects, and in this way make them scientific objects. The objects of science are not natural objects, but rather artificial ones, that the mind constructs by making ordinary objects

17 Bachelard, *Le nouvel esprit scientifique*; Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique: contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective*, "Discours préliminare".

rational. In Bachelard's words, 'scientific objects carry the human mark'.[18] Bachelard claimed that the subject, by 'meditating' on the object, not only removes irregularities from the object itself, but also removes 'irregular attitudes from his intellectual behaviour'. In his view, this process leads to an 'orthopsychism.'[19] For him the mind is not immediately rational; rationality is something that has to affirm itself against a background of irrationality and imagination.

The immediate manner in which the mind approaches its objects is for Bachelard imaginative. The objects of imagination bear the 'human mark' just as those of science, the difference being that in this case the human mark consists of images the root of which lies deep in human desires and sexual drives. *La formation de l'esprit scientifique* provides a catalogue of the types of imaginative approaches that human beings have towards the natural world. For instance, Bachelard thinks that scientific realism should be explained in psychoanalytic rather than philosophical terms. For instance, in his view, the concern with the material existence of sub-atomic particles derives from a drive to own precious little things, rather than from any rational reflection.[20] In Bachelard's account, the way in which alchemists saw and explained the world was completely dominated by their own sexual fantasies and desires: some substances copulate, some are offspring of others, some are sterile, and so on.[21]

A reader of *La formation de l'esprit scientifique* and *La psychanalyse du feu* cannot fail to notice a striking difference. Science is described in chronological terms: Bachelard claims that it emerged at the end of the eighteenth century (when the 'scientific mind' comes into being), has undergone a major epistemological break at the beginning of the twentieth century ('the new scientific mind'), and new changes can be expected. From the perspective of history of science, the time in which a doctrine has been elaborated is crucial. For Bachelard alchemy and modern chemistry are the products of different activities, which employ different

18 Gaston Bachelard, *Le rationalisme appliqué* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986 [1949]), p. 123.

19 Gaston Bachelard, "Idéalisme discursif," in *Études* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970 [1934-35])., pp. 91-92. Bachelard also uses the term 'orthopsychism' in *Le rationalisme appliqué*, p. 67.

20 Bachelard, *La formation de l'esprit scientifique: contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective*, Chapter 7: "Psychanalyse du Réaliste".

21 Ibid., Chapter 10, "Libido et connaissance objective".

mental faculties; they cannot be discussed together, if not to show their heterogeneity.

By contrast, when Bachelard describes imaginative activities, he operates strictly within a snapshot approach to the past. Imagination in his view does not have a history in the sense of narrative or development. Imagination does not change. At the beginning of *La psychanalyse du feu* he himself explains why a narrative approach to his subject matter would have been impossible:

> To draw up a plan of human errors is an enterprise impossible of fulfilment. It is particularly difficult in the case of a task like ours, which cannot be treated on the historical plan because the conditions that led to reverie in the past have not been eliminated by contemporary scientific education. Even the scientist, when not practising his speciality, returns to the primitive scale of values. Thus it would be a vain undertaking to trace the historical development of a thought which has always countered to the teaching of the history of science. Instead we shall devote part of our efforts to showing that reverie takes up the same primitive themes time and again and always operates as it would in primitive minds [...].[22]

It is one of Bachelard's aims to show that imagination does not evolve, and that its works do not have a history in the sense of narrative. For him history of poetry, opinion and any inquiry before the nineteenth century is a 'history' only in the sense in which historians of philosophy like Robin or Bréhier talked about history of philosophy, that is, as a repository of texts the date of which is of secondary importance. Obviously, the crucial difference between them and Bachelard is that Bachelard regarded most of the historians of philosophy's primary sources as works of imagination rather than rationality.

The part of the mind that for Bachelard is responsible for poetry, art, opinion, in brief anything which for him is not rational and scientific, is our unchanging 'primitive' self. Bachelard intended to investigate it, and turned to the discipline that studied traditional societies, or 'primitives', according to the terminology of the time: ethnology. He read in particular Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's and James G. Frazer's works. Bachelard subscribed

22 Bachelard, *La psychanalyse du feu.*, p. 15, Engl. tr.: Gaston Bachelard, *The Psychoanalysis of Fire* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 4.

to Lévy-Bruhl's theory that there is a primitive way of thinking that exhibits a different way of organizing data from the modern way. What counted as 'primitive' for Bachelard was very inclusive indeed, and corresponded to his category of pre-scientific. All which is not science is for Bachelard the expression of our primitive self. This means that for him all cultures have been primitive until the beginning of the nineteenth century. More importantly, he did not agree with Lévy-Bruhl that the primitive mentality had disappeared in modern societies. On the contrary, he thought that the primitive way of thinking was still with modern people; this was the imaginative approach to one's objects, informed by desire rather than rationality, and expressed in reverie and poetry. Without this primitive way of thinking, for Bachelard, there would not be poetry and art.

Since the emergence of science, for Bachelard, however, the primitive and scientific ways of thinking have applied and should apply to different spheres of life. The primitive way of thinking should be exercised within the private sphere of reverie, poetry and art, whereas the scientific way in the public sphere of rational inquiry. This distinction between private and public spheres is crucial in Bachelard's project, and partly it explains why, although he employed ethnology and sociology, ultimately he rejected them as ways of analysing imagination, or the primitive part of the mind. Both ethnology and sociology focussed on social practices. For Bachelard, the roots of non-scientific mentality are to be found in the unconscious, which for him is only superficially touched by historical and social circumstances. The images, desires, fears and dreams caused by fire, water, earth or air – the four elements of ancient cosmology to which Bachelard dedicated five books[23] – are for him inscribed in the human psyche, rather than the result of specific cultural and social situations, or worse, of practical needs. He was particularly critical of Frazer, whose interpretation of the fire festivals of Europe he rather simplified. In Bachelard's eyes, Frazer based his explanation on the utility of these fire festivals, by pointing out that the ashes would be used to fertilize fields. It is while discussing Frazer that Bachelard declares that there is 'the

23 Bachelard, *La psychanalyse du feu,* Gaston Bachelard, *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté. Essai sur l'imagination de la matière* (Paris: Corti, 1992 [1947]), Gaston Bachelard, *La terre et les rêveries du repos. Essai sur les images de l'intimité* (Paris: Corti, 1992 [1948]), Gaston Bachelard, *L'air et les songes. Essai sur l'imagination du mouvement* (Paris: Corti, 1972 [1943]), Gaston Bachelard, *L'eau et les rêves. Essai sur l'imagination de la matière* (Paris: Corti, 1942).

necessity for correcting the sociologist's interpretation by a psychoanalytical interpretation'[24].

For Bachelard, non-scientific texts should be read as expressions of a timeless primitive mentality, which should be analysed in its own right, rather than as the result of socio-historical circumstances. Psychoanalysis provided that, and psychoanalysis had also a therapeutic programme, which was crucial to Bachelard's project in the late Thirties and beyond. This is because Bachelard wanted not only to describe the way in which knowledge obtained, but also to advocate the advancement of rationality and the separation of rationality and imagination. Bachelard not only wanted to say how science is, but also how science should be; not only to narrate how modern science emerged and developed, but also to indicate the way to make our knowledge advance even more. He wrote in La *psychanalyse du feu* that:

> Our aim will be as follows: to cure the mind of its happy illusions, to free it from the narcissism caused by the first contact with the object, to give it assurances other than mere possession, and powers of conviction other than mere warmth and enthusiasm, in short, to give the mind proofs that are not as unsubstantial as flames! [25]

I will not discuss here how Bachelard interprets psychoanalysis, if not to say that his is a very personal interpretation of it, aimed mostly at intellectual and moral reform. What interests me here is the epistemological break that Bachelard establishes between rational and non-rational activities, and their difference with regard to history. In his *Le matérialisme rationnel* (1953) Bachelard advocates a 'complete separation of rational life and oneiric life,' and 'a double life, that of the nocturnal man and of the diurnal man, double basis of a complete anthropology.'[26]

If we take the meaning of history as narrative, that is, as development and change, only the scientific mind for Bachelard has a history. History of science and history of the mind are equivalent in Bachelard's philosophy. This I find to be one of the most interesting aspects of

24 Bachelard, *La psychanalyse du feu*, p. 68.
25 Ibid., p. 16, Engl. tr.: Bachelard, *The Psychoanalysis of Fire*, p. 4.
26 Gaston Bachelard, *Le matérialisme rationnel* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972 [1953]), p. 19.

Bachelard's philosophy. Science for Bachelard is a social activity, which comes out of the dialectical interactions of individuals, of minds and objects, of theory and technology. Following Bachelard's philosophy, we could write a social history of science, while we could not write a social history of the works of imagination; indeed, no history of the works of imagination could be written at all. Science for Bachelard is true knowledge, but this for him does not mean that its goals are achieved once and for all, or that its truths are eternal. Science is change and activity rather than a system of truths. Bachelard's history of science is normative, because he adopts a norm by which he judges what is science and what is not. However, this norm is given by current science, and current science today is obviously not what it will be tomorrow. As a consequence, history of science as reconstructed by current science changes too. This history reconstructed from the point of current science is what Bachelard called sanctioned history.[27] In this way, even the content of history of science will change with the advancement of science.

For Bachelard the advancement of science is crucial because it develops rationality, objectivity and the collaboration between individual minds. In this way, the advancement of science would foster the overcoming of subjectivity and ultimately selfishness. For Bachelard, it was not just a matter of scientific progress, but of moral improvement. The message at the core of Bachelard's separation between imagination and rationality, poetry and science, private and public space, and subjectivity and objectivity is in my view a moral and pedagogical one.[28] Bachelard aimed to show that there is an epistemological rupture between opinion and the works of the imagination on the one hand, and science and the works of rationality on the other. However, this rupture does not only pertain to knowledge. Bachelard says that what is needed is a 'conversion', a change in values and a pedagogical break. He is not interested in the advancement of science for its own sake, but in the advancement of what he regards as scientific values, first of all objectivity, understood as an overcoming of private interests and desires. Science for Bachelard presupposes and develops collaboration between individuals that is informed by shared interests rather than individual

27 Gaston Bachelard, *L'activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), Chapter 1.

28 This is one of the main theses of my book on Bachelard: Cristina Chimisso, *Gaston Bachelard: Critic of Science and the Imagination, Routledge Series in Twentieth-century Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

power. He certainly represents this collaboration as conflictual, but the conflict is aimed at communal and objective goals. Not by chance Bachelard insists on the fact that the space of science is a public space, not belonging to anyone in particular; this space is the city, as the shared space, which is heterogeneous, and in which differences co-exists and interact.[29]

Bachelard's representation of science is based on a radical difference between science and the works of imagination. But is this difference acceptable? I think that Bachelard offers insights into the historical and social character of science, and of knowledge in general, and on the historical character of the mind. However, I am rather sceptical about Bachelard's representation of opinion, art and poetry as the result of the timeless make-up of the human psyche. I am much more inclined to regard the works of imagination in a manner similar to that in which Bachelard sees science, that is, as historical and social realities.

Is there, or should there be, then, any difference between 'science', or mediated knowledge, and other forms of approaching the world around us? There is much to be criticised in Bachelard's representation of science and non-science as two heterogeneous, if dialectically connected, activities, different in the mental faculties they employ, in their objects, in their values, and in their social relationships they presuppose. However, in a profoundly revised form, Bachelard's concept of epistemological rupture between science and opinion can still hold. It can hold, however, only from an epistemological rather than historiographical point of view, and as a regulative ideal rather than an achievable goal. In other words, I do not want even remotely to suggest that the sciences, as historical realities, have displayed that disinterestedness and 'purity' that Bachelard thinks they should aspire to. However, I do think that knowledge is acquired through a reflexive rupture with common sense. The need for a rupture with common sense becomes all the more apparent if we carry out an empirical study of a discipline. I agree with those French philosophers who argued that philosophy needed a laboratory. The study of a discipline makes us less prone to universalise and objectify our own unreflective, 'native' relationship with the object of our knowledge, and with the categories and procedures of this knowledge. The break with our common knowledge appears all the more necessary when we realize that our assumptions, far from being universal, result from our unreflective

29 Bachelard, *Le rationalisme appliqué*, pp, 3, 48; see also pp. 133ff.

approach to objects or ideas and from our social and cultural make-up. This is particularly important for philosophers, historians or sociologists because many objects of our study are not far removed from those of every-day experience, and we always have to guard ourselves from assuming that our native, common-knowledge conception of a certain object does not require further reflection.

References

Anonymous [Bréhier]. "Notre programme." *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* 1, no. 1 (1927): 1-4.

Bachelard, Gaston. "Idéalisme discursif." In *Études*, 87-97. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970 [1934-35].

———. *La formation de l'esprit scientifique: contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective.* Paris: Vrin, 1993 [1938].

———. *La philosophie du non. Essai d'une philosophie du nouvel esprit scientifique.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1940.

———. *La psychanalyse du feu.* 1st ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1949 [1938] (Engl. tr.: *The Psychoanalysis of Fire.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

———. *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté. Essai sur l'imagination de la matière.* Paris: Corti, 1992 [1947].

———. *La terre et les rêveries du repos. Essai sur les images de l'intimité.* Paris: Corti, 1992 [1948].

———. *L'activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951.

———. *L'air et les songes. Essai sur l'imagination du mouvement.* Paris: Corti, 1972 [1943].

———. *Le matérialisme rationnel.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972 [1953].

———. *Le nouvel esprit scientifique.* Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1934.

———. *Le rationalisme appliqué.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986 [1949].

———. *L'eau et les rêves. Essai sur l'imagination de la matière.* Paris: Corti, 1942.

Bergson, Henri. *Creative Evolution.* Mineola, New York: Dover, 1998 [1907].

Brunschvicg, Léon. *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique.* Paris: Alcan, 1922.

Brunschvicg, Léon et al. "Histoire et Philosophie." *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 23 (1923): 145-72.

Canguilhem, Georges. *Études d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences.* Paris: Vrin, 1968.

———. *Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie.* Paris: Vrin, 1977.

Chimisso, Cristina. *Gaston Bachelard: Critic of Science and the Imagination, Routledge Series in Twentieth-century Philosophy.* London and New York: Routledge, 2001.

———. "The Mind and the Faculties: The controversy over 'primitive mentality' and the struggle for disciplinary space at the inter-war Sorbonne." *History of the Human Sciences* 13, no. 3 (2000): 47-68.

———. "The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 34, no. 2 (2003): 297-327.

Guigue, Albert. *La faculté des lettres de l'Université de Paris depuis sa fondation (17 mars 1808) jusqu'au 1er Janvier 1935.* Paris: Alcan, 1935.

"Liste de Sujets de Thèses déposés à la Faculté des Lettres." *Annales de l'Université de Paris* 13 (1938).

Metzger, Hélène. "La méthode philosophique dans l'histoire des sciences." *Archeion* 19 (1937): 204-16.

Rey, Abel. "Avant-propos." *Thalès* 1 (1934): xv-xix.

Pli 16 (2005), 186-208

On Contingency of Datum: Carnap, Husserl, Bachelard

BERNARD BARSOTTI

Let us begin with this hypothesis: the *Aufbau* (1928)[1] is a 'well known' book, which is not properly known. I agree with M. Friedman's judgment[2] that Carnap's *Aufbau* is not a pure phenomenistic manifest as usually presented by Quine[3] and Carnap himself later on: on the contrary the opus is an attempt to converge not only with neo-kantian transcendentalism, but with Husserl's phenomenology.

To put it briefly, what we want to know is what the Carnap of *Aufbau* (1928) and, to a lesser degree, Bachelard, think about the datum, which they consider a mere contingency in front of the activity of science that constructs the truth through necessary propositions, both of them turning their back on sense data, following Descartes' 'abducere mentem a sensibus'. Contingency in both senses, existential and essential: first, as a non-being or inessential being in front of the scientific objects and their purified and legitimated ontology; second, in so far as the sense data include uncertain, moving and irregular states of affairs or relations, in other words, as Kant would have said, mere 'rhapsodic contents'. More particularly, Carnap and Bachelard use different ways to undervalue psychological and subjective contents of experience: the former stresses the necessities of logical theory in *The Logical Structure of the World*; the

1 *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, Berlin, Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928; *The logical structure of the world*, Berkeley and California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967 (*LSW*).

2 M. Friedman, *A parting of the ways: Carnap, Cassirer, Heidegger*, Chicago, Open court, 2000, pp. 70-71.

3 W. V. O. Quine, 'The two dogmas of empiricism', *From a Logical Point of View*, Harvard University Press, 1953.

latter stresses the conceptual acts of the subject of science and the objective penetration of mathematic hypothesis and laws.

On the other hand, and in a somewhat paradoxical situation, Husserl, who could be supposed to neglect the datum or some aspects of it, putting it in parenthesis with the act of epoche, will appear to us as the guardian of a certain consistency and intrinsic regularity of datum at a preconceptual or precategorial level, the lack of which makes it impossible to constitute any scientific truth.

I. Carnap's *Aufbau* and the aporia of affinity

Let us retrace the way in which the *Aufbau*'s project finally faces a difficulty due to Carnap's own conception of datum.

1. The status of datum, especially the sense granted to its possible necessity, is a big issue for philosophy that determines the meaning of knowledge, and even more, the meaning of truth, in so far as human subjectivity is involved in its production.

The *Aufbau* begins like a book by Condillac: the reference to datum is the absolute basis for every concept, every thought. The aim is the 'rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given'. 'In this book I was concerned with the indicated thesis, namely that it is in principle possible to reduce all concepts back to the immediately given'[4]. This declaration of faith in the immediate datum of experience (no matter objective or subjective) strongly contrasts with enterprises such as Bachelard's or Kuhn's, who in different ways deny the epistemological reliability of datum: Bachelard making phenomenology a function of noumenology (despite the nuances I have tried to show in my book *Bachelard as a Critic of Husserl*); Kuhn stressing the essential relativity of datum, the meaning of which carries away in its drift the meaning of theories. Our only purpose is to verify whether Carnap was faithful or not to his own reliance on datum, whether he was able or not to draw from it necessity or consistency.

4 *LSW*,, Preface to the second edition, p. v, p. vi.

A good way into Carnap's strategy is the critique of Kant's synthetic *a priori*[5], for which he claims arguments from two major sources, Russell of course, but also Husserl. All the more as, as we will see, the breaking point of the whole *Aufbau* can be summed up in a confusion between Kantian 'judgment of perception and judgment of experience', as J. Vuillemin very cleverly pointed out[6]. As it is well known the very terms of 'constitution' and 'reduction' are drawn from Husserl, but not only the terms. Carnap draws a parallel and a complementarity between his main Russellian purpose: to apply the 'theory of relations' to 'the reduction of "reality" to the "given"', and Husserl's 'mathesis of lived experiences'[7]. In both cases, one seeks to make *a priori* constitution useless showing that the datum contains the immanent resources able to constitute the object, on condition that we can retrace, as Carnap says, 'the series of constitutional steps which lead to it from the basic objects'[8]. Whether the link between the elementary lived experiences is a logical or an eidetic one, is a big difference, which separates a philosophy that aims to understand the world without 'making any assertion about the objects as individuals' and a philosophy turned on the unique essence of each respective type of reality[9]. But at the level of ontological neutrality beyond realism and idealism where Carnap claims to be, he can argue that for Husserl too, the main philosophical problem is not eidetics but synthesis, not essence but relation, not to decide about existence but to find the authentic rythm of connection, the true steps for filling the gaps along the way from datum to object. To this extent, Carnap may adopt Husserl's style and say:

> At the beginning of the system, the lived experiences must simply be taken as they occur. We shall not claim reality or unreality in connection with these lived experiences; rather, these claims will be 'bracketed' (i.e., we will exercise the phenomenological 'withholding of judgment', epochè, in Husserl's sense.[10]

5 'It is the contention of construction theory that there are no such things as the "synthetic judgments *a priori*"', *LSW*, § 106, p. 176; 'In the view of construction theory, there are no other components in cognition than these two, the conventional and the empirical ; thus, there is no synthetic a priori', *LSW*, § 179, p. 289.

6 J. Vuillemin, *La logique et le monde sensible*, Paris, Flammarion, 1971, p. 259.

7 *LSW*, § 3, pp. 7-9.

8 *LSW*, § 7, p. 12.

9 *LSW*, § 10, p. 19. Everywhere, I modify 'experience' into 'lived experience' (*Erlebnis*).

Carnap is certainly thinking about a parallel between his own theory of relations and Husserl's mereology of parts and wholes, in which certainly relation is at least equal in importance to essence. But such an appropriation is on the whole doubtful. As we can guess, the following assertion, presented as a 'chief conception of the theory of constitution', according to which '*a system of relation is primary relative to its members*'[11] is not exactly convenient with Husserl's position. Especially when the 'fundamental elements' are, as he claims, 'my lived experiences', and 'basic relations' between lived experiences.[12] Such a neutralisation of lived experiences does not sound very Husserlian.

The setting up of Carnap's anti-transcendentalism begins with the topic of 'dematerialization'[13]. As a rough sketch, Carnap will deny ontological function in objectivity, in other words necessity and universality, not only to the natural given object of perception, but to the material part of it, and to the subjectivity which is connected to it : there is only one thing consistent for him : the pure '*structures* of relations' between sense data.[14] So that he will have to compensate the elimination of any transcendental features in knowledge by seeking to establish, like the quest for the Holy Grail, a *formal identity* between the various structures of relations in qualitative datum. This orientation is clearly scheduled with the distinction between 'relations between the sensations', that remains connected to the 'qualitative peculiarity' of elements, as in Poincaré's *Valeur de la science*, and 'structures of relations' between sensations, which are 'formalized'[15]. The whole problematics of the *Aufbau* is confined to the hope of finding a consistency in the datum by purifying it more and more. It is the story of the failure of a too-passionnate, badly run belief in empiricity. Monstration is logically eliminated for the benefit of characterization,

10 *LSW*, § 64, p. 101. See also: Constitution 'must exercise a methodological abstinence as far as the postulating of reality is concerned (*Realsetzung*); thus it is available to use a neutral language', *LSW*, § 53, p. 88. Something truly Husserlian is also the will, in resistant cases (for example spirit), of a 'construction that goes back to the given', § 151, p. 232.

11 *LSW*, § 7, p. 13.

12 *LSW*, § 7, p. 13.

13 *LSW*, § 12, p. 23.

14 *LSW*, § 11, p. 21.

15 *LSW*, § 16, p. 30.

because, 'whatever does not belong to the structure but to the material (i.e., anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive definition), is, in the final analysis, subjective'.[16] Monstration is a perpetual possibility of the indirect characterization of objects, but it is not necessary to truth. 'There is science only of structure', Carnap could say. What is for Husserl an ultimate, that is to say the impressional lived experience with its contents, immanent relations, and constitutive eidetics, is for Carnap reducible to a logical frame supporting a pure, disontologised reference.

'Dematerialization' goes with 'desubjectivization'[17], as in Husserl's hyletic analysis and constitution go with transcendental subjectivity. At this point Carnap pronounces side by side one 'basic thesis of the theory of constitution' and one 'remaining problem' attached to it. The thesis is: 'fundamentally there is ultimately only one object domain', the problem is that of 'intersubjective reality'[18]. This is inevitable with a psychologistic and relativistic interpretation of subject and hyletic datum. Denying that the object of perception is ontologically supported by its hyletic background, is parallel to denying universality in a single subjectivity. Consequently, Carnap's answer to the admission that 'the series of lived experiences are different for each subject', when he says that constitution is independent of this material 'completely divergent content'. That is not enough, because taking away identity from datum, makes it impossible to obtain a real universal subject. So Carnap cannot avoid another question: 'How do entities result which have a structure which is the same for all subjects, even though they are based on such immensely different series of lived experiences?'[19] This 'extremely' is an admission of the transcendental aporia of the *Aufbau*. For why should subjectivities be initially given as 'extremely different', rather than 'reasonably similar'? Though this question is undecidable, Carnap's answer shows a limitation to phenomenist difficulties: if the respective structures of phenomenal subjectivities were too different, he should actually have no means to assert identity between structures of relations in datum. Deprived of any entrance in the structures of datum through hyletic qualities or subjectivity, we understand that Carnap will be obliged to reintroduce a kind of factual necessity, of factual intersubjectivity and universality, through an external way. To this extent, the transcendental shortcoming of

16 *LSW*,§ 16, p. 29.
17 *LSW*, § 16, p. 29.
18 *LSW*, § 16, p. 29.
19 *LSW*,§ 16, p. 29.

Aufbau may be seen as the root motivation for his philosophy of language. On the contrary, Husserl looks for universality in the immanence of datum, in the '*Bathos* of experience'[20] as Kant says, revealing laws of relations that rule esthesiological and inter-esthesiological connnexions.

2. Characterization is an analytic figure of knowledge, since, remarks Carnap, 'through the method of structural definite descriptions, it now becomes possible to assign unique symbols to empirical objects'.[21] Intuition has no real part in science.[22] In a nutshell, we could say that Carnap's *Aufbau* offers a *negative* epistemology, not really a theory of cognition, but a theory of *re*-cognition! Yet, things are a little more complicated. Despite Carnap's rejection of a 'material synthetic *a priori*' in Husserl's style, we could more easily establish a grouping of Husserl and Carnap against Bachelard, than any other one. This depends on two reasons, which are basically convergent: first, say the thesis of continuity; second, say the primacy of the psychic. Let us look at a sentence like this:

> Statements about physical objects which are not immediately about sensory qualities can be reduced to statements that are. If a physical object were irreducible to sensory qualities and thus to psychological objects, this would mean that there are no perceptible indicators for it. Statements about it would be suspended in the void.[23]

Apart from vocabulary, it could be attributed to Husserl, certainly not to Bachelard. As Husserl does, Carnap uses the term indication or indicative sign (*Kennzeichnen*), which here conveys an essential, be it discrete, continuity between perceptual object and scientific object, when Bachelard, on the contrary, stresses the break between them. For truth, it is the whole problem of the *phenomenology* of physical object which is posed here. As is well known, Carnap makes a stark opposition between 'logical value' which is aimed at by constitution, and 'epistemic value', which is purely psychological.[24] In this view, reducibility of indirectly sensitive physical objects to sensible qualities takes place entirely on the

20 To quote Kant : *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward a science*, Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1997, Appendix II, note.
21 *LSW*, § 15, p. 27-28.
22 *LSW*, § 49, p. 82.
23 *LSW*, § 57, p. 92.
24 *LSW*,, § 57, p. 84.

side of logical constitution. But this aspect crosses with another consideration, that of the right restitution, of the right 'translation' of cognitive value by logical value[25]: and this gap is exactly the place Bachelard calls for, and Husserl too to some extent (phenomenology). Carnap is far from indifferent to this problem, that, in Bachelard's words, of unperceptuality of the object of phenomenotechnique.[26] Indeed, Carnap is as much further from Husserl's integration of qualities in the physical constitution of the physical object as we find it in *Ideen I*[27], but he has real exigencies of convergence of logical and cognitive, in a much stronger sense than Bachelard's pedagogism, and with a general intention which is very close to Husserl's continuism. Carnap would not disregard the ideal, as he calls it, of 'reproducing exactly, by a setting in order of the objects, the cognitive relationship'.[28] Although he rejects 'metaphysically' 'positivism' and 'sensualism', he methodologically looks in their direction and often refers to Mach's phenomenism.[29]

This first nearness between Carnap and Husserl is obviously strengthened by the choice of the psychic basis of constitution against the physical basis. The reason for it being no other than the *phenomenological* performance of this basis, that is to say its ability to restitute the psychological, let's say, the anthropological value of scientific objects. Carnap's choice is not a formal choice within the large alternative of materialism and psychologism. It is derived from a clear consciousness, close to Husserl's analysis, that sensible datum can be taken from two sides, an objective one, and a subjective one, so that a consideration of something like a 'correlation' is at least implicit in his mind. There is no

25 *LSW*, § 50, p. 84. 'The constitution is not a mere fiction, but a rational reconstruction of actual processes', *LSW*, § 94, p. 150. From case to case, is 'this viewpoint allows and even requires deviations of the construction from this actual process of cognition', *LSW*, § 143, p. 221.

26 See the general assertion : 'Construction theory and subjective idealism agree with one another in the claim that statements about objects of cognition can in principle, all be transformed into statements about structural properties of the given', § 177, p. 285.

27 *Ideen pertaining to a transcendental phenomenology and a pure phenomenological philosophy, I*, The Hague-London, Nijhoff, 1982, § 40.

28 *LSW*, § 59, p. 134 ; § 67, p. 144. 'The most important reason for this lies in our intention to have the constructional system reflect not only the logical constructional order of the objects, but also their epistemic order', *LSW*, § 64, p. 101.

29 *LSW*, § 60, p. 96-97.

symmetry, choice is not arbitrary: the subjective approach of constitution gives best guarantees both for logical constitution and for phenomenology. Carnap affirms both: the individual psychic basis, he says, can 'follow the direction of cognitive connexion'; 'It is possible to have', he says too, 'a constructional system with a psychicological basis'. Carnap's empiricism in *Aufbau* goes with a mistrust in materialistic atomism. What is reliable in datum, is not its non-subjective part, but the part which is in connection with psychic lived experiences. Carnap thinks that if we want to escape relativism, it is not towards the materialistic myth of a pure physical basis that we have to turn, but towards the objective *qualia* as internally, psychically given. Not surprisingly Carnap is in order to sustain eventual Husserlian pretentions : our 'construction of physical objects from sense qualities', he says, 'doesn't amount to a psychologizing of the physical'.[30]

3. Let us look closer now at what Carnap calls the fundamental field of 'the given'.[31] What is its place and function in the constitution? Carnap's purpose is a paradoxical but conscious intention to use the notion of datum, yet taking it as something neutral, as a 'degré zéro', as a radical contingency regarding knowledge. Two theses are well known about the components of datum: 1. its elements are 'undecomposable', 'simple, indivisible lived experiences'[32], 'indivisible unities' that have no properties 'otherwise characters would be attributed to them, what is contradictory with their concept'[33]; 2. its 'fundamental relations' are '*undefined* fundamental concepts', and are eventually to be '*eliminated*'.[34] What we just want to show is that Carnap cannot succeed completely in this neutralization, and that against his will datum poses its rights. Let us quote a sentence that in our view bears symbolically the whole difficulty Carnap is entangled in: 'If the basic elements were given as coexisting *without proprieties* and without relation then no, constructional step, through which we could advance beyond them would be possible'.[35] If we look accurately at this sentence, we can see in it the seeds of a contradiction with one *Aufbau* principle, yet recalled in the same paragraph: 'The basic

30 *LSW*, § 152, p. 234.

31 *LSW*, § 64, p. 138.

32 *LSW*, § 63, p. 100, § 65, p. 104.

33 *LSW*, § 69, p. 111.

34 *LSW*, § 61, p. 98 ; § 155, p. 237. Let us remember that 'undefined' objects or concepts are 'non logical', *LSW*, § 153, p. 235.

35 *LSW*, § 61, pp. 98-99.

relations take precedent over the basic elements which are their members'.[36] If the core problem Carnap wants to resolve in *Aufbau*, is to discover the originary relations that could affect or determine *a minima* the ontology of fundamental elements of datum, just enough for them to function successfully in constitution, we can ask to what extent elements can associate without any intrinsic property of associability. In other words: is not a theory that claims to set real relations between elements without any ontological intrinsic determination of them, but only extrinsic, a philosophical artifice? Thence we make an amazing discovery right in the core of a cold doctrine that has taken for its basic method a stark separation between 'property description' and 'relations description'[37]: and it is, that *Aufbau* is connected to the warm problem of *affinity*, not as an empirical but as a transcendental problem, and for very similar reasons to those that urge Kant to face this notion in his first version of the Transcendental Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as we have tried to show in a paper 'What is transcendental affinity?'[38]. Originary elements must not be absolutely neutral, if we want to find out originary relations. Something strange such as 'proprieties of relations' should be considered. Indeed, Carnap knows about them as 'essential relations', but rejects them as belonging to 'metaphysics'.[39] Affinity, as far as it is not assumed to be a feature of datum, provokes an uncontrolled dialectic of *substance* and *relation* in philosophical thought. From now on we can follow embarrassments induced by this root contradiction of *Aufbau*, which is in explicit terms a *transcendental denial of necessity of datum*, as an existence, and as an essence.

These are not marginal difficulties in *Aufbau*, but central ones, that corrupt the original methodological device of the 'quasi-analysis'. Let us compare two texts in order to make clear the gap between the ideality and reality of *Aufbau*.

> we mentioned as one of our basic tenets, that the indivudual constructions of an elementary experience do not stand out in the individual experience, but are gained only through abstraction, namely , by placing the experience into orders

36 *LSW*, § 61, p. 99.
37 *LSW*, § 10, p. 19.
38 B. Barsotti, 'Qu'est-ce que l'affinité transcendantale?', *Philosophie*, 1999 / 63, 'Kant', pp. 31-54.
39 *LSW*, § 161, p. 248.

> which comprise other experiences also. An indivudual experience taken by itself is inanalyzable ; *lived experiences, taken as a manifold, can be compared and ordered, and only through their order result the (quasi) constituents of the individual lived experiences.*[40]

Now, can this technique of quasi-analysis be identified with transcendental idealism as Carnap claims?

> Construction theory agrees with transcendental idealism in the conception that all objects of cognition are constructed (in idealistic language, "are created in thought") [...]. Ultimately this holds for the basic elements of the constructional system. Even though these basic elements are initially introduced as unanalyzable units, eventually, in the progress of construction, different proprieties are attributed to them, and they are analysed into (quasi) constituents.[41]

For truth, what a strange appropriation of the transcendental! A transcendental philosopher would call such a description a dogmatic one, because transcendental philosophy never closes its eyes on what comes out of the other side of correlation, never neutralizes the content (*Bestand*) of *noem*, the 'life' of *hylè*, in front of eidetics or logics. And phenomenogical transcendental idealism is no more — and claims to be *less* — dogmatic than Kant's transcendental idealism.

In this light, a second aspect of constitution can be analysed as a strategy imposed by Carnap's intial opacification of datum, rather than necessary philosophical choice. Carnap wants a *pure* datum, namely: a pure 'stream of lived experiences'[42]: that is to say, a 'psychological' given[43] related to no subject intending to it, to no subjectivity made of its material. 'Lived experiences must be taken as they are given', says Carnap; and he proceeds: 'the given does not have a subject[44] One "subjectless" given means that the sentence "my lived experiences" is neutral: 'Egocentricity is not an original property of the basic elements, of

40 *LSW*, § 93, p. 149. Italics by R. C.
41 *LSW*, § 177, p. 285.
42 *LSW*, § 64, p. 102.
43 *LSW*, § 60, p. 97.
44 *LSW*,§ 64, p. 101 ; § 65, pp. 103-106.

the given'.[45] A relation to an I is a relation to exteriority that would confer on datum a form of propriety of relation, that would alter the invisibility and simplicity of the elements of datum, which *Aufbau* denies. Carnap considers indeed that phenomenological descriptions are the closest to the immanence of datum, and that the reason why his real opponent in these pages is Husserl, whose description he rejects namely the 'transcendental subject' and the 'correlation between object and subject'[46]. But Husserl is not immanent enough. Carnap wants not only depsychologisation like Bachelard, but absolute desubjectivisation. Now here is the philosophical choice :either one agrees to find and establish the *relative solidity* of datum within the internal relation between a subjectivity and its datum, or one wants *absolute* solidity, so he rejects this *I*-relation and must abandon the logic of relation to enter the logic of proprieties and especially proprieties of relation. This situation is probably an expression of what can be called the *finitude* of human knowledge, not necessarily scepticism. And such is Carnap's aporia: he would like to avoid relativism (and what he calls 'subjectivism'[47]), not entering the internal proprieties of datum. For Husserl, on the contrary, connection to subjecitivity is the only way we can establish *a priori* regulations, which cannot be a-subjective regulations of datum, but *esthesiological* regulations of a datum *a priori* connected to a subject. Subjectivity is, paradoxically, the price to pay to get something firm in datum. In other words, there is no *mechanical connectivity* in datum, as Hume believed. Datum is impressional, and there is no way to find out the impressional rules or regularities outside an impressional subjectivity: this does not expose Husserl to subjectivist relativism any more than Carnap's 'neutral' impressionalism.

Look how contradictory *Aufbau*'s §66 is, as an inevitable consequence of his transcendental denial. Carnap claims to focus only on the formal proprieties of datum, on the pure logical relations it bears, but his argumentation is mediated by intersubjectivity, a relation which he defines as an 'essential propriety of the "reality"': relational proprieties seem to wander until they find a shelter. Let us quote:

> The solution to this problem lies in the fact that, even though, the material of the individual streams of lived experience is

45 *LSW*, § 65, pp. 104-105. He is not the only one to turn Husserl's phenomenology into a-subjectivity.
46 *LSW*, § 65, p. 105 ; § 66, p. 107
47 *LSW*, § 66, p. 142.

> completely different, or rather altogether, incomparable, since a comparison of two sensations or two feelings of different subjects, as far as their immediately given qualities are concerned, is absurd, certain *structural properties* are analogous for all streams of experience.[48]

Such a presentation illustrates the dismantling of what transcendental phenomenology tries to unify and make cooperate: the gap between *material* and *relational* features of datum, the gap between subjectivity and its impression, the gap between impressional subjectivities. Carnap indicates the two sources of *Aufbau*: 'positivism' and 'neo-kantism' but he does not offer us a real, internal, non dogmatic synthesis of the two aspects of knowledge.[49]

4. The whole method of quasi-analysis, that could also be called a pseudo-synthesis, is derived from, says Carnap, a 'special difficulty'[50], which is in our view the aporia of affinity. Elementary data, that is to say lived experiences, have no propriety at all, they are given in point forum, 'punctual'[51], undecomposable, so that no analysis can distinghish in one datum an aspect that could be helpful for entering an external connection: they are, so to speak, unpredictable. Hence an indirect predication by 'synthetic'[52] means: elementary data shall have the proprieties, or shall be supposed to have the 'quasi-characteristic'[53], induced in them as 'products of the method' — and it is really an abstractive induction in the sense of Frege-Russell's 'principle of abstraction'[54] — by the necessities of being members of such and such 'relations'[55]. Once the conversion from lived experiences to 'classes'[56] of lived experiences is made, no way back to phenomenology is possible. *Aufbau* seems to follow from now on a sort of

48 *LSW*, § 66, p. 143.
49 'Positivism has demonstrated that the unique material of knowledge lies in the datum in its natural state, as it is lived; there must be looked for the basic elements of the system of constitution. But transcendental idealism, especially the neo-kantian stream (Rickert, Cassirer, Bauch), has stressed with good reason that these elements are not enough ; to pose an order, that is to say our "fundamental relations"', *LSW*, § 75, p. 157.
50 *LSW*, § 68, p. 109.
51 *LSW*, § 69, p. 111.
52 *LSW*, § 68, p. 110 ; § 69, p. 111.
53 *LSW*, § 71, p. 116.
54 *LSW*, § 69, p. 110.
55 *LSW*, § 69, p. 111 ; § 74, p. 120.
56 *LSW*, § 75, p. 124.

schizoid way: on the one hand, the choice of the basic relation as 'recall of resemblance' is declared to be based on pure arguments of 'convenience' and efficacity for logical constitution, not at all on phenomenological interest in the 'psychology of cognition' of the 'factual' giveness of objects[57]. On the other hand, the massive phenomenological implication of such a basic relation cannot be eclipsed, since it settles the dimension of *time* in the core of logical constitution, in a sense very close to Husserl's idea of '*retention*' — perhaps the major, most decisive *Aufbau* borrowing from phenomenology. 'The Recall of resemblance', says Carnap, is the 'comparison of a memory representation' of a lived experience with a 'more ancient' one, not only in the sense of 'reproduction', but also of 'retention of a just preceding lived experience, for example, a perception which has not vanished, but still "has vivid aftereffects"'.[58] This pragmatic contradiction expresses the insufficiencies of Carnap's concept of synthesis, or generally speaking, of its articulation of logic on phenomenology. Introducing subjective time in logical constitution is a valuable challenge, Carnap did not take up. In the sense of J. Vuillemin, we can say that Carnap has not made clear how temporal 'dissymmetry' articulates with logical 'symmetry'.[59] So Cl. Imbert roughly concludes: Carnap wanted to 'outstrip neo-Kantism by missing out the step of subjective synthesis'.[60]

Actually it is most interesting to see how close *Aufbau* §100 is to an analysis by Husserl in, for example, *Cartesian Meditations*, the difference being that Carnap accepts as a non-problematic fact a cleavage, the synthesis of which will be in Husserl the core of phenomenology. Like Husserl, Carnap separates within the perceptual object a *derivated* and an *originary* part: 'The "datum" never exists in the consciousness in the state of a pure, untreated material, but always already within more or less complex combinations and configurations'. The 'object formation', Carnap adds, is a 'synthesis of cognition' that 'takes place intuitively'.[61] So that the right question is: 'What has actually been seen in the lived

57 *LSW*, § 75, p. 123 ; § 78, p. 127.
58 *LSW*, § 78, p. 128.
59 J. Vuillemin says : 'It is no more a matter of the relation of the phenomena to supposed objects out of experience, but of the relation of the phenomena to their condition of possibility in the flow of experience', *La logique et le monde sensible*, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
60 Cl. Imbert, *Phénoménologies et langues formulaires*, Paris, P. U. F., 1992, p. 55.
61 *LSW*, § 100, p. 158.

experience of recognition, and what belongs to its aperceptive treatment?', in order to separate in the 'entire conscious process' 'the pure given and the synthesis'.[62] That is largely convenient with Husserl's distinction between 'originary institution (*Urstiftung*)' and 'acquired convictions'.[63] Now, on this basis, Husserl is looking for rules of an *a priori* synthesis in the immanence of consciousness, sustaining such a derivated construction, since Carnap easily accepts a disconnection between the processes, being the connection between intuitive or phenomenological constitution and logical constitution, a matter of formal indication (*Kennzeichnung*). Here on one point we find some common ground between Husserl, Carnap and Bachelard. All three agree that datum in itself must be differentiated in levels, not be taken as a unidimensional datum: the sense of 'regions' in Husserl, the sense of 'pure' and 'constructed' in Carnap, the sense of 'first' and 'second phenomenality' in Bachelard. There is, to echo Husserl, something non relative sealed in the core of the 'subjective relative'[64], of the intuitive datum. But Husserl goes all the way: only for him this difference in level goes up to a radical consisting level of the datum: not, as we have seen, an absolute one, but a necessary one in the finitude of knowledge, which necessarily sustains the scientific phenomenology of perceptual consciousness, and makes it not a mere 'rational reconstruction'[65], as Carnap claims, but a real synthesis, the synthesis of the 'things in themselves'. Here, Bachelard would probably be standing back regarding Carnap, but it is a mere impression: because if he poses the problem of the reduction, from top to bottom, and not the problem of constitution, from bottom to top, that is, the step from phenomenotechnique to perceptively given objects, in fact his own silence is not so different from Carnap's failure.

Carnap's synthesis can be called a *weak* synthesis, unable to make the two series of phenomenological data and of logical components converge in one and the same "thing in itself". After this lucid topography of the structure of what *should* be a real phenomenological synthesis of the objects of human experience, begins what we can call the decline of *Aufbau*, that expands from the introduction of a compensatory *postulate*

62 *LSW*, § 100, p. 158.
63 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1977, § 38, pp. 65-67.
64 Husserl, *The Krisis of european sciences and the transcendental phenomenology*, Evanston, Northwestern U. P., 1970, § 9.
65 'L'analyse est une reconstruction, pas une pénétration', says J. Vuillemin, *La logique et le monde sensible*, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

(§135), to the final *elimination* of the fundamental relations (§153). How subtle Carnap's position about quality-quantity connection is! He does not merely reject outright a phenomenological consideration in the style of Goethe's *Theory of Colours*, which aims to 'remain within the domain of the sense qualities and to ascertain the regularities which hold between them'.[66] But he remarks that, for such qualitative intrinsic rules, they would be 'of a much more complicated nature than the laws of physics'[67]: hence, too complex to be investigated, in a word, inaccessible. Here is the paradoxical lack of confidence of the empirist in the datum. Better to stipulate, and so he does, a 'physical-qualitative correlation', based, as a pure *dogmatist* would claim, on a double postulate about the *uniformity* of nature, which finally removes any trace of transcendentalism in *Aufbau*'s problematisation: 'postulate of causality' and 'postulate of substance'. The logical way is not only, as Carnap says, 'much more simple'[68]: it is the only one. It is very puzzling for philosophical reflexion, and very significant about the essential proximity of what for a century we have opposed as continental and analytic philosophy, how narrow the room is for deciding on transcendental or linguistic ways, for internal or external investigation. And the *Aufbau* is an illuminating illustration of this fact, since in the text we have before our eyes an occurrence of this philosophical fracture. What a pity, we could say, after seeing the phenomenological necessity of the *temporalized* fundamental relation 'resemblance', to eventually give up using it for logical constitution. Logical empiricism, deeply grounded as it is in *Aufbau*, is very near indeed to transcendental phenomenology.

'Simplicity', 'univocity'[69] of datum: such terms are used by Carnap in the following as ungrounded evidence, leaving universality and necessity of datum as a dogma from now on. Contradictions are inevitable: a few pages before abandoning any phenomenological reference to consisting fundamental relations, as a useless grounding for extensional truth, Carnap acknowledges against his will the phenomenological function of datum, when he remarks that for the constitution of a specific object, we must refer not only to 'the given itself', but he says, 'more precisely', 'through the inventory (*Bestand*) of the basic relation'.[70]. 'Bestand': a term dear to phenomenology, that makes us recognize the interval between the logically

66 *LSW*, § 136, p. 209.
67 *LSW*, § 136, p. 210.
68 *LSW*, § 135, p. 209 ; § 136, p. 210.
69 *LSW*, § 136, p. 210 ; § 143, p. 221.

'undefined'[71], contingent relation and the essential, necessary relation, that the synthesis really needs. The paradox is not only that empiricists are not confident enough in datum, but that rationalists, more or less transcendentalist, are *more* confident in datum than empiricists. Hence, (1) even the Humian 'rules of association' were to be cancelled by the evolution of empiricism in the twentieth century; (2) that rationalism was to turn into phenomenology in order to seek a *finite* but necessary solidity of datum within its attachment to a subjectivity. With Husserl, necessity is *transcendental* necessity: that means, it is generated in and by the relation of the subject to datum, not before, and so, in a temporalized way. Facing this enormous difficulty, the deep problematisation in *Aufbau* ends with the failed attempts to eliminate the fundamental relation. The last word, so to speak, is not exactly the elimination of the problem, but its admission (§154) that we cannot 'consider the problem as already solved'.[72] The achievement of *Aufbau* needs the transformation of basic relations into logical concepts, in other words: the attempt to empty the datum of any valuable component, of any structure that could play a role in truth. What Carnap calls ' *extralogical* object domain'[73] is such a dead datum. He achieves the tour de force of interpreting the fundamental relation as 'relation founded' on 'natural' relation of the 'lived experiences'[74], and to define this connection as a matter of 'formal logic'.[75] On this final, unresolved contradiction, the *Aufbau* closes.

II. Husserl and the transcendental necessity of datum

1. A distinction must be made between datum before and after 1907. Before, Husserl defends a representational theory of consciousness, since he considers the sense data or hyletic data as neutral mental contents, non intentional ones, which receive intentional animation, and, in fact, any kind of intentional interpretation or act of meaning. In a word, his first descriptive psychology in *Logical Investigations* is strongly congruent

70 *LSW*, § 144, p. 239. Carnap accepts the idea of 'the inherent nature of the given', § 169, p. 278.
71 *LSW*, § 153, p. 222.
72 *LSW*, § 154, p. 237.
73 *LSW*, § 154, p. 237.
74 *LSW*, § 154, p. 236.
75 *LSW*, § 154, p. 237.

with the thesis of the contingency of datum. That looks like a sort of youthful misdemeanour of the theory of intentionality as a native aptitude of consciousness. After 1907, transcendental phenomenology will paradoxically admit more necessity in the hyletic datum as regards its link with operative acts of mind. That, basically, because hyletic datum is no longer considered as an external, static component of consciousness, but as internal, involved in the life of consciousness. It is to be noticed, nevertheless, that the representational contingency of datum was already in full contradiction with another discovery of early Husserl, that of mereology of parts and wholes in non-independent contents, which brings out the non causal relation of consciousness with the parts of the phenomena, but the non parallelistic *a priori* correlation of intentionality. The third and fourth *Logical Investigations* are, as Husserl claimed, the matrices of transcendental phenomenology itself, more precisely, in our present consideration, of the *necessity* of datum, as a transcendental component of mind, relative to the intentional constitution of the objects. The necessity of datum is conveyed through a non causal, non parallelistic relation mind/object, which is to be understood as a modern way for transcendental deduction. It is to be stressed that the necessity of datum in terms of eidetic laws appears at the same time with another theoretical transformation, in which the datum changes its status of empirical, psychological, subjective-related *sense data*, into a piece on the transcendental chessboard.

2. Carnap's rejection of Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgments is well known. Yet, he remains in a Kantian's prospect since he tries to add to the Einsteinian and logical positivist distinction between formal space and physical space a third one, an intuitive space, as an autonomous spring for synthetic *a priori* knowledge in geometry at a non-Euclidian level, according to the claims of Einteinian relativity and Quantum Mechanics. As we know, he was helped in his intuitional overtaking of Kantism by explicit reference (*Der Raum*, 1922) to Husserl's *Wesensschau*. Unfortunately this reference is not appropriate, because Carnap fails to combine, as is predictable, Husserlian eidetic and Kantian empirical intuitionism. What he gains in terms of totality and infinity of space, he loses in terms of syntheticity. His error[76] consists in this fact, that he does

76 R. Jagnow, 'Carnap, Husserl et l'idée d'une géométrie matérielle', in eds. D. Fisette and S. Lapointe, Paris, Vrin, 2003, p. 49 ss. 'La notion d'espace intuitif de Carnap fait en sorte que la géométrie matérielle se dissout dans la géométrie formelle'.

not really derive infinite space on the basis of intuitable parts or regions, neither in the sense of Euclidian experience nor in that of eidetic idealisation of it, but that he does construct a formal infinite space in sense of Hilbertian formalism.

Husserl's solution is quite different. For Husserl, the infinite space is not first an axiomatic one, but a constitutive, originary implication of the intuition of spatial objects. The '*Fernsphäre*' of the non orientated space is involved as a pure possibility of the '*Nahsphäre*', in the body-orientated space. So that it must not be constructed by generalisation, so that it retains an intuitive signification. As in Kant, infinite space is immanent to the datum. Kant says: 'space is a given infinite quantum'. Husserl seems to be superior to Kant on this point: because the intuitive ground of the intuitive space is not the mere Euclidian geometry of our natural perception, but the transcendental possibility of our free 'I move', which stands for a general power of *Entperspektivierung*, as B. Rang says[77], deperspectivisation, providing a chance for any logical or formal space, and a concrete, even if very distant, basis for the axiomatic possibilities of space.

We must pay attention to the kind of interpretation of hyletic data we choose. Two common errors must be avoided, due to the representational misunderstanding of Husserl's intentionality[78]. First, hyletic datum is non-intentional and so non-related to transcendence; second it is shapeless and meaningless, and gets shape and meaning through the acts of noetic intentionality. This interpretation could be worked out picking up various quotations, and stressing early Husserl's texts. Meanwhile, the real story is that Husserl, from the lectures on time consciousness of 1907, involved sense data in intentional life-consciousness, as an intentional moment of our connexion to the world. In other words, the intentional connexion between sense data and datum is a part of the universal correlational *a priori*, so that the eidetic necessities of the hyletic flow are strictly connected to the eidetic necessities of the datum as giveness of wordly qualia. The datum bears transcendental necessities inside the facticity of its givenness.

Carnap's theoretical denial of the necessity of datum is logically completed by a pragmatic denial: he sought to establish a logical

77 B. Rang, *Kausalität und Motivation*, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1973, p. 206.
78 D. Zahavi, *Husserl's phenomenology*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 107.

behaviourism which would not be exposed to the criticism focused on Watson's methodological behaviourism. The intentional mental states are not to be ontologically denied, but they can be reduced or translated into observational, physicalist propositions. To this extent, it is doubtful that Carnap shall escape the argument Wittgenstein focused against behaviourism in general: the observational, visual datum, for instance, can be ambiguous, as is well known through the famous example of the drawing of the rabbit and the cane, and must be supplied by mental actions.[79] We can say more: too much denial of meaningfulness of datum is the best way to be constrained to switch to robust idealism. Conversely, looking for pre-predicative degrees of sense in sensual datum is a transcendental attitude which could be shared by both empiricism and idealism, following the way opened by Husserl in *Ideen II*, *Experience and Judgment*, or the *Krisis*.

3. Let us regard that the necessity of datum, more exactly of something necessary in the core of the factual datum, is in general a feature of transcendentalist rationalism, visible in Husserl, but heralded by Kant himself, the philosopher of the "diversity of sense data", in his last *Critique*, which is on this point a limited but true surpassing of the latent atomism of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* The validity of subjective necessity as a result of transcendental reflexion of the faculties on their sensible datum, is not only based on the intersubjective agreement in the common sense, but more deeply consists in a sympathy with the structural constitution and connections of the *qualia* the beautiful thing is made of. In Husserl, the épochè makes also the qualia give their maximum.

To the critique of Husserl by Bachelard, it can be answered that the datum in Husserl is not an absolute, when Bacherlard's main reproach is that the 'given' as a starting point for phenomenological descriptions and analysis is an illusion of primitivity, of purity, of purified onticity. As a sense datum, the 'given' is not a starting point outside or after the épochè, but is submitted to the épochè as well. That means it contains a depth, which is to be investigated seeking for its eidetic kernel through various, more or less authentic, levels. There is no mythology of primitivism in Husserl, but a critical reflection *in* the phenomenological datum.

Husserl's consideration of datum is anti-dualistic. 'Don't we possess anything more in common than this idea, necessary but empty idea, of things that are objectively by themselves. Is there not in the appearences

79 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical investigations*, Prentice Hall, 1999, II, § 11.

themselves a content-of-sense, that we have to attribute to real nature?'[80]. This question does not mean that Husserl makes the sense data an absolute truth, but that inside the datum, in the depth of it, we can find a structure of 'motivation' which is connected to our categorial intentionality, whose structure guarantees objectivity of knowledge and intersubjectivity. It is one aspect of transcendental correlation. Appearances are not the truth, but are at the same time all the truth, in an altered, derived state.

One cannot say as usual that datum, if we follow Husserl, is or is not contingent: because datum is not a simple entity. Some authors claim that for both Husserl and Bachelard there must be a break between science and contingent perception, since Kant, on the contrary, falsely identified the object of science and the object of perception. In my view, the real question is to distinguish *in* the datum contingent moments and necessary moments, and to have a vision of how they are connected to each other and in which direction it works. If we look accurately, as I have tried to show in my book, we can see that Bachelard does not deny a certain phenomenality of noumena, what he calls 'phenomenality in second position'.[81] That signifies that scientific phenomenality, or the phenomena of phenomenotechnique, do bear a certain amount of significance by themselves. But it is for him a mere idea, no evidence nor elaboration are given. The chief discourse is: there is a break from science to initial phenomenality, or in other words, science constitutes another, heterogenous phenomenality. For Husserl, a true theory is able to re-constitute at least a part of phenomenality of the sensible object. From this analysis, Bachelard should be classified with Kant, as they both claim that science prescribes and pushes back natural perception. Moreover they both converge inevitably towards logical positivism in the sense of a neutralisation and disontologisation of sense data. If we seek to explain the reason for Bachelard's failure, we can say this: he did not succeed in explaining how to think the link between first and second phenomenality; he has taken the whole datum as a simple, contingent entity. Let us take as a mere hypothesis that Bachelard hesitated on the reality of this connection, because he wanted to preserve his agreement with the dualistic interpretation of the Copenhagen school on Quantum Mechanics, although he approved on the other hand of Einstein's mathematical realism.

80 Husserl, *Krisis*, § 9.
81 G. Bachelard, *Le rationalisme appliqué*, PUF, Paris, 1998, p. 137.

4. The very long ninth paragraph in *Krisis* (a little book in itself), 'The galilean mathematisation of nature', shows a view on what we can understand under the formula 'necessity and contingency of datum'. Husserl distinguishes two aspects in the datum of life-world: the formal, that is mathematisable through geometry, and the material, the hyletic contents of datum, for which is missing a 'mathematisation of the fulfilments'.[82] With Galileo an indirect mathematisation of hylè, was initiated, the strategy of which was to submit apparitions and contents of hyletic data to forms through necessary rules of connection. Husserl's term for this is 'Universal indication', or 'Universal inductivity',[83] But this evolution towards a conversion of the whole sphere of sensible datum into terms of necessity is not itself necessary: on the contrary, we must look towards the deepest necessities, in front of which the necessities of our present perception of life-world, especially our inscription of sensible matter and qualities in pre-existing geometric forms, appear to be mere habits or contingencies. What is usually looked at as necessity is now to be seen as contingency derived from deeper necessities, in the realm of which hyletic data are ontologically autonomous. The aim of phenomenological description is now to retrace the genesis of contingency in necessity through the misunderstanding and misleading nature of the most originary connections between hyletic datum and our subjectivity, connections which are the basic form of transcendental correlation: what Husserl calls *Motivationsanalysis*. It includes a philosophical stress on hylè against our natural stress on form in the sphere of datum, the hylè being infused by *a priori* regulations, not absolute regulations, but transcendental regulations in so far as they exist only through the *Leistung* of our subjectivity receiving-working on them (they are as we can say the objective or natural side of passive synthesis). Generally speaking, it is a matter of 'quantification of quality', which has been weakly challenged from time to time through attempts like Goethe's *Theory of Colours*[84]. Carnap, on the contrary, firmly sustains the reductibility of quality to quantity and the indirect geometrisation of nature. He objects to Goethe that there are two kinds of languages, one that indeed loses 'some qualities of the objects it describes', and other languages that 'seem to leave some qualities aside, but actually don't'.[85] For instance, a black and white photograph loses colours, but a musical score does not leave the definite sounds aside. The

82 Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 39.
83 Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 43, p 45.
84 Goethe, *Theory of Colours*, Cambridge, MIT press, 1970.

possibility of 'translation' is grounded on a 'general rule', which depends again on the concept of 'indication' or 'index' (*Kennzeichen*), as was already laid down by *Aufbau*[86]. But as we have seen, Carnap does not enter by phenomenological means into this 'characterization' term to term. Carnap uses in *Aufbau* indication as a solution, when Husserl finds it necessary to reassume and reinvestigate the whole notion of universal indication up to its ontological, hyletic roots. As Husserl says: 'tout mode de l'induction a le sens d'une induction de quelque chose d'intuitionnable "qui renvoie au" donné évident'.[87] Let us explain it this way: 'anticipations' (and especially science) beyond immediate datum are possible and legitimate, but are strictly conditioned by immanent *a priori* rules of the datum. Are there such necessary laws, deeper than mathematical laws of analytic geometry, in the qualitative hyletic sphere? If there are, then they contribute to the doctrine of truth. Indeed, says Husserl, the Galilean idea of quantification of quality is not an approach to eidetic necessities, but an 'infinite process of approximation'[88], with ever residual datum, and this in his view is a proof that geometrisation is not the right way to the stable and consistent reality, or that reality is not made of mathematical laws. It is better to understand the non-mathematicity (at least at the actual stage of mathematics) of the essence of reality, which is *not* to say irrationality. In a Platonic inspiration, Husserl considers the relativisation of mathematics not as an argument for irrationality, but as a step towards the revelation of ultimate rationality of the real, of what he calls the 'enigma of enigma: the deep essential connection between reason and ontical being'.[89] So there are intrinsic laws of datum for Husserl, the elucidation of which is an important piece of First philosophy as a standard of measure for Second philosophy, that is to say as an ontological source for the rectification of foundations and concepts of mathematics, for the calibration of the real ontological scope of modern sciences, for the signication of scientificity today.[90] Thus becomes visible the distance

85 Carnap, *Philosophical foundations of physics*, New York, Basic books, 1974, French edition pp. 111-113, p. 114.
86 *LSW*,, § 49, p. 82 ; § 57, pp. 121-131
87 Husserl, *Krisis*, § 91, p. 145
88 Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 49.
89 Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 19.
90 Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 54. The idea of rectification and progress of mathematics throughout the deepening of their meaning, as the core of scientificity, though formally derived from Plato, is expressed for the first time with enough light by Berkeley, to be attributed to him. See the *First Principles of Human Knowledge*.

between Husserl and Carnap, whose project of rectification is entirely based on powers of logical formalism. On the contrary, being devoted to the deviation of the essence of science, the ninth section of *Krisis* rejects two visions of datum: first an atomistic vision of datum, as pure neutral diversity susceptible of any necessary connection and so submitted to categories; second, a *Gestalt* theory that is true as a phenomenology of perceptual types, but that remains a contingent knowledge, because *Gestalt* does not dive into the hyletic dimensions which are the ontological background of types. Rectificate science, is for Husserl, to give eidetic poles and norms to scientific concepts, but eidetic poles are not only produced through formal ontology, but are also inspired by the pure description of hyletic compossibilities.

Pli 16 (2005), 209-229

Affect as the Space of the Political

Anthony Cascardi, *Consequences of Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).[1]

Catherine Chalier, *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas*, trans. Jane Marie Todd, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002).

KOSTAS KOUKOUZELIS

Affect is a notion, which, for a very long time, was absent from discussions in philosophy and the social sciences. A good reason for that seemed to be that most, if not all, of the time, it was taken to be identical with mere sense (self-interest, desire) – thus, the 'triumph' of contemporary 'commonsense' epistemologies, moralities and political theories. Nevertheless, part of the beginnings of our awakening from such a 'commonsensical' slumber is, I think, the fact that the increasing complexity of our information-driven liberal societies has obliged us to address again and again the phenomenally too outmoded question of the relation between nature and freedom – not that everybody thinks that *this* is *still* a question.

The books under review, namely A. Cascardi's *Consequences of Enlightenment* and C. Chalier's *What Ought I to Do?* contribute essentially to the re-emergence of this question in the most fruitful way. Both conceive of affect as being something of great importance and both appeal surprisingly back to Kant for that, either favourably or critically. Now, is it not strange that Kant has to reactivate our preoccupation with affect? And further, what might be the connection with the political, if

1 All references with page numbers in parentheses inserted inside the text are to this book.

any? My focus is mainly on Kant's Third *Critique*, the *Critique of Judgment*.

It is true that Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (*CJ*) has been proved one of the most difficult and challenging philosophical texts of the Enlightenment tradition. Its opacity, I would say, marked in the past and in a significant way still does, the very dichotomy between the analytic and the continental philosophical traditions. This dichotomy is broadly signified by what constitutes Kant's explicit problem in the *Critique* itself, namely the gap between nature and freedom or in other terms between the universal and the particular or objectivity and subjectivity. The analytic tradition neglected until recently challenges to the project of Enlightenment as an already finished enterprise. Scientistic and epistemological concerns offered only reductions of the whole project. On the other hand, the continental tradition, mainly through post-structuralism and postmodernism, built almost exclusively a body of politics upon its most difficult knots.

Cascardi's interesting book is an effort to rethink the project of Enlightenment as a still incomplete or, according to him, impossible to complete project. Coming from the latter tradition, Cascardi expresses dissatisfactions with both post-structuralism and postmodernism and their one-sided, historicist account of the Third *Critique*, namely the complete destruction of the universal. But, by opposing the analytic tradition's different kinds of reductionism, he sees in continental philosophy (something derived from the *CJ*) a highly neglected notion: *affect*, as being the form of a more complex, dynamically singular subject. Cascardi's problem then becomes one of normativity.[2] He develops Kantian arguments in reconstructing *CJ*'s effort to bridge the gulf. However, although his account seems right, in the end he does not succeed in fully disentangling the key problems and, most of all, does not complete the drawing of a more adequate picture of how to incorporate the singularity of *affect* into a theory of normativity in a broad sense. This is because:

6. when assessing Kant, he does not see that Kant has a fully inclusive term for the subject's complexity, namely *orientation*

2 Although Cascardi never formulates explicitly the problem as a problem of normativity (but see p. 172) it is a consequence of his concerns with the gap between freedom and nature, that makes it appear as pressing and thus central.

7. although he refers to action, Cascardi does not see that the problem is in the end a practical one
8. after locating a 'romantic' affective force within the subject, he escapes from answering how this can be shared, when it comes to the political.

In the first part of the essay I will pick up some key issues from Cascardi's account of Enlightenment and see first if aesthetic reflection goes deep enough. In the second part, I will consider whether his account of the Third *Critique* is complete giving also some hints for some alternative ways to deal with the *Critique*. In doing so, I will also try to situate the role of *affects* and *feelings* inside a richer conception of normativity. Chalier's book comes in the end as a paradigm of a possible direction of such an account. Levinas makes the effort to extend Kant's philosophy.

I.

Cascardi's critique has a twofold aspect: First comes the traditional philosophical question of the separation of the realms of knowledge, goodness and art as a consequence of the Enlightenment project (the separation of fields thesis). This alleged separation and the autonomization of the fields is a consequence of a particular path modernity has taken and in no way implies that it is a *necessary* characteristic of its definition. This entails a further point, which Cascardi acknowledges, that the project of Enlightenment is characterized by its *non-closure*, its on-going development and rethinking, which is *part* of its very definition. Thus *disenchantment*, one of the big problems that emerged from the extreme rationalization of society through the above separation of the fields thesis, is just a *pathology* of our failure to adapt to a way of thinking that is not static or fixed, while avoiding radical scepticism. The problem is situated exactly in the 'difficulty' (or the impossibility) of representing this connection of the true, the good and the beautiful.

What comes second is the post-structuralist and postmodernist reaction to this *disenchantment* that dissatisfies Cascardi. In many places in the book he seems to be very critical of the historicist or extreme sceptical solutions provided by thinkers representing this strand, such as Eagleton and Rorty. So, as he formulates it, one face of the central thesis of the

book is that 'the question of our relationship to the Enlightenment is better understood in terms of the difficulty of locating any position that would be categorically inside or outside the Enlightenment, inside or outside objectivity, inside or outside critical or systematic thought' (p. 5). The thesis aims to place his project in a position between postmodernism and Habermasian pragmatic rationality, a thesis that follows up the argument made in his earlier book *The Subject of Modernity* where he questioned the fixed, united modernist subject. What he wants to achieve, in this book, is a move from subjectivity towards the sources of normativity. At any rate, Cascardi commits himself to a reconstruction of modernity's argument. Kant is the paradigmatic thinker but he supports him with some of Wittgenstein's stimulating theses in his late philosophy. The outcome is very interesting indeed.

Here is the problem: aesthetic reflection is, for Cascardi, the privileged mode of reflection in relation to our constructive attitude towards nature and institutions. Although he is *not* crystal clear about Kant (for example he does not locate the aporias in the *CPR*'s schematism chapter), he finds in Kant's writings a struggling effort to find a solution to the problem of *judgment*. To be more specific, the problem Kant himself identifies is how to apply the categories of understanding to the mere appearances of the phenomenal world (*CPR*, A138/B177). In other words, it is not clear *how* to subsume intuitions under concepts. If concepts are already rules in order for us to structure intuitions, do they not need further rules according to which they can be applied? And do not these rules, in their turn, need further rules? Unless we find a solution the connection seems magical and, at any rate, an infinite regress threatens us. However, what Kant calls *schemata* are *not* meta-rules for the application of rules, but something more and different in nature. Cascardi is not clear about that. He even says that schemata are rules (p. 185). Nevertheless, he rightly aligns the *aporia* in Kant with the problem of rule-following in Wittgenstein's late philosophy.

At the end of chapter 6 he confronts the problem of the infinite regress of our interpretation of signs. This is a very interesting connection and a crucial point for unpacking what is at stake. In Wittgensteinian terms, the problem remains the same, i.e., of the infinite regress of interpretations in following a rule (the famous paradox of sec. 201 of the *Philosophical Investigations*): 'no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule...if

everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it'. Infinite interpretations of a sign, in that sense, may be seen as being compatible, but then if there is no way to stop the regress, there is also no way to get something wrong. The possibility of mistaken understanding is thrown out of the window. Wittgenstein is searching for a *ground*. In the end, he says: 'obeying a rule is a practice' [*PI*, sec. 150]. He then sees the solution to the riddle of judgment in *forms of life*, in *praxis*. Wittgenstein makes the rule-following public, in the sense of already presupposing a platform of shared beliefs or intentions. But this move presupposes too much.

Why then does aesthetic reflection dig deeper than Wittgenstein's *lebensformen*? This is a point Cascardi very usefully draws attention to. In exploring this, I want to consider the role of aesthetic-reflective judgment in Kant. As a member of the generic category of *hypotyposis* (*CJ*, sec. 59, *Ak.*, 5: 351) it is a judgment based on no concept, a judgment that functions as a vehicle not of ascribing meaning by the subsumption of the particular under the ready-made universal, but of the *estimation* of the whole of particulars (of their *purposiveness*) for exactly *producing* their unity. In section 76 of the *CJ* Kant says that were the faculty of judgment incapable of recognizing purposiveness with respect to particulars, it would be unable to make any determinate judgment about particulars. The aesthetic reflection contains something intransitive in its essence, in the sense of Wittgenstein's striking statement that 'when I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly' [*PI*, sec. 232].

In that sense following a rule is a practice; according to Wittgenstein (*PI*, sec. 202). But then *what* is a practice, and how *should* we take it? Where does Kant differentiate himself? Aesthetic reflection digs deeper in the sense of trying to thematize further not the reflective, but the self-reflective (performative-expressive) element. Wittgenstein's practices contain subjects that are already constituted. Then the ability to 'go on' with the application of rules within a practice, does not explain how we *learn* that; and this contains the possibility of exploitation and of violence. On the other hand, Kant's agents problematize exactly this aspect. Kant is searching for *constitutive* elements of the subject in a practice, i.e., the fundamental measure. He is trying to account for the *productive* role of art in that enterprise: '...the rule must be gathered from the performance' [*CJ*, sec. 47].

Nevertheless, both Kant and Wittgenstein resist *any* mechanistic explanation of a whole or a practice by disapproving, for example, the Hobbesian discussion of nature. This is their strength, and this distinguishes their philosophies from the *disenchanted* mainstream of either bald naturalism or rationalistic platonism. Cascardi sees that clearly, but is trapped within his anxiety to affirm the primacy of the *contingent*, the *ephemeral*. But neither *forms of life*, nor Kant's aesthetic judgment have a nihilistic touch of complete groundlessness (p. 240). Cascardi rightly refers to the very nature of the *intransitive* component of practices (p. 235). However, he does not acknowledge that what lies under reflective judgment in Kant is the rational feeling of *orientation*; the subject orients itself in a practice finding its direction aesthetically through a whole (note here affinities with the hermeneutical tradition). This constitutes an agent's *perspective* towards things; a perspective that is neither fully conceptual nor entirely non-conceptual, i.e., describes what might be *affect*'s nature.

Nevertheless, Cascardi mentions and discusses at length the notion of *sensus communis* as the Kantian basis for communication. It is there, I think, that we must search for the formulation of the best possible questions that do justice to Kant's project. Cascardi's targets are the inconclusiveness of the fact/value distinction, and the always disruptive role of *affects*. Do both of them constitute successful arguments for his thesis about the *radical* contingency of our practices? My view is that much more work has to be done in that direction, and in the end Cascardi's critique of post-structuralism and postmodernism is confronted with *no given alternative*, unless someone sees Kant's project in its entirety.

II.

To begin with we need to point towards Kant's task in the *Critique of Judgment*. Cascardi rightly thematizes something that is prematurely closed in much of the philosophical tradition, namely the fact/value distinction. After the experience of their extreme separation fact and value, or nature and freedom, have again been put together in the form of epistemology that talks about the language of factuals and counter-factuals unproblematically. It is true that Kant saw the 'is' / 'ought' distinction as

forming a unity that leaves behind the Humean objection that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Kant, of course, did not commit this fallacy. This is why the derivation of the moral law *in principle* is a distinct enterprise with no empirical admixtures. What is then the problem Cascardi sees? Kant famously acknowledges the 'difficulty' or obscurity of bridging the gap between freedom and nature he himself created in the Second and First *Critiques* respectively. It is there, I think, that Cascardi situates the inconclusiveness of the Enlightenment project.

The alleged *aporia* of judgment can be traced, apart from the *CPR*'s schematism, to the realm of action itself. There is again a problem of infinite regress of volition found at the heart of moral judgment, i.e., we always need a prior volition to support voluntary action.[3] The problem of causality cannot be solved by the exclusive reference to a *mechanistic* Hobbesian model, which collapses to metaphysics because it requires an external point of reference-cause; this is disenchantment *par excellence*. Kant is fully aware of that and Cascardi rightly points to one of the central questions posed in the published Introduction of the Third *Critique*, namely 'that people leave it undetermined whether the concept that gives the rule to the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom' (*CJ*, Intro, sec. I, *Ak.*, 5: 172). Cascardi rejects the cause-effect teleology of 'deep structure' theories and rightly attributes to Kant the irreducibility of *spontaneitat* (pp. 44-48). But then how does judgment really function if neither the naturalistic thesis (the causal one) nor the rationalistic one (conceptual all the way) is true?

This is the where we need more than what Cascardi offers. He does not discuss the problem of reflective judgment as contributing to a more complete picture of Kant's *moral* philosophy. He sees it as disrupting every effort towards a coherent situated moral and political judgment. This position has direct effects for his notion of politics and democracy and, in a sense, tragically imprisons him within the same post-marxist politics he successfully criticizes. He is, however, very much on the right track when he criticizes Eagleton's historicist interpretation of Kant's aesthetics because it tries to subsume aesthetics under universal categories such as class or ideology. This treatment not only fails to contribute anything to the argument but also loses *any* sight of the pressing problems Kant is struggling to solve. Also considered as Cascardi's success is his effort to

3 The problem is acknowledged in the 'Typik' of the *Critique of Practical Reason*; see also Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson of London, 1966, pp. 67ff.

resist the easy solution of the tension between the *universal* and the *particular*, i.e., that of taking the particularistic strand all the way and arriving at a conclusion that prohibits any kind of universalization. This is how I read his criticism of both Rorty's pragmatism and Laclau and Mouffe's radical politics. Let us say more on that in order to clarify in what way affect is relevant.

Rorty's famous ironist liberal pragmatist is *not* concerned with theory but only with practice. So, a consequence of this would be to adopt a general philosophical stance, namely the one that opts only for 'what it works'; there is *no* universal truth and that means, simply put, that contingency is all that matters. I find it difficult, and Cascardi has the same attitude, to account for a philosophy that is incapable, following this principle, to justify *why* we should even care about its truth (at least it has to admit that its position has *some* truth value). In any case, to deny the existence of every truth is at least itself *a* truth! On the other hand, Cascardi refers to Laclau and Mouffe's politics of antagonistic struggle for recognition. Unfortunately, their thesis is another misrepresentation of the particular/universal dichotomy. Laclau is fascinated with the existence of social movements such as feminism or other minority groups. But he sees their struggle only as making particularistic claims, claims about rights with *no* correspondence to any kind of universal. This approach, characteristic of those that doubt the existence and the perspective of universal human rights, commit the fallacy of bluntly equating universalism with capitalism and/or totalitarianism.

But when feminists demand *equal respect* they do not make a particularistic claim, i.e.m they do not refer to a recognition of a privately conceived subject, but to a universal claim of equal respect for *every* subject with differences. There are not exclusive 'capitalist' rights or 'male' rights. The particular always contains the universal. Universals exist, but the difficult problem remains that in order not for them to be *empty*, their instantiation has to be constructed; and there are various *ways* to do that. For example, human rights exist, but in a form that destroys their force, i.e., without any support from our affective nature. On the opposite our affective selves remain imprisoned within an *individualistic, narcissistically oriented* community of interests. Rights are simply *used* and are *not shared*. That is why obligation suffers from extinction when it is moral, and from excessive coercion when it is political. Constitutional democracies of our time are still trying hard to reconcile exactly this

opposition between constitutional principles and constitutional patriotism (their instantiation by popular sovereignty). Cascardi acknowledges this under the conflict between 'genesis' and 'normativity' (pp. 172-173).[4]

Returning to Kant himself, we have to stress that Kant was trying to answer the same question with the engagement with *sensus communis*. The question was *not* different in kind, i.e., the impossibility of universals. It was rather the Rousseauian one, I think, of how we can guarantee that sensuous and embodied creatures like us would strive for moral law in the long run. In other words, it is *not* enough we can come to *know* the morally 'ought' as long as we cannot (we do not have the capacities) or do not want (we are carried away from weaknesses) to pursue it, or think that rationality is a self-contained process. This is a striking problem, which, in many ways, manifests itself in Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the Enlightenment project, as believing itself to have side-stepped it. Cascardi allies himself with the Enlightenment project and sees both Kant's struggle and his own project as a continuation of it. It is, as mentioned above, the question of *affect*, or *affective scepticism* that always disrupts the project of connecting nature and freedom. This was the sting of Nietzschean criticism, but Cascardi shows that Kant has encompassed the problem. At the very end of the book, in the chapter called 'Feeling and/as Force' he makes the effort to substantiate his claim of the need to see more closely the *expressive* qualities of the will as non-reducible to the 'third person' point of view. This is both the strong and the weak point of Cascardi's overall effort. Although he unveils subjectivity as *affect*, a dynamic singularity, he does not provide the connection with normativity or with the 'separation of fields thesis'. In that sense he does not see that his problem is *practical*.

However, if the problem remains a problem of *judgment*, then Cascardi is right to see it as a problem of *sensus communis*. He does not, nevertheless, engage himself explicitly with the problem of the Deduction of the judgment of taste. It is there, that what Kant poses as a problem goes hand in hand with the formulation of the above. The object of beauty is not based in its characterization as such on any of its material or conceptual properties. So, if the object is red, big, hairy, good or abhorrent, this *does not* entail anything for the *mode of apprehension* in a subject. Beauty is a subjective feeling. A consequence of that is that there

4 Frank Michelman's constitutional theory thematizes this tension inside constitutional democracies.

is *no epistemological necessity* that all subjects have to respond in the same way in the apprehension of an object. It is of no necessity that I have to affirm that '*x* is beautiful'. This claim destroys every rationalistic argument. In a world with only facts or with perfect rationality judgments of taste would be either impossible or completely unnecessary. So, if it is *judgment* that is at stake here, its aporia is not that there is no universal, but the 'difficult' tension between the particular and the universal. Then, what comes as a solution is a feeling of *orientation* that suffers from problems of representation. Both the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime are responses to this inadequacy of reason.

Were everything discursive, i.e., strictly conceptual, then Habermasian communicative rationality would be an answer. But judgment is not the product of transcendental foundationalism, nor is agency an input/output machine of information in a communication process. *Sensus communis* is not, as Cascardi says *sensus communis logicus*, based exclusively on common understanding, but *sensus communis aestheticus*. Arendt knew that well in her *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Habermas and Arendt wanted a rational politics, but it is Habermas, who rests on exclusively representational political and moral judgments. On the contrary, Kant's notion of *orientation* in judgment has a *teleological* component, that Arendt sees, a component that can only be seen from the standpoint of the *spectator*, the standpoint of the sun as Kant says (*OQ*, 300, *Ak.*, 7: 83). It is an issue of distance and proximity that has an impact on *how* we form rationality itself, the very condition of determinant judgment. This is for Kant, as we said, a rational feeling that, because it does not allow speculative reason to be dogmatic, remains critical.

Orientation, I would argue, is a consequence of our aesthetic apprehension of wholes, such as universal history. Cascardi discusses well the relation to the representational problems that a judgment of a historical event, such as the Holocaust, poses for us. But in order to make the most out of it, we have to compare it with Žižek's formulation of the problem, namely that what lies underneath and defines the project of modernity is not the impossibility of synthesis or transcendence but rather the ineluctability of the very *desire for* transcendence (p. 206). This is a striking claim not about the strictly speaking *possibility*, but about *actualization* itself, and points to a complex subjectivity. This leads us smoothly, I think, to the antinomy of the Deduction of taste once again. It is here that we have to reconstruct the Kantian argument in order to

present it *not* as a problem of philosophical aesthetics and art, but as mainly a problem of *morality*. Many commentators have appealed to the moral content of aesthetic ideas in order to complete the *necessary subjective agreement* that is required as a duty among agents under suitable circumstances[5]. This agreement, because it is not reducible to either rational or empirical agreement but based on both realms, is *sensus communis* in the sense that it cannot be proved but created. It is the *basis* for both the epistemological subject and the moral agency in the sense that it is always presupposed and *yet* to be created.

It is, in other words, an agreement on the *presentation* [*Darstellung*] of morality and duty in the sensible world, a presentation, which always has a symbolic *form*, i.e., escapes representation. If the symbolic *forms* are reduced to mere empirical, sensuous representations, then the agreement is dangerously anthropological, the source of illusion. If the symbolic *forms* are reduced to the opposite moral concepts, namely completely immaterial platonic forms, then the agreement could only be rational, i.e., dangerously empty, a-temporal and a-historical. In artistic terms, the former would be identified with *l' art pour l' art* movement (aestheticism) and the latter would be a version of aesthetic moralism (kitsch). Symbolic, i.e., cultural forms, which have a surplus of meaning translatable into *affect* tend to deny exactly this reconciliation in our capitalist societies. History itself could be regarded as a continuous effort for this reconciliation and in that sense it is written by the failures of *what* becomes actual. Aesthetic critique is then the tragic effort to complete the never complete, ongoing project of Enlightenment through a never-ending reorientation of human beings towards the whole of world history. But how does this become practical?

If *duty*, in Kantian terminology, has a meaning it has always to be *actualized* in the subject as an efficacious cause, i.e., orientation. So, aesthetics is *not* just a matter of art or even moral psychology. The latter especially would entail that feelings are considered as just obstacles that have to be violently *fixed* into an immaterial pure reason. What, each time, founds normativity in Enlightenment thought are Wittgensteinian practices seen from the Kantian perspective of *sharing* something that is neither a thing, nor a concept, but an intransitive feeling of *orientation*. The word 'validity' Kant uses, although paradoxical because it is used for truth-

5 See especially the work of Salim Kemal, K. Rogerson and Anthony Saville.

value propositions, reveals a thicker notion of truth, namely, one close to Heidegger's non-propositional world-disclosure notion.

Cascardi, however, criticizes Arendt for losing sight of the 'radical indeterminacy' of aesthetic judgment. But he fails, as she does, to appreciate Kant's ethical thought which, attached to the Third *Critique*, is *not* just a version of conventional liberalism (p. 179). It is striking that perhaps where the book ends other people take it as a starting point, namely through thematizing the interaction between affect and action. Politics for Kant go hand in hand with his ethics and we can only make sense of this, if we see its crucial treatment of feeling in its paradigmatic field of aesthetics as presenting itself as moral feeling (*respect*, *Achtung*). Respect is not a precondition for acceptance of the moral law, but the subject's response to *acknowledging* it, identical with consciousness of one's duty, 'morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive' (*CPrR*, 201, *Ak.*, 5: 76). A lot of work is waiting to be done both in Kantian scholarship and political philosophy, which connects the *Critique of Judgment* with the *Metaphysics of Morals* and Kant's *Anthropology*. Kant saw moral progress as a revolution in our *mode of thought* [*Denkungsart*] and *orientation* is exactly a *modality*.

III.

Granted that affect is important, is Kant, consequently, susceptible to the nihilistic objection, as presented in the last chapter of Cascardi's book, the force of will? In my view he is, if we still consider Kant's ethics as the deliverance of the supersensible, ready-made, rigorous universal deontology of a pyramid of rules. This caricature of Kant is though a very unfortunate misunderstanding of his thought, a misunderstanding we have to get rid of as soon as possible. Desire, pleasure and belief play a crucial role but have been hugely misrepresented in causal theories of action. Cascardi makes an interesting but very short effort to articulate a theory of subjectivity based not on the beautiful, but the sublime as a strenuous affect (*animus strenuous*, *CJ*, sec. 29, *Ak.*, 5: 272 'General Comment'). Instead of repeating the old Marxist-Hegelian master and slave critique (p. 260) as represented in the sublime, we can mention very briefly a couple of points, which seem helpful for the work to be done in the future.

Kant sees that *moral motivation* is not constituted by the *thought* of duty alone, but needs our affective nature as an *ally*, rather than an enemy. Practical agency extends to the modification and cultivation of our inclinations. If someone takes exclusively the line of argument that gives priority to a version of the Categorical Imperative (CI) that relies on strict tests of universalizability, then it is certain that she will face the familiar criticism of empty or non-existent universality. CI always presupposes that we have some moral understanding of actions before we use its procedure. But Kant was careful enough to also state the Formula of Humanity as the ground for the imperfect duties to both moral perfection and the promotion of happiness in others (in the *Doctrine of Virtue* [*Tugendlehre*]). The subjective agency is a complex entity that is the *end*, not the beginning of our moral epistemology, and that becomes manifest in the indispensable empirical element in any derivation of duties: '[b]ut just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for applying those highest universal principles of a nature in general to objects of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object the particular *nature* of man, which is known only by experience, in order to *show* in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles (*MM*, 372, *Ak.*, 6: 217). Kant talks about a *tendency* in the human race, i.e., the collective subject of history, that marks our judgment of progress (*OQ*, 301, *Ak.*, 7: 84).

Humeans, and in a sense Nietzscheans, believe that reason is always the slave of the passions, that affect is a destabilizing force that does not fit well within the Kantian model of mind or morality. Affect is an intruder that disrupts the smooth exercise of *logos*. But this is not a necessary feature of affect. Kant's agent when he exercises the orientational reflective judgment acts according to moral requirements, not because he has to conform to them but because he *feels* he has to do it. When a father smiles benevolently when he is taking his children to the circus, and says that he does it because he loves them, what we admire in him is not the *rightness* of his action, but the *way* he acts, and the way he acts is the *form* he *constitutes* himself as an agent. There is another striking similarity. Acting from duty strangely enough is close to acting compassionately. A compassionate person does not act in order to be compassionate or to do the compassionate thing. His actions are expressions of his compassion. Similarly, Kant's moral person expresses

his respect for duty. So, emotions, after all, are not necessarily disruptive and Kant knows that very well.

What is politically significant is that *affect* is not simply the flux of stimuli coming from outside, but the structure of our sensibility that alone *responds* to normative requirements.[6] If we see normativity exclusively cognitively, i.e., conceptually, we do not only over-intellectualize our minds, but we miss every opportunity to give a plausible explanation of *how* we learn things, or what the process of *constitution* is all about. Then it is certain that we forever remain stuck in the 'separation of fields' thesis and into a politics that pretends to be rational, although it controls its citizens aesthetically. Media and 'societies of spectacles' point exactly to that fundamental aporia in Enlightenment's thought, which furthermore entails that the dominion of power today is exactly exercised where affect is important. Thus, Cascardi's argument is on target.

Nevertheless, he finds himself in a difficult position towards the very end of the book, when he assimilates truth with a Nietzschean 'intensity' in our attitudes. If the subject of modernity is indeed expressive or capricious, then its force as cause is *creation* and *becoming*. But then here comes the interesting question (pp. 188-189). Eternal change does not explain anything: neither the motives of the change, nor its non-contingency as a principle. But can transformation be both its own justification and its goal? Normativity would then just be impossible. By distinguishing his position from the Habermasian conception of normativity and acknowledging that 'myth' as 'affect' is always present, Cascardi makes room for something *more* in the aesthetic critique of modernity, i.e., the *modal* status of our ethical norms or, in other words, their *constitutive* aspect. Following that, what one needs to show further is that normativity is not only a matter of the principles we adopt, but also a matter of how close we are, as a community, in *sharing* these principles. This suggestion is, I think, the most promising path that this interesting book can take, as a part of a larger project. Cascardi is an example of a tendency to keep some distance from postmodern strands of thought and still not to be abandoned in some of modernity's naïve presuppositions; Kant is surely the place to start and *affect* is surely a highly misunderstood concept. This entails that there is a lot more to be said especially in the

6 For this point see especially the path-breaking work of Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

field of the philosophy of action or in Kantian terms, practical anthropology (culture).

IV.

Almost all of the above formulated questions apply equally to the context of Catherine Chalier's *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas.*[7] It is again, although posed in a quite different formulation, the problems of *affect* and *orientation*, which, according to Chalier, characterize the philosophies of both Kant and Levinas. This is true, although infrequently acknowledged. Levinas, following certain Kantian insights, tries as well to save normativity from an instrumental function and conceive a basis for obligation and responsibility that is not a product of a dry and abstract universalism. This is the sense of the characteristic distinction at the beginning of the book between a kind of universality through abstraction and a kind of universality through concrete singularity (p. 12). In a quite significant sense Levinas's ethical thought tries to give responses to all the above questions by extending and going beyond the Kantian heritage.

Accordingly, we are informed that both Kant and Levinas, because they show a certain mistrust towards theoretical knowledge, have developed a significant critique of intellectualism. As pointed above (Part I) this is true for both of them and this was exactly the central problem of the *Critique of Judgment.* This is also *the* key feature of Levinas's ethics and it is a misfortune that there was no alternative successful English translation of the original French title of the book: *Pour une morale au-dela du savoir: Kant et Levinas.* Leaving that aside, it is of great interest to see how Chalier understands the similarities of Levinas's ethics with Kant's moral philosophy.

What I shall make an effort to show is that, as much as the two philosophers attack the same kind of instrumentality of reason, Levinas makes the step that Kant never wanted to make for himself, albeit at the same time as unveiling Kant's richness. My discussion will be limited to drawing attention to the concept of *orientation* that characterizes both but, at the same time, distinguishes their philosophies in a profound way.

7 Hereinafter, references to this book will also be inserted together with pagination numbers inside the text.

Thus, for Levinas, it makes normativity (conceived as responsibility and obligation) a purely existential commitment towards the Other, which *affects* the constitution of subjectivity transposing the philosophical focus from autonomy to heteronomy and from the 'right' towards the 'good'. First I will describe how *orientation* as *affect* enters the Levinasian existentialism, and then say why for Kant this is an issue of the power of judgment – which, as opposed to Chalier's Levinas, opens up the space of the political.

Chalier provides at the beginning of the book (chapters 1 and 2) a good discussion of Kant's and Levinas's critique of intellectualism and strict cognitivism. The extreme 'rule-following' view of judgment is now rightly baptized as 'legality' (pp. 32-37). Mere 'legality' faces all the problems we mentioned above (Part I) as being pathologies of a rationality too much preoccupied with itself. To add a further characteristic, this is reflected in a contemporary democratic culture that tends to subordinate legal prosecution and litigation for political participation. 'Ethics' on the other hand, being a larger category, inclusive of but not reducible to legality, aims at concretizing the inevitable 'abstraction' of moral principles.[8] For Levinas, the thesis 'that the free person is pledged to his or her neighbour, and that no-one can save himself without others' (p. 77), epitomizes the fundamental existential ethical commitment.

This fundamental ethical commitment of responsibility and obligation is placed *before* subjectivity and gives an account of a different constitution of it. This was exactly our interpretation of Kant's 'difficulty' of judgment. Such an *orientational* commitment stands at the intersection, or the interval of concept and intuition, and provides, as we said, not meta-rules for the application of concepts, but something distinct and different in nature, i.e., certain *modalities* of solving the aporia of judgment. Levinas's ethics is an ethics that unveils such a modality, such an orientation: subjectivity is a product of a certain kind of election, an election coming from the immediate encounter with the unfathomable vulnerability of the Other - of its face, irreducible to conceptuality - which immediately and uncompromisingly puts it under obligation and responsibility.

8 It is not accidental that Levinas does not make the analytical distinction between 'morality' and 'ethics', the former indicating the public and the latter the private aspects of practical philosophy. This stems from a number of distinct Levinasian theses, most notably the critique of pure interiority (pp. 118ff) and the view that ethics is an optics [*TI*, p. 15].

Chalier seems to acknowledge this fundamental similarity with Kant although not with great consistency (for example, p. 121)[9]. This is perhaps because she takes Kant as never having broken with the Cartesian tradition. In any case, I take it that, practically speaking, orientation points exactly to certain modes of being and is revealed positively exactly in the Levinasian obligation and negatively in attitudes such as cynicism, hypocrisy and narcissism. This is not psychology for either Kant or Levinas, but it is not the place here to elaborate on that. It points rather towards our relation with whatever stands exterior to us (others and environment). It is this 'exteriority', which, for Levinas orients us, and in the case of the Other completely shatters our egoistic nature.

So far, so good; Levinasian orientation seems to satisfy, at least intuitively, what we are missing in our encounter with the problem of Enlightenment and provides us with a thicker conception of normativity. But it is the role of this 'exteriority' – for Levinas the realm of Infinity - which is a point of disagreement between the two philosophers, and it is exactly where affect becomes a different entry point. Responsibility and obligation for Levinas precedes the subject's freedom, because it is posited within that 'exteriority' from time immemorial, and calls into question the exercise of that freedom [AE, pp. 156-157]. Chalier and Levinas believe that 'exteriority' is what transforms the ego into a subject. To be a subject is to be in subjection [AE, pp. 147-148, TI, pp. 333-334]. But, where Kant sees this as a condition of autonomy, for Levinas and Chalier it becomes a mark of heteronomy.

Chalier devotes a whole chapter (chapter 4) in order to discuss this fundamental departure of Levinas from Kant's Copernican revolution in moral philosophy. To be sure, we have to stress the mutual agreement of the two philosophers that freedom and autonomy are *not* completely identical. Autonomy does not entail an unproblematic and immediate adoption of a rational moral principle. This would fall under our already acknowledged inadequacy of 'determinant' judgment. But this just puts more pressure on the complexity of the theory of judgment; it does not

9 But see Stuart Dalton, 'Subjectivity and Orientation in Levinas and Kant' in *Continental Philosophy Review*, Vol. 32, 1999, pp. 433-449 for a more detailed discussion of that point. For another, less balanced statement of this connection, see John Llewelyn, 'What is Orientation in Thinking? Facing the Facts in *Robinson Crusoe*' in M. New, R. Bernasconi, R. Cohen (eds.), *In Proximity: Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century*, Texas Tech University Press, 2001, pp. 69-90.

mean that we have to leave subjectivity in the 'immediacy' of its heteronomy, i.e., the non-conceptual encounter with the Other. Autonomy does not have to be either something fixed or something totally capricious. It does not have to be a digestive enterprise or some kind of autism as assumed by both Chalier and Levinas. However, in any case this *is* the problem of judgment.[10]

Kant is clear when he offers the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative and especially the so-called Formula of Humanity. What Levinas seeks is already present in Kant's urging to treat others not only as means but also always as ends-in-themselves. It is a misunderstanding to treat this formulation as being equivalent in function to the *formal* principle of the Categorical Imperative. The Formula of Humanity is a way of 'representing the principle of morality' that is 'subjectively rather than objectively practical' [*G*, 85, *Ak.*, 4:436] and that furthermore brings the moral law 'nearer to intuition' in order to 'secure acceptance' for it [*G*, 86, *Ak.*, 4:437]. Thus, Kant is fully aware that judgment has to bring together both the universality of principles and the particularity of everyday life and confrontation with other people. To be *affected* by the irreducible vulnerability of the Other, i.e., to be oriented towards an 'exteriority' (Infinity as Other), is neither conceptual all the way up, nor non-conceptual all the way down the subject, which means that there is no priority for either metaphysics or ontology. To support this I shall add a couple of brief points in relation to Kant's distinct discussion of orientation, that I did not mention earlier.

For Kant the non-conceptual, intransitive element in judgment comes from the way our *sense* is implicated in the external world. Sense does not only entail meaning, but also *direction* [*Gegend*]. This is described by Kant as a 'subjective feeling [*Gefuhl*]' [*WOT*, 8, *Ak.*, 8:134] of orientation towards the external world. Note that this feeling is not based on 'the objective data in the sky', but on a subjective *ground* of differentiation [*WOT*, 9, *Ak.*, 8:135]. This feeling can be described as the feeling of directing ourselves only according to our sense of the left and the right hand. The left/right hand distinction is both *internal* and *external* to subjectivity. Because, although it refers to the world, it 'displays no

10 To be fair, Levinas devotes a lot of space to the problem of judgment in *AE*, trying to bring *together* conceptuality [the said, *le dit*] and that, which escapes it [the saying, *le dire*]. Regarding that point, Chalier is brief in the book and what remains unclear is the degree of the abandonment of the 'ontological' (but see pp. 106-109 and ch. 5 passim).

perceptible difference as far as external intuition is concerned' [*WOT*, 8, *Ak.*, 8:134-135]. So, even for Kant, this conversation with 'exteriority', the external world, comes as a necessary supplement to instrumental rationality of the objective conceptual thinking and marks a *surplus* of non-cognitive meaning.

An existential commitment like the one that Levinas puts forward as a basis for morality has such a non-cognitive aspect and relates to sense as a *purposiveness* of the external world as a system. Now, for Kant, this is very important, but only gives a *modality of the realization of conceptual moral principles*, where I take it that for Levinas this *is* the whole point of morality. Levinas puts too high the stakes of subjectivity and our responsibility towards the Other. For example - and this is considered as being a classical objection - the insatiability of the notion of responsibility does not even allow him to appreciate the inescapable fate of conflicts between an obligation towards a friend and an obligation towards a stranger. This is something that Chalier does *not* discuss and it is an irony that, finally, in the book at hand, the title is *What ought I to do?*

Anyhow, Levinas's insistence on the importance of a non common-sense morality and the focus on the role of sensibility opened again a number of suppressed Kantian themes. Independently of the fact that both philosophers disagree in certain aspects of morality, Levinas, on his side, managed to show the complexity of Kantian philosophy. Of course, there are many important and interesting themes in Chalier's book that I have not touched here, particularly the way she tries to answer misunderstandings of Levinas's demanding morality. I shall end up with a remark on the *political* that shows why *affect* has to be one of its privileged instances.

Kant and Levinas share the idea that the most important normative statements cannot be deduced from knowledge (not the propositional statements of right/wrong), which further means that there is a *mode* of practical signification that does not depend just on ontology (p. 72). The examples we mentioned above about the meaning of acting *from* duty and about the father expressing his love for his daughter refer to exactly this thing. Is practical reasoning, in the form of 'rule-following', *by itself* all we need politics to provide, perhaps a common space (in the form of a court room) for arguments and counter-arguments? This is, by and large, a hugely a-political conception of politics much favoured by 'commonsense' epistemologies and moralities.

Anyhow, neither Levinas nor Kant believe in that sort of ready-made, pre-packed reconciliation. *Affect* comes now to remind us that *it is already the space of the political* (and not a part of a dark metaphysical story), granted that the big political games are played exactly where affect becomes of significance, namely information, media and consumption. It is rather the resistance and the negation of its importance that de-politicize, in an uncompromisingly profound way, our liberal democracies.

References

All references to Kant's works follow first the pagination of the English translations cited below and second the standard German edition of Kant's works, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter deGruyter & Co., 1900).

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. W. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Company, 1996, [*CPR*].

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Creed Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, [*CJ*].

Kant, Immanuel, 'What does it mean to orient oneself in Thinking?' in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, [*WOT*].

Kant, Immanuel, *Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by Mary J. Gregor, in the Cambridge Edition of the works of Im. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, [*MM*].

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by Mary J. Gregor, in the Cambridge Edition of the works of Im. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, [*CPrR*].

Kant, Immanuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by Mary J. Gregor, in the Cambridge Edition of the works of Im. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, [*G*].

Kant, Immanuel, 'An old question raised again: Is the human race constantly progressing?' translated by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in the Cambridge Edition of the works of Im. Kant, *Religion and Natural Theology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, [*OQ*].

Levinas, Emmanuel, *Autrement qu' être ou au-delà de l'essence*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974 [*AE*].

Levinas, Emmanuel, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'Exteriorité*, Kluwer Academic, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971 [*TI*].

Dalton, Stuart, 'Subjectivity and Orientation in Levinas and Kant' in *Continental Philosophy Review*, Vol. 32, 1999, pp. 433-449.

Herman, Barbara, *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Llewelyn, John, 'What is Orientation in Thinking? Facing the Facts in *Robinson Crusoe*' in M. New, R. Bernasconi, R. Cohen (eds.), *In Proximity: Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century*, Texas Tech University Press, 2001, pp. 69-90.

Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson of London, 1966.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edition, Blackwell, 2001 [*PI*].

Call for Papers

Pli invites submissions for the next volume (Volume 17) which will be concerned with the topic of Ultra-politics and political conflict.

How are we to account for the sense that, just at the point when everything becomes political, politics itself disappears? Slavoj Žižek has suggested the term 'Ultra-politics' (in *The Ticklish Subject*) to name that particular avoidance of the political which results from the very intensification of political conflict. Ultra-politics is the result of conflict which is always on its way to warfare.

If we take contemporary political thought as symptomatic of strong ultra-political tendencies, then we are forced to think through various philosophical problems regarding the logic and structure of sovereignty, domination, struggle and conflict. We would particularly welcome papers which address these issues and their impact in recent European thought, for example, in the work of such thinkers as Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou. In this context papers could address some of the following issues:

- How can we develop a concept of the political which, whilst resisting Carl Schmitt's ultra-politics, retains some of the advantages of his conception, e.g., that there is no specific realm of the political and that political struggle is indeed marked by intensity?

- In the late 1930s Martin Heidegger developed an analysis of 'machination' as the form of power informing contemporary political phenomena. Such phenomena as 'total war' are indicative of the dwindling distinction between war and peace in which both become indifferent manifestations of a prevailing totality. In doing so Heidegger anticipates the concerns of many post-war thinkers of 'totalitarianism' and frequently gives a more radical account of its source and prevalence. In assessing these analyses we are confronted with the issue of how this 'being-historical' thought comes to bear upon our understanding of political conflict.

- What are the consequences of the thought that a state of 'permanent exception' is not simply a contemporary political expediency but, as Giorgio Agamben analyses it, the very logic of sovereignty?

Submissions, preferably no longer than 8,000 words, should be sent in the form of a single hard copy, plus a copy on disk as an RTF file. The deadline for submissions is **31st August 2005**. Please refer to the 'Notes for Contributors' in this volume (also on the *Pli* website). Include an e-mail address if possible for future correspondence.

Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

For further information e-mail:

pli_journal@hotmail.com

Visit www.warwick.ac.uk/philosophy/pli_journal

Notes for Contributors

- Submissions should be sent to *Pli*, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK.
- They should be printed in double line spacing and be accompanied with a copy on disk in RICH TEXT FORMAT only. If possible, an e-mail address should be included for any further correspondence.
- Accepted submissions will be printed from the electronic copy supplied. Footnotes will be printed at the bottom of the page. Italics and other typographical features (such as accents and text in Greek) will be printed as they appear in the electronic copy (so do not underline items that will eventually appear in italics, such as titles of books, for example). All submissions should be supplied in and will be printed in Times New Roman font.
- Footnote references should conform to the style of the following examples:

  I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), hereafter *CPR*.
  G. Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986), p. 24.
  D. W. Conway, 'Genealogy and Critical Method', in R. Schacht, ed., *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 318-33, esp. p. 320.
  D. Sedley, 'Epicurus, On Nature Book 28', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 3 (1973), 5-83, p. 56.

In general, submissions should follow the guidelines outlined in the *MHRA Style Book*, 5th edition (London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1996).

Visit the *Pli* Website:

www.warwick.ac.uk/philosophy/pli_journal/

The recently upgraded *Pli* website now offers:

- Full contents listings from Volume 6 onwards.
- A complete index to volumes 6-10, also downloadable as a PDF file.
- Free downloadable PDF files for all contributions to past issues now out of print (where possible). Currently available volumes will be added as free PDF files when printed stocks become exhausted.
- Full details regarding how to buy *Pli*, including links to our new international distributor frontlist.com from whom customers (especially in North America) can buy *Pli* on-line using a secure server.